Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces The mighty Soviet Army is no more. The feckless Russian Army that stumbled into Chechnya is no more. Today's Russian Army is modern, better manned, better equipped and designed for maneuver combat under nuclear-threatened conditions. This is your source for the tactics, equipment, force structure and theoretical underpinnings of a major Eurasian power. Here's what the experts are saying: "A superb baseline study for understanding how and why the modern Russian Army functions as it does. Essential for specialist and generalist alike." -Colonel (Ret) David M. Glantz, foremost Western author on the Soviet Union in World War II and Editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. "Congratulations to Les Grau and Chuck Bartles on filling a gap which has yawned steadily wider since the end of the USSR. Their book addresses evolving Russian views on war, including the blurring of its nature and levels, and the consequent Russian approaches to the Ground Forces' force structuring, manning, equipping, and tactics. Confidence is conferred on the validity of their arguments and conclusions by copious footnoting, mostly from an impressive array of primary sources. It is this firm grounding in Russian military writings, coupled with the authors' understanding of war and the Russian way of thinking about it, that imparts such an authoritative tone to this impressive work." -Charles Dick, former Director of the Combat Studies Research Centre, Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, author of the 1991 British Army Field Manual, Volume 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art and author of From Victory to Stalemate The Western Front, Summer 1944 and From Defeat to Victory, The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. "Dr. Lester Grau's and Chuck Bartles' professional research on the Russian Armed Forces is widely read throughout the world and especially in Russia. Russia's Armed Forces have changed much since the large-scale reforms of 2008, which brought the Russian Army to the level of the world's other leading armies. The speed of reform combined with limited information about their core mechanisms represented a difficult challenge to the authors. They have done a great job and created a book which could be called an encyclopedia of the modern armed forces of Russia. They used their wisdom and talents to explore vital elements of the Russian military machine: the system of recruitment and training, structure of units of different levels, methods and tactics in defense and offence and even such little-known fields as the Arctic forces and the latest Russian combat robotics." -Dr. Vadim Kozyulin, Professor of Military Science and Project Director, Project on Asian Security, Emerging Technologies and Global Security Project PIR Center, Moscow. "Probably the best book on the Russian Armed Forces published in North America during the past ten years. A must read for all analysts and professionals following Russian affairs. A reliable account of the strong and weak aspects of the Russian Army. Provides the first look on what the Russian Ministry of Defense learned from best Western practices and then applied them on Russian soil." -Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) and member of the Public Council of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Author of Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, Russia's New Army, and The Tanks of August.

In this first comprehensive treatment of the subject, Richard Harrison shows how this theory emerged and developed to become - despite radically different political settings and levels of technology - essential to the Red Army's victory over Germany in World War II.".

PRINTED IN COLOR - The Russian Way of War - Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces Published by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G2's Foreign Military Studies Office in 2016, this book picks up where the FM 100-2 series left off and discusses Russian military structure, capabilities, and future development. Includes July 2019 BONUS materials on the following: *1K17 Szhatie (1К17 Сжатие) Russian "Stiletto" Laser Tank *Combat Laser System (Peresvet) Russian Laser Cannon *T-14 Armata Main Battle Tank *T-15 Heavy Infantry Combat Vehicle *Kurganets-25 Light Tracked Armored Vehicle *2S35 Koalitsiya-SV 152-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer *VPK-7829 Bumerang Modular Infantry Wheeled Fighting Vehicle Why buy a book you can download for free? We print the paperback book so you don't have to. First you gotta find a good clean (legible) copy and make sure it's the latest version (not always easy). Some documents found on the web are missing some pages or the image quality is so poor, they are difficult to read. If you find a good copy, you could print it using a network printer you share with 100 other people (typically its either out of paper or toner). If it's just a 10-page document, no problem, but if it's 250-pages, you will need to punch 3 holes in all those pages and put it in a 3-ring binder. Takes at least an hour. It's much more cost-effective to just order the bound paperback from Amazon.com This book includes original commentary which is copyright material. Note that government documents are in the public domain. We print these paperbacks as a service so you don't have to. The books are compact, tightly-bound paperback, full-size (8 1⁄2 by 11 inches), with large text and glossy covers. 4th Watch Publishing Co. is a SDVOSB. https://usgovpub.com

"Russia has recently carried out substantial reforms to its military forces, increasing capability in several key areas. Russia's military has improved to the extent that it is now a reliable instrument of national power that can be used in a limited context to achieve vital national interests. Russian strategists, concerned about the capability of an advanced military adversary to carry out a large-scale conventional aerospace campaign against the Russian heartland, focus on preserving Russian influence in buffer states along its borders and on reinforcing a series of defensive bulwarks. Russian operations will show a high degree of coordination across a wide range of military units, using deception and simultaneity to achieve objectives quickly and minimize periods of vulnerability to an adversary's most dangerous capabilities. Russian tactics will continue to heavily emphasize gaining and maintaining fire superiority over an adversary; leveraging improved ISR capabilities and a wide range of fires platforms; and using speed, surprise, and integrated combined arms in maneuver forces to disrupt and overwhelm enemies once encountered"--RAND website.

In Crimea, Donbass, Aleppo, and over the English Channel, Russia is using its still-modernizing military to (re)gain territory, secure geopolitical access and influence, convey geopolitical strength domestically and internationally, and test the political resolve of others. While the Russians pose a real military threat to the United States and many European countries, the U.S. Army should ensure it prepares against Russian -and not Soviet - forces. This paper builds on tactical and operational analyses of how Russians approach war against a competing power to outline strategic implications for the U.S. Army. The paper concludes that understanding how Russians approach war, while keeping Russian successes and problems in context, will allow U.S. leaders to pursue military and political policies that maintain respect for this resurgent Russian power without overestimating Russia's military capabilities.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1. Russia Can and Will Prosecute a Different Type of Warfare than the United States * 2. Russia's Military Believes Nuclear War Could Be a Reality * 3. Russia's Post-2008 Military Modernization is Real, but it was Undertaken and Appears More Dramatic for a Host of Reasons * 4. Alternative Arguments * 5. Recommendations for the U.S. Army With Respect to Competing Powers * 6. ConclusionTo be able to deter, and defeat if needed, the Russian military, the U.S. Army must understand how Russians approach warfare - including how they man, train, equip, and organize their military - in addition to the Armed Forces' ongoing combat operations. Recent publications provide excellent tactical and operational analyses of the Russian military, including the Foreign Military Studies Office's (FMSO) 2017 report on The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (hereafter, RWW). In particular, RWW identifies important details on the Armed Forces' composition, structure, way of fighting, and modernization plans, stemming in part from Russia's real and perceived threats. The RWW also describes major reforms Russia began two months after it invaded Georgia in 2008.

The present study constitutes one of the first attempts to establish the extent to which Russian military thought became westernized by the end of the eighteenth century. The task is an important one in light of Soviet and Russian scholarship that maintains that Russia developed a unique, different, and, some argue, superior way of war to the West. This work argues that Russian military thought was greatly influenced by the 'military enlightenment' of Europe, and that the ideas proposed by Russia's foremost military theoreticians were not as novel as previously claimed. Therefore, the final intellectual product was more a continuation of, rather than a break with, Western practices and traditions of warfare. In this respect, the underlying theme of this thesis clashes with traditional Russian national military historical scholarship. The second major theme of this study is to challenge the pervasive but flawed and often simplified interpretation of the Russian army and its soldiers as undisciplined and uneducated barbarians. Contrary to these misleading views, the writings of Russian theorists bring to light the concerns about discipline and education for the officers, personal hygiene and hospital care for the soldiers and Russian awareness of complex strategic theoretical issues. The humanitarianism and sophistication of early-modern Russian military thought thus becomes abundantly clear. The scope of this work is inescapably restrictive, and the period that it examines, roughly from 1757 to 1800, has been consciously chosen to reflect the ideas of Russia's two most important and influential military statesmen: Peter Rumyantsev and Alexander Suvorov.

"This book analyses the categories of thought underpinning Russia's strategic decision-making and military operations, unpacking their nature, development, and interaction. The work argues that mainstream Western analysis of Russian military and strategic behaviour is affected by two limitations: first, by forcing Russian choices into pre-packaged logics of action, it fails to grasp the peculiar assumptions and intellectual nuances underpinning Moscow's strategies; second, an overreliance on buzzwords such as 'hybridity' has mystified understanding of the Russian military modus operandi, its true character and strong consistencies. The book addresses such limitations by stressing the influence of strategic culture on Russia's approach to strategy and war-fighting. After proposing an original model of strategic culture, it employs this conceptual framework to interrogate Russian primary sources and military practices between 2008 and 2018. This allows general hypotheses to be formulated about the ultimate principles underpinning the Russian way of war, which are then tested against three case studies: Russia's interventions in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-15), and Syria (2015-18), respectively. While steering clear of making forecasts, this book provides a solid basis on which to build expectations about and to chart strategies for counter-acting Moscow's actions - including in the context of the current war in Ukraine. This book will be of much interest to students of Russian security, military and strategic studies, foreign policy and International Relations in general"--

From a globally renowned expert on Russian military strategy and national security, The Russian Way of Deterrence investigates Russia's approach to coercion (both deterrence and compellence), comparing and contrasting it with the Western conceptualization of this strategy. Strategic deterrence, or what Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky calls deterrence à la Russe, is one of the main tools of Russian statecraft. Adamsky deftly describes the genealogy of the Russian approach to coercion and highlights the cultural, ideational, and historical factors that have shaped it in the nuclear, conventional, and informational domains. Drawing on extensive research on Russian strategic culture, Adamsky highlights several empirical and theoretical peculiarities of the Russian coercion strategy, including how this strategy relates to the war in Ukraine. Exploring the evolution of strategic deterrence, along with its sources and prospective avenues of development, Adamsky provides a comprehensive intellectual history that makes it possible to understand the deep mechanics of this Russian stratagem, the current and prospective patterns of the Kremlin's coercive conduct, and the implications for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

This book analyses the categories of thought underpinning Russia’s strategic decision-making and military operations, unpacking their nature, development, and interaction. The work argues that mainstream Western analysis of Russian military and strategic behaviour is affected by two limitations: first, by forcing Russian choices into pre-packaged logics of action, it fails to grasp the peculiar assumptions and intellectual nuances underpinning Moscow’s strategies; second, an overreliance on buzzwords such as ‘hybridity’ has mystified understanding of the Russian military modus operandi, its true character and strong consistencies. The book addresses such limitations by stressing the influence of strategic culture on Russia’s approach to strategy and war-fighting. After proposing an original model of strategic culture, it employs this conceptual framework to interrogate Russian primary sources and military practices between 2008 and 2018. This allows general hypotheses to be formulated about the ultimate principles underpinning the Russian way of war, which are then tested against three case studies: Russia’s interventions in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Syria (2015–2018), respectively. While steering clear of making forecasts, this book provides a solid basis on which to build expectations about and to chart strategies for counter-acting Moscow’s actions— including in the context of the current war in Ukraine. This book will be of much interest to students of Russian security, military and strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.