This book explores the relationship between Hegel’s dialectics and formal logic. It examines the concept of dialectics, its meaning, and its use in contemporary thought. The volume opens the “old” debate about the formalization of Hegel’s dialectics and is motivated by the idea that asking about the connection between Hegel’s dialectics and formal logic is still relevant, for various reasons: Firstly, a new Hegel is circulating nowadays in the philosophical literature, with specific reference to Hegel’s dialectical logic and its relation to the history and philosophy of logic. Secondly, new research about the connection between contradictory logical systems and Hegel's dialectics is also being developed. Finally, there have been recent confirmations that the concept of dialectics is of general interest, and that the usual perplexities about the Hegelian triadic and fairly mechanic device of ‘yes, not, and not not’ are in remission. The chapters feature philosophically and historically motivated presentations of formal features of Hegel’s dialectics, critical considerations about the very idea of ‘formalizing dialectics’ and presentations of past attempts to formalize Hegel’s dialectics. The Formalization of Dialectics will be a key resource for scholars and researchers of the history and philosophy of logic and Hegel’s dialectics. It will also be of interest to anyone who wants to know more about the concept of dialectics, its meaning and its use in contemporary thought. This book was originally published as a special issue of History and Philosophy of Logic.

he present book and its companion volume The Tensed Theory of Time: a T Critical Examination are an attempt to adjudicate what one recent discussant has called "the most fundamental question in the philosophy of time," namely, "whether a static or a dynamic conception ofthe world is correct. "] I had originally intended to treat this question in the space of a single volume; but the study swelled into two. I found that an adequate appraisal of these two competing theories of time requires a wide-ranging discussion of issues in metaphysics, philosophy of language, phenomenology, philosophy of science, philosophy of space and time, and even philosophy of religion, and that this simply could not be done in one volume. If these volumes succeed in making a contribution to the debate, it will be precisely because of the synoptic nature of the discussion therein. Too often the question of the nature of time has been prematurely answered by some philosopher or physicist simply because he is largely ignorant of relevant discussions outside his chosen field of expertise. In these two complementary but independent volumes I have attempted to appraise what I take to be the most important arguments drawn from a variety of fields for and against each theory of time.

This seminal project aims to fundamentally change the way we think about semantics, from the combined perspectives of the mind, nature, society and culture, with enormous implications for the human future and what the author originally called its 'post-human' fate.

This provocative new book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as "How is it that an object can survive change?" and "How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed?" To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a completely new theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing physical entities are what the author calls "hunks," four dimensional objects extending across time and space. This is a major new contribution to ontological debate and will be essential reading for all philosophers concerned with metaphysics.

This volume brings together many of Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes: Newcomb's problem, the Monty Hall problem, the two-envelope paradox, the sorites paradox, and the Sleeping Beauty problem. Newcomb's problem arises because the ordinary concept of practical rationality constitutively includes normative standards that can sometimes come into direct conflict with one another. The Monty Hall problem reveals that sometimes the higher-order fact of one's having reliably received pertinent new first-order information constitutes stronger pertinent new information than does the new first-order information itself. The two-envelope paradox reveals that epistemic-probability contexts are weakly hyper-intensional; that therefore, non-zero epistemic probabilities sometimes accrue to epistemic possibilities that are not metaphysical possibilities; that therefore, the available acts in a given decision problem sometimes can simultaneously possess several different kinds of non-standard expected utility that rank the acts incompatibly. The sorites paradox reveals that a certain kind of logical incoherence is inherent to vagueness, and that therefore, ontological vagueness is impossible. The Sleeping Beauty problem reveals that some questions of probability are properly answered using a generalized variant of standard conditionalization that is applicable to essentially indexical self-locational possibilities, and deploys "preliminary" probabilities of such possibilities that are not prior probabilities. The volume also includes three new essays: one on Newcomb's problem, one on the Sleeping Beauty problem, and an essay on epistemic probability that articulates and motivates a number of novel claims about epistemic probability that Horgan has come to espouse in the course of his writings on paradoxes. A common theme unifying these essays is that philosophically interesting paradoxes typically resist either easy solutions or solutions that are formally/mathematically highly technical. Another unifying theme is that such paradoxes often have deep-sometimes disturbing-philosophical morals.

The present volume of the Handbook of the History of Logic brings together two of the most important developments in 20th century non-classical logic. These are many-valuedness and non-monotonicity. On the one approach, in deference to vagueness, temporal or quantum indeterminacy or reference-failure, sentences that are classically non-bivalent are allowed as inputs and outputs to consequence relations. Many-valued, dialetheic, fuzzy and quantum logics are, among other things, principled attempts to regulate the flow-through of sentences that are neither true nor false. On the second, or non-monotonic, approach, constraints are placed on inputs (and sometimes on outputs) of a classical consequence relation, with a view to producing a notion of consequence that serves in a more realistic way the requirements of real-life inference. Many-valued logics produce an interesting problem. Non-bivalent inputs produce classically valid consequence statements, for any choice of outputs. A major task of many-valued logics of all stripes is to fashion an appropriately non-classical relation of consequence.The chief preoccupation of non-monotonic (and default) logicians is how to constrain inputs and outputs of the consequence relation. In what is called "left non-monotonicity, it is forbidden to add new sentences to the inputs of true consequence-statements. The restriction takes notice of the fact that new information will sometimes override an antecedently (and reasonably) derived consequence. In what is called "right non-monotonicity, limitations are imposed on outputs of the consequence relation. Most notably, perhaps, is the requirement that the rule of or-introduction not be given free sway on outputs. Also prominent is the effort of paraconsistent logicians, both preservationist and dialetheic, to limit the outputs of inconsistent inputs, which in classical contexts are wholly unconstrained.In some instances, our two themes coincide. Dialetheic logics are a case in point. Dialetheic logics allow certain selected sentences to have, as a third truth value, the classical values of truth and falsity together. So such logics also admit classically inconsistent inputs. A central task is to construct a right non-monotonic consequence relation that allows for these many-valued, and inconsistent, inputs.The Many Valued and Non-Monotonic Turn in Logic is an indispensable research tool for anyone interested in the development of logic, including researchers, graduate and senior undergraduate students in logic, history of logic, mathematics, history of mathematics, computer science, AI, linguistics, cognitive science, argumentation theory, and the history of ideas. - Detailed and comprehensive chapters covering the entire range of modal logic. - Contains the latest scholarly discoveries and interprative insights that answers many questions in the field of logic.

This book summarizes the works and new research results presented at the First International Symposium on Intelligent Interactive Multimedia Systems and Services (KES-IIMSS 2008), organized by the University of Piraeus and its Depa- ment of Informatics in conjunction with KES International (Piraeus, Greece, July 9–11, 2008). The aim of the symposium was to provide an internationally respected forum for scientific research into the technologies and applications of intelligent int- active multimedia systems and services. Besides the Preface, the book contains sixty four (64) chapters. The first four (4) chapters in the book are printed versions of the keynote addresses of the invited speakers of KES-IIMSS 2008. Besides the invited speaker chapters, the book contains fifteen (15) chapters on recent Advances in Multimedia Data Analysis, eleven (11) chapters on Reasoning Approaches, nine (9) chapters on Infrastructure of Intelligent Interactive Multimedia Systems and Services, fourteen (14) chapters on Multimedia Applications, and eleven (11) chapters on Quality of Interactive Multimedia Services.

The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language is a collection of twenty new essays in a cutting-edge and wide-ranging field. Surveys central issues in contemporary philosophy of language while examining foundational topics Provides pedagogical tools such as abstracts and suggestions for further readings Topics addressed include the nature of meaning, speech acts and pragmatics, figurative language, and naturalistic theories of reference

Discover the world's greatest thinkers and their groundbreaking notions! Too often, textbooks turn the noteworthy theories, principles, and figures of philosophy into tedious discourse that even Plato would reject. Philosophy 101 cuts out the boring details and exhausting philosophical methodology, and instead, gives you a lesson in philosophy that keeps you engaged as you explore the fascinating history of human thought and inquisition. From Aristotle and Heidegger to free will and metaphysics, Philosophy 101 is packed with hundreds of entertaining philosophical tidbits, illustrations, and thought puzzles that you won't be able to find anywhere else. So whether you're looking to unravel the mysteries of existentialism, or just want to find out what made Voltaire tick, Philosophy 101 has all the answers--even the ones you didn't know you were looking for.

Offers a systematic introduction and discussion of all the main solutions to the sorites paradox and its areas of influence.