Presidential Image has become an integral part of the campaign, presidency and legacy of Modern American presidents. Across the 20th century to the age of Trump, presidential image has dominated media coverage and public consciousness, winning elections, gaining support for their leadership in office and shaping their reputation in history. Is the creation of the presidential image part of a carefully conceived public relations strategy or result of the president's critics and opponents? Can the way the media interpret a presidents' actions and words alter their image? And how much influence do cultural outputs contribute to the construction of a presidential image? Using ten presidential case studies. this edited collection features contributions from scholars and political journalists from the UK and America, to analyse aspects of Presidential Image that shaped their perceived effectiveness as America's leader, and to explore this complex, controversial, and continuous element of modern presidential politics.

This book is likely to rank as the standard source on the Hoover Presidency for years to come.

Choice Outstanding Title H. R. Haldeman, President Nixon's former chief of staff, is said to have boasted: "Every president needs a son of a bitch, and I'm Nixon's. I'm his buffer and I'm his bastard. I get done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of him." Richard Ellis explores the widely discussed but poorly understood phenomenon of presidential "lightning rods"--cabinet officials who "take the heat" instead of their bosses. Whether by intent or circumstance, these officials divert criticism and blame away from their presidents. The phenomenon is so common that it's assumed to be an essential item in every president's managerial toolbox. But, Ellis argues, such assumptions can oversimplify our understanding of this tool. Ellis advises against indiscriminate use of the lightning rod metaphor. Such labeling can hide as much as it reveals about presidential administration and policymaking at the cabinet level. The metaphor often misleads by suggesting strategic intent on the president's part while obscuring the calculations and objectives of presidential adversaries and the lightning rods themselves. Ellis also illuminates the opportunities and difficulties that various presidential posts--especially secretaries of state, chiefs of staff, and vice presidents--have offered for deflecting blame from our presidents. His study offers numerous detailed and instructive examples from the administrations of Truman (Dean Acheson); Eisenhower (Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Herbert Brownell, and Ezra Taft Benson); LBJ (Hubert Humphrey); Ford (Henry Kissinger); and Reagan (James Watt). These examples, Ellis suggests, should guide our understanding of the relationship between lightning rods and presidential leadership, policymaking, and ratings. Blame avoidance, he warns, does have its limitations and may even backfire at times. Nevertheless, President Clinton and his successors may need to rely on such tools. The presidency, Ellis points out, finds itself the object of increasingly intense partisan debate and microscopic scrutiny by a wary press. Lightning rods can deflect such heat and help the president test policies, gauge public opinion, and protect his political power and public image. Ellis's book is an essential primer for helping us understand this process.

The first full-length examination of presidential travel and its role in transforming the image and identity of the presidency from "first citizen" to political celebrity. Colorful anecdotes and acute analysis combine to provide a fresh look at the importance of travel in shaping the "imperial" presidency.

A thoroughly revised, updated, and newly illustrated version of the Gaddis Smith called "the best book on the totality of the Carter presidency." The new edition includes more on the former president's foreign and environmental policies and expands coverage of the "personal" Carter as well as his wife Rosalyn's activist role during his administration.

Reveals how Cold War U.S. presidents intervened in Latin America not, as the official argument stated, to protect economic interests or war off perceived national security threats, but rather as a way of responding to questions about strength and credibility both globally and at home.

Recalling Tocqueville's exhortation for the French to "look to America" for a better understanding of their own government, John Rohr returns the favor by revealing how much we can learn about American constitutionalism from a close study of French governance. The French and American republics both emerged from the same revolutionary era and share a common commitment to separation of powers, rule of law, and republicanism. Even so, the two constitutional traditions are quite different. France, after all, has replaced its constitution at least thirteen times since 1789, while the American constitution has endured essentially intact. Yet, as Rohr shows, French constitutionalism merits our careful attention. Focusing upon the founding of the French Fifth Republic and the drafting of its constitution, Rohr compares the nations' divergent approaches to executive, legislative, and judicial power; independent administrative authority and discretion; and the relation of administrative law to statutory law. His analysis of France's divided versus our unified executive, the two presidents' exceptional powers, and their influence on the legislative process provides particularly fresh insights into how the two constitutional traditions promote and inhibit the capacity for administrative action. Rohr shows that French administrative institutions are much more thoroughly developed than their American counterparts due to recurrent presidential and constitutional crises. Without such a strong public administration, daily life in France would likely be extremely unstable if not quite chaotic. The proper role of the French institutions, he suggests, is largely determined by their relationship to elected officials whereas their American counterparts are essentially shaped by the constitutional order. A model for future comparative work in constitutional law and public administration, Rohr's study should help us see that the constitutional path we've pursued wasn't the only possibility—and why we've chosen that route nevertheless. As such, it should have great appeal for students, teachers, and practitioners in U.S. and French law, politics, and public administration.

Harry Truman's administration began searching for an American response to the clash in Indochina between Frech colonialism and Vietminh communism in 1945. Thirty years and five administrations later, Gerald Ford and his aides tried unsuccessfully to solicit additional aid for South Vietnam from a reluctant Congress. For Truman, Ford, and every American leader in between, the dilemma in Vietnam hung ominously over the presidency. In Shadow on the White House, seven prominent historians examine how the leadership of six presidents and an issue that grew into a difficult and often unpopular war shaped each other. Focusing on the personalities, politics, priorities, and actions of the presidents as they confronted Vietnam, the authors consider the expansion of presidential power in foreign-policy formulation since World War II. In their analyses, they chronicle the history of executive leadership as it related to Vietnam, assess presidential prerogatives and motives on war and peace issues, and clarify the interconnection between the modern presidency and the nation's frustrating, tragic, and humiliating failure in Southeast Asia. Although other histories have been written about the Vietnam experience, this book is the first systematic and comparative survey on presidential leadership as it relates to the war issue. It is organized by presidential administrations, giving a detailed examination of each president's decisions and policies. Based on the most recently opened archival sources, the essays provide a framework on which to hang the kaleidoscopic events of the war. -- Amazon.com.

For years many citizens have complained that our national government is fettered by legions of inefficient, unaccountable, feather-nesting lawyers. These critics might be right about the numbers—there are nearly 40,000 lawyers employed by the federal government in every branch and at every level. But most of these professionals fulfill functions that are essential to or extremely valuable in running the machinery of government. In this volume, Cornell Clayton and eight other authorities on public law and legal agencies explore the role that politics play in this federal legal bureaucracy—especially within the executive branch. They provide insights into the historical development, present status, future trends, and interrelations among the offices of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, Special Prosecutor, White House Legal Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, and counsels in regulatory agencies like the EPA and the EEOC. All the essays highlight a common theme—the perpetual tensions and conflicts between executive-branch politics and the profession's principled independence. Readable and enlightening, these essays add much to our understanding of—and remove some of the tarnish from—this elite corps of legal experts. They should benefit anyone interested in the legal profession, presidential politics, administrative law, public policy, and bureaucratic politics in our nation's capital.