The majority of the world’s children live in countries where local governments are responsible for the provision of basic education services. Although subnational governments manage their own education systems, they often rely on transfers from the central government for funding. The main purpose of this study is to assess how these fiscal transfers affect public funding for education and how they ultimately affect student schooling and learning outcomes. Through a careful analysis of how fiscal transfers have affected education systems in different contexts, the investigation develops a set of principles to support improvements in the design and implementation of transfer systems with a specific focus on the provision of education services. The study is centered on seven country case studies that aim to answer a set of common research questions using a similar approach. Country case studies were conducted in Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Sudan, and Uganda. The analysis shows that fiscal transfer mechanisms can improve the adequacy of public education spending, reduce spending inequalities between regions, and improve spending efficiency. Moreover, the study highlights that carefully designed and implemented transfer systems can help raise overall education outcomes and reduce education inequality. This publication was funded by a grant from the Results in Education for All Children (REACH) trust fund at the World Bank. REACH is supported by the government of Germany through theFederal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the government of Norway through NORAD, and the government of the United States of America through the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Improving learning evidence and outcomes for those most in need in developing countries is at the heart of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal on Education (SDG4). This timely volume brings together contributions on current empirical research and analysis of emerging trends that focus on improving the quality of education through better policy and practice, particularly for those who need improved 'learning at the bottom of the pyramid' (LBOP). This volume brings together academic research experts, government officials and field-based practitioners. National and global experts present multiple broad thematic papers – ranging from the effects of migration and improving teaching to the potential of educational technologies, and better metrics for understanding and financing education. In addition, local experts, practitioners and policymakers describe their own work on LBOP issues being undertaken in Kenya, India, Mexico and Ivory Coast. The contributors argue persuasively that learning equity is a moral imperative, but also one that will have educational, economic and social impacts. They further outline how achieving SDG4 will take renewed and persistent effort by stakeholders to use better measurement tools to promote learning achievement among poor and marginalized children. This volume builds on the second international conference on Learning at the Bottom of the Pyramid (LBOP2).* It will be an indispensable resource for policymakers, researchers and government thinktanks, and local experts, as well as any readers interested in the implementation of learning equity across the globe. *The first volume Learning at the Bottom of the Pyramid (LBOP1), may be obtained at: http://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/learning-bottom-pyramid-4608

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a dominant feature of subnational finance in most countries. They are used to ensure that revenues roughly match the expenditure needs of various orders (levels) of subnational governments. They are also used to advance national, regional, and local area objectives, such as fairness and equity, and creating a common economic union. The structure of these transfers creates incentives for national, regional, and local governments that have a bearing on fiscal management, macroeconomic stability, distributional equity, allocative efficiency, and public services delivery. This paper reviews the conceptual, empirical, and practice literature to distill lessons of policy interest in designing the fiscal transfers to create the right incentives for prudent fiscal management and competitive and innovative service delivery. It provides practical guidance on the design of performance-oriented transfers that emphasize bottom-up, client-focused, and results-based government accountability. It cites examples of simple but innovative grant designs that can satisfy grantors' objectives while preserving local autonomy and creating an enabling environment for responsive, responsible, equitable, and accountable public governance. The paper further provides guidance on the design and practice of equalization transfers for regional fiscal equity as well as the institutional arrangements for implementation of such transfer mechanisms. It concludes with negative (practices to avoid) and positive (practices to emulate) lessons from international practices.

Intergovernmental Transfers in Federations presents a synthesis of international experience of large federations in the most recent times in addressing the most fundamental issue of horizontal and vertical imbalances in their countries through the prism of intergovernmental transfers. Contributors delve into the various aspects of policy making as well as policy choices in selecting an efficiency path for a meaningful fiscal devolution aimed at integrating performance and incentives to reach an expenditure mix that facilitates better service delivery.

The design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers has a strong bearing on efficiency and equity of public service provision and accountable local governance. This book provides a comprehensive one-stop window/source of materials to guide practitioners and scholars on design and worldwide practices in intergovernmental fiscal transfers and their implications for efficiency, and equity in public services provision as well as accountable governance.

'Decentralization in Client Countries' assesses the effectiveness of Bank support for decentralization between fiscal years 1990 and 2007 in 20 countries, seeking to inform the design and implementation of future support. Given the difficulties of measuring the results of decentralization, the evaluation uses intermediate outcome indicators- such as strengthened legal and regulatory frameworks for intergovernmental relations, improved administrative capacity, and increased accountability of subnational governments and functionaries to higher levels of government and to local citizens- to assess the results of Bank support in these 20 cases. To examine potential lessons at a sectoral level, the evaluation also assesses whether Bank support for decentralization improved intermediate outcomes for service delivery in the education sector in 6 of the 20 countries.

This book examines and analyzes issues related to public finance in subnational governments, along with a discussion of case studies on decentralization. Most of the analysis applies to all public goods and services provided by subnational governments, with some placed on the role of subnational governments in the management of environmental resources, notably water and waste Coverage includes optimal arrangements for sharing fiscal responsibilities among different levels of government, the potential impact of decentralization on the quality of public goods delivery, local governments’ expenditure and revenue choices, and the effect of decentralization on accountability, governance and policy outcomes. The scope of discussion extends to both public finance theory and applied policy debates. The first chapter, on trends in financing of public services, opens with an explanation of the how and why of government intervention in the economy, the nature and purposes of transfers between and among governments and trends in decentralization. Case studies examine the impact of decentralization in such areas as service delivery, water and sanitation, education and health, and on poverty and income inequality. Chapter 2 examines public budgets: governance structures, norms and organizational practices, building up understanding of budgets, budget cycles, fiscal revenues from fees and taxes, expenses, debt and political economy issues, rules mandating balanced budgets in government and more. Chapter 3 discusses issues of accountability and policy outcomes, offering important lessons from recent international experience, including ways to strengthen political, administrative and financial accountability. The concluding chapter recounts lessons from recent international experience and surveys implications for the nexus approach to management of environmental resources. The information, analysis and expert advice presented here is particularly relevant for developing and emerging countries, where well designed decentralization reforms have a higher potential to improve efficiency in the provision of public services, and to enhance the development of integrated and sustainable strategies for the use of water, soil and waste resources and applications that advance the nexus approach.

The main objective of this book is to restate the important theories and evidence from economic analysis concerning intergovernmental fiscal issues. More importantly, the second objective of the book is to identify gaps in knowledge, empirical uncertainties, and missing theoretical structures and then to establish a preliminary agenda for new research on this topic. The book is organized in two sections. The first covers the core body of intergovernmental fiscal relations, including optimal size for jurisdictions and assignment of public sector functions, the formulation and execution of tax policy in an intergovernmental setting, and the appropriate structure and use of intergovernmental transfers. In the second section, the core knowledge is applied to four major policy areas: education, welfare, fiscal interaction in urban areas, and economic development. In thinking about a new research agenda, the authors call for more current and authoritative estimates of fiscal incidence, including interjurisdictional spillovers, for more fundamental research about the federation process and effects of consolidation, for new evidence about the long run, general equilibrium effects of interjurisdictional competition, and for basic research about the choice process and establishment of intergovernmental fiscal institutions and policies by federal and subnational governments.

Ethiopia’s model for delivering basic services appears to be succeeding and to confirm that services improve when service providers are more accountable to citizens. As discussed in the World Development Report 2004, accountability for delivering basic services can take an indirect, long route, in which citizens influence service providers through government, or a more direct, short route between service providers and citizens. When the long, indirect route of accountability is ineffective, service delivery can suffer, especially among poor or marginalized citizens who find it challenging to express their views to policymakers. In Ethiopia, the indirect route of accountability works well precisely because of decentralization. Service providers are strictly accountable to local governments for producing results, but in turn, the local authorities are held accountable by the regional and federal governments. A degree of local competition for power and influence helps to induce local authorities and service provides to remain open to feedback from citizens and take responsibility for results. The direct route of accountability has been reinforced by measures to strengthen financial transparency and accountability (educating citizens on local budgets and publicly providing information on budgets and service delivery goals), social accountability (improving citizens’ opportunities to provide feedback directly to local administrators and service providers), and impartial procedures to redress grievances. Woreda-level (district) spending has been a very effective strategy for Ethiopia to attain its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Woreda health and education goes to pay for health extension workers (HEWs) and teachers. This study finds evidence that woreda-level spending in health and education is effective. Owing to the intervention of HEWs, the use of health services has increased, especially among the poorest quintiles. Finally, the effect of woreda-level spending on agricultural extension workers is associated with higher yields for major crops. Spending on agricultural extension workers increases the probability that farmers, regardless of the size of their plots, will use improved farming techniques. Education, health, and agriculture account for 97 percent of woreda spending. This is complemented by support for capacity building and citizen voice. Clearly, spending efficiency is improved through better capacity, more transparency, and greater accountability to citizens.

China is the most decentralized country in the world in terms of expenditures shares, with subnational governments responsible for 85 percent of government spending. Limited revenue autonomy and insufficient intergovernmental transfers have led to large unfunded mandates and a build-up of debt outside the budget. The government has recently announced an ambitious intergovernmental fiscal reform, which will increase the role of the central government. Comprehensive reform is needed to improve public service delivery, increase overall social spending levels and reduce regional disparities. Revenue reforms are also necessary to improve efficiency and reduce vulnerabilities from excessive subnational borrowing. These reforms are challenging, but are crucial so that the government can support China’s continued development and prosperity.