Recent events have vividly underscored the societal importance of science, yet the majority of the public are unaware that a large proportion of published scientific results are simply wrong. The Problem with Science is an exploration of the manifestations and causes of this scientific crisis, accompanied by a description of the very promising corrective initiatives largely developed over the past decade to stem the spate of irreproducible results that have come to characterize many of our sciences. More importantly, Dr. R. Barker Bausell has designed it to provide guidance to practicing and aspiring scientists regarding how (a) to change the way in which science has come to be both conducted and reported in order to avoid producing false positive, irreproducible results in their own work and (b) to change those institutional practices (primarily but not exclusively involving the traditional journal publishing process and the academic reward system) that have unwittingly contributed to the present crisis. There is a need for change in the scientific culture itself. A culture which prioritizes conducting research correctly in order to get things right rather than simply getting it published.

Recent events have vividly underscored the societal importance of science, yet the majority of the public are unaware that a large proportion of published scientific results are simply wrong. The Problem with Science is an exploration of the manifestations and causes of this scientific crisis, accompanied by a description of the very promising corrective initiatives largely developed over the past decade to stem the spate of irreproducible results that have come to characterize many of our sciences. More importantly, Dr. R. Barker Bausell has designed it to provide guidance to practicing and aspiring scientists regarding how (a) to change the way in which science has come to be both conducted and reported in order to avoid producing false positive, irreproducible results in their own work and (b) to change those institutional practices (primarily but not exclusively involving the traditional journal publishing process and the academic reward system) that have unwittingly contributed to the present crisis. There is a need for change in the scientific culture itself. A culture which prioritizes conducting research correctly in order to get things right rather than simply getting it published.

Science is continually confronted by new and difficult social and ethical problems. Some of these problems have arisen from the transformation of the academic science of the prewar period into the industrialized science of the present. Traditional theories of science are now widely recognized as obsolete. In Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (originally published in 1971), Jerome R. Ravetz analyzes the work of science as the creation and investigation of problems. He demonstrates the role of choice and value judgment, and the inevitability of error, in scientific research. Ravetz's new introductory essay is a masterful statement of how our understanding of science has evolved over the last two decades.

Robin Dunbar asks whether science really is unique to Western culture, even to humankind. He suggests that our "trouble with science" may lie in the fact that evolution has left our minds better able to cope with day-to-day social interaction than with the complexities of the external world.

The topic to which this book is devoted is reductionism, and not reduction. The difference in the adoption of these two denominations is not, contrary to what might appear at first sight, just a matter of preference between a more abstract (reductionism) or a more concrete (reduction) terminology for indicating the same sUbject matter. In fact, the difference is that between a philosophical doctrine (or, perhaps, simply a philosophical tenet or claim) and a scientific procedure. Of course, this does not mean that these two fields are separated; they are only distinct, and this already means that they are also likely to be interrelated. However it is useful to consider them separately, if at least to better understand how and why they are interconnected. Just to give a first example of difference, we can remark that a philosophical doctrine is something which makes a claim and, as such, invites controversy and should, in a way, be challenged. A scientific procedure, on the other hand, is something which concretely exists, and as such must be first of all described, interpreted, understood, defined precisely and analyzed critically; this work may well lead to uncovering limitations of this procedure, or of certain ways of conceiving or defining it, but it does not lead to really challenging it.

Shows how the problem of social order has shaped concept formation, theory, and normative argument in political science.

The unity of science has been a widely discussed issue both in the philosophy of science and within several sciences. Reductionism has often been seen as the means of bringing the different sciences to a fundamental unity by reference to some basic science, but it shows many limitations. Multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity have also been proposed as methodologies for attaining unity without underestimating the diversity of the sciences.This volume starts with a clarification of the possible meanings of this unity and then discusses the features of the mentioned approaches to unity, evaluating the success and the shortcomings of the unification programme among different sciences and within a single science.

Rationality of science was the topic of two conferences (held in 1988 and 1989) organized by the Department of Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University. Both conferences included a small group of invited speakers. This book contains a selection of papers presented there. It is intended mainly for specialists in the philosophy of science and scientists interested in philosophy. Students and especially postgraduate students would also benefit from reading it. The first conference, 'Popper, Polanyi and the Notion of Rationality', was held from 1 to 5 October 1988 in Janowice. The second conference, 'The Aim and Rationality of Science', was held in Cracow at the Jagiellonian Univer sity, from 4-10 June 1989. The topics of both conferences were inspired by our late friend Dr. Tomasz Kocowski, who many years earlier invited me and my colleagues from the Department to participate in research concerning the problem of creativity, and serve him and other psychologists as methodological advisors. Personal contacts with this intelligent and inquisitive man helped us to realize that we could not fulfill our task while adhering to the received view in the philoso phy of science. This experience helped us to see science not only as scientific knowledge but also as a process of research. We then turned our attention to Michael Polanyi, who seemed to provide the philosophy we were looking for.

‘Environmental Problem-Solving' presents short excerpts from carefully selected readings, expert commentaries on those readings, assignments, and the best MIT student responses to the assignments and exam questions with excellent student response. The book presents four main models of environmental policy-making: competing theories of environmental ethics; tools for environmental assessment and environmental decision-making; and techniques for public engagement and group decision-making. The book covers the material presented in the semester-long course required of all students enrolled in MIT’s Environmental Policy and Planning Specialization.