This book combines lessons and insights from financial theory with qualitative evidence, showing how the Georgians actually behaved and explaining why a bubble could occur without a gambling mania being to blame.

In late September 1720 the South Sea bubble burst. The collapse of the South Sea Company's share price caused the first great British stock market crash, the repercussions of which were felt far beyond the City of London. Patrick Walsh's book traces for the first time the impact of the rise and fall of the South Sea bubble on the peripheries of the British state. Its primary focus is on Ireland, but Irish developments are placed within a comparative context, with special attention paid to Scotland. Drawing on an impressive array of evidence, including bank ledgers, private correspondence, pamphlets, newspapers, and contemporary literary sources, this book examines not only investment in London but also the impact of the bubble on the fate of non-metropolitan projects in the 'South Sea Year', notably the failed project for an Irish national bank. Central to the book is the lived experience of the bubble and the wider financial revolution. The stories of individual investors - their strategies, speculations, aspirations, gains, losses and misunderstandings - are employed to create a new, more personal narrative of the momentous events of 1720, showing how they impacted on the lives of the inhabitants of early eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland. Patrick Walsh is Irish Research Council CARA Postdoctoral Fellow at University College Dublin. He is the author of The Making of the Irish Protestant Ascendancy: The Life of William Conolly, 1662-1729 (Boydell Press, 2010).

Seminar paper from the year 2022 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 1,3, University of Münster, language: English, abstract: This paper analyses how far the events of 1720 actually constituted a bubble. While there is an ongoing discussion of what a "bubble" actually is, this study will sidestep much of the formal discussion and focus more on presenting stylised facts that any theory would need to be able to explain. Consequently, this paper will follow Quinn and Turner (2020) in defining a "bubble" as having two parts: a period of sharply increasing prices followed by a period of sharply decreasing prices. This definition has the advantage of not hinging on the cause of the bubble itself but focusing on the actual price developments (more on that later). While these price increases may carry the innuendo of not being justified by “fundamentals”, the definition does not explicitly require this. From the first international collapse of financial markets in the early 18th century to the more recent Great Financial Crisis, financial bubbles have been the source of massive economic gains as well as losses and bear an unrivalled potential to disrupt real economic activity. Consequently, they are often controversially discussed – both in the general public, as well as in academic literature. With every new supposed bubble episode, comparisons to past crises are drawn. While much of their original context got lost to the history books, a sense of awe regarding the madness that the participants seem to have suffered from remains. Even after 300 years, the events surrounding the South Sea Bubble of 1720 are still part of a controversial debate about the very nature of financial markets and the investors participating in them. As pointed out by Paul (2011), the South Sea Bubble "has become a byword for folly and fraud" and a landmark in the economic history of Europe. A company that survived for over one and a half centuries is today mostly remembered for what happened to it in less than a year. As one of the most famous crashes in history, its name is often invoked in debates of more recent bubbles – often with little understanding of the actual events.

Publishes general papers and a section on English politeness: conduct, social rank and moral virtue.

This paper presents a case study of a well-informed investor in the South Sea bubble. We argue that Hoare's Bank, a fledgling West End London banker, knew that a bubble was in progress and that it invested knowingly in the bubble; it was profitable to ride the bubble. Using a unique dataset on daily trades, we show that this sophisticated investor was not constrained by institutional factors such as restrictions on short sales or agency problems. Instead, this study demonstrates that predictable investor sentiment can prevent attacks on a bubble; rational investors may only attack when some coordinating event promotes joint action. Keywords: Bubbles, Crashes, Synchronization Risk, Predictability, Investor Sentiment, South Sea Bubble, Market Timing, Limits to Arbitrage, Efficient Market, Hypothesis. JEL Classifications: G14, G12, N23.