This book advances a constructive theological approach to the controversial issues of sharī'a, public law, and secularism in Christian-Muslim relations.

This book measures contemporary attitudes to the law - within and outside of the legal profession – to see how c17th century Englishmen defined the role of law in their society, to see what their expectations were of the law and how these expectations helped shape political debate – and ultimately determined political decisions – over the course of a very turbulent century.

The rule of law is frequently invoked in political debate, yet rarely defined with any precision. Some employ it as a synonym for democracy, others for the subordination of the legislature to a written constitution and its judicial guardians. It has been seen as obedience to the duly-recognised government, a form of governing through formal and general rule-like laws and the rule of principle. Given this diversity of view, it is perhaps unsurprising that certain scholars have regarded the concept as no more than a self-congratulatory rhetorical device. This collection of eighteen key essays from jurists, political theorists and public law political scientists, aims to explore the role law plays in the political system. The introduction evaluates their arguments. The first eleven essays identify the standard features associated with the rule of law. These are held to derive less from any characteristics of law per se than from a style of legislating and judging that gives equal consideration to all citizens. The next seven essays then explore how different ways of separating and dispersing power contribute to this democratic style of rule by forcing politicians and judges alike to treat people as equals and regard none as above the law.

Most scholars believe that the numerous similarities between the Covenant Code (Exodus 20:23-23:19) and Mesopotamian law collections, especially the Laws of Hammurabi, which date to around 1750 BCE, are due to oral tradition that extended from the second to the first millennium. This book offers a fundamentally new understanding of the Covenant Code, arguing that it depends directly and primarily upon the Laws of Hammurabi and that the use of this source text occurred during the Neo-Assyrian period, sometime between 740-640 BCE, when Mesopotamia exerted strong and continuous political and cultural influence over the kingdoms of Israel and Judah and a time when the Laws of Hammurabi were actively copied in Mesopotamia as a literary-canonical text. The study offers significant new evidence demonstrating that a model of literary dependence is the only viable explanation for the work. It further examines the compositional logic used in transforming the source text to produce the Covenant Code, thus providing a commentary to the biblical composition from the new theoretical perspective. This analysis shows that the Covenant Code is primarily a creative academic work rather than a repository of laws practiced by Israelites or Judeans over the course of their history. The Covenant Code, too, is an ideological work, which transformed a paradigmatic and prestigious legal text of Israel's and Judah's imperial overlords into a statement symbolically countering foreign hegemony. The study goes further to study the relationship of the Covenant Code to the narrative of the book of Exodus and explores how this may relate to the development of the Pentateuch as a whole.

This volume compares the different conceptions of the rule of law that have developed in different legal cultures. It describes the social purposes and practical applications of the rule of law and how it might be improved in the varied circumstances.

This is the first English commentary on Josephus’ Against Apion, his apologetic treatise which rebuts Egyptian and Hellenistic slurs on the Judean people. Accompanied by a new translation, the commentary provides full analysis of the historical, literary, and rhetorical features of the treatise, and analyses its engagement with the cultural politics of the ancient world.

We cannot see the world as it is because we face it in a 'contaminated' vein. That is, our conceptual scheme and biological constitution condition our world view. The legal normative world we are dealing with has some special features, like the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason and the primacy of the internal point of view over the external point of view. Although it is not a feature of all legal traditions, 'legal dogmatics' is a privileged way of knowing legal normative object, that is, our legal orders. But we are not undertaking - as legal scholars - an empiricist enterprise because, among other reasons, we are not interested in the reality 'in itself' but in the 'relevant' reality, at least for us. In this respect, we do not only depend on theories (like physicists) but also on legal authoritative sources, that is, power and legitimacy. Legal scholars (and other participants in the legal life) are not neutral observers of their own world, trying to discover some hidden truth. They are committed experts trying to describe, justify and improve the legal order.

""What shall we do?"" was the question people asked John the Baptist as they came to be baptized. Others asked this question of Jesus during his ministry in Galilee, and of Peter on the Day of Pentecost. After two thousand years, even many confirmed Christians remain confused. May a Christian work on the Sabbath? Is the Sabbath Saturday or Sunday? Must we eat Kosher? Paul said that Christ fulfilled the Law, so what are the rules for today? Must Christians still follow the Ten Commandments, or have all the commandments been abolished in favor of ""love""? If there is no Law, is anything still a sin? What are we required to do, or forbidden to do, and how much can we get away with, and still be saved? The New Testament, especially in the practical teachings of the Apostle Paul, contains adequate answers to many of these questions and provides principles for making Godly decisions even on debatable matters never dreamt of two thousand years ago.