Witnessing Stalin's Justice brings together contemporary American reactions to the Moscow show trials and analyses them to understand their impact on US-Soviet relations. Held between 1936 and 1938, the show trials made false charges such as espionage, sabotage and counter-revolutionary plotting at the behest of the exiled Leon Trotsky to condemn the veteran Party leaders who had founded the Communist Party and led the Russian Revolution. Using eyewitness accounts by American diplomats and foreign correspondents for the American press as well as official US government sources, this book highlights the wildly different reactions seen from liberals, radicals, intellectuals and mainstream media. Evans and Welch show how fractures of opinion ran through every level of US society and divided political groups, especially between the American Communist party and other left-wing organisations. Covering the closed trials of the Soviet military, the Soviet anti-foreigner campaign and the Dewey Commission as well as the show trials themselves, Witnessing Stalin's Justice uncovers and brings together American reactions to the Soviet Union's Great Purge.

This is the third in a series of volumes detailing the history of Soviet foreign policy from the Great Depression to the Great Patriotic War. It covers Soviet policy in the Far East from the Japanese rejection of a non-aggression pact in January 1933 to the conclusion of a neutrality pact in April 1941. During the course of that period the Soviet Union moved from being the vulnerable and isolated suitor to a position of negotiation from strength.

Hitler’s path to war consisted of two different stages that paralleled the internal development of Germany. From 1933 to the end of 1936, he created a diplomatic revolution in Europe. From a barely accepted equal, Germany became the dominant power on the continent. With the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the stalemate in the Spanish Civil War, the forming of the Axis, and the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the first phase was completed. In the second phase, the diplomatic initiative in the world belonged to Germany and its partners. Germany’s march toward war therefore became the central issue in world diplomacy.

This volume charts how the national strategic needs of the United States of America and Great Britain created a "parallel but not joint" relationship towards the Far East as the crisis in that region evolved from 1933-39. In short, it is a look at the relationship shared between the two nations with respect to accommodating one another on certain strategic and diplomatic issues so that they could become more confident of one another in any potential showdowns with Japan.

What effect did personality and circumstance have on US foreign policy during World War II? This incisive account of US envoys residing in the major belligerent countries – Japan, Germany, Italy, China, France, Great Britain, USSR – highlights the fascinating role played by such diplomats as Joseph Grew, William Dodd, William Bullitt, Joseph Kennedy and W. Averell Harriman. Between Hitler's 1933 ascent to power and the 1945 bombing of Nagasaki, US ambassadors sculpted formal policy – occasionally deliberately, other times inadvertently – giving shape and meaning not always intended by Franklin D. Roosevelt or predicted by his principal advisors. From appeasement to the Holocaust and the onset of the Cold War, David Mayers examines the complicated interaction between policy, as conceived in Washington, and implementation on the ground in Europe and Asia. By so doing, he also sheds needed light on the fragility, ambiguities and enduring urgency of diplomacy and its crucial function in international politics.

One of a select group of American foreign service officers to receive specialized training on the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s, George Frost Kennan eventually became the American government's chief expert on Soviet affairs during the height of the Cold War. Drawing upon a wealth of original research, David Mayers' fascinating life of George Kennan examines his high-level participation in foreign policy-making and interprets his political and philosophical development within a historical framework. Mayers presents an engaging and lucid account of Kennan's training; his rise to prominence during the late 1940s and his policy failures; and his later roles as critic of America's external policy, advocate of détente with the Soviet Union, and proponent of nuclear arms limitation. Mayers also explores Kennan's complicated relationships with such important political figures and analysts as Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Walter Lippmann.