This study addresses the issue of violence as it pertains to the Muslim Brotherhood and, more specifically, the Brotherhood’s so-called Special Apparatus. Despite the Brotherhood’s claim to be nothing but a religious and social advocacy movement, the formation of the Special Apparatus under the supervision of the Brotherhood’s First Guide has been seen as evidence of the Group’s institutionalization of violence as a means of ensuring achievement of its goal of coming to power and establishing the “Islamic State” and, beyond this, offering what the Brotherhood’s founder Hasan al-Banna referred to as “the exemplary model for the world.” The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has provided the intellectual foundations for a variety of contemporary Islamist groups from Al Qaeda to ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which have drawn on such ideas in their justification of violence and terrorism throughout the world. This ongoing appeal to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has guaranteed the continuity of the Special Apparatus despite the blows it received from government security forces in the nineteen fifties and sixties. The Brotherhood’s declared dissolution of the Special Apparatus and termination of its activities aside, the Group remains favorably disposed to the possession and use of force. From its point of view, the Muslim Brotherhood possesses a credibility and purity that set it apart from all other entities such that if it were to decide to use force, it would most certainly be in response to an urgent need. Depending on internal and external variables, the activity of the Special Apparatus currently takes a variety of forms, be they relevant to politics, intelligence-gathering, or public relations. Such activity also includes what is termed "defensive violence," represented by the unrest, vandalism of infrastructure and targeting of police forces that came in the wake of the late President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster.

This study addresses the issue of violence as it pertains to the Muslim Brotherhood and, more specifically, the Brotherhood’s so-called Special Apparatus. Despite the Brotherhood’s claim to be nothing but a religious and social advocacy movement, the formation of the Special Apparatus under the supervision of the Brotherhood’s First Guide has been seen as evidence of the Group’s institutionalization of violence as a means of ensuring achievement of its goal of coming to power and establishing the “Islamic State” and, beyond this, offering what the Brotherhood’s founder Hasan al-Banna referred to as “the exemplary model for the world.” The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has provided the intellectual foundations for a variety of contemporary Islamist groups from Al Qaeda to ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which have drawn on such ideas in their justification of violence and terrorism throughout the world. This ongoing appeal to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has guaranteed the continuity of the Special Apparatus despite the blows it received from government security forces in the nineteen fifties and sixties. The Brotherhood’s declared dissolution of the Special Apparatus and termination of its activities aside, the Group remains favorably disposed to the possession and use of force. From its point of view, the Muslim Brotherhood possesses a credibility and purity that set it apart from all other entities such that if it were to decide to use force, it would most certainly be in response to an urgent need. Depending on internal and external variables, the activity of the Special Apparatus currently takes a variety of forms, be they relevant to politics, intelligence-gathering, or public relations. Such activity also includes what is termed "defensive violence," represented by the unrest, vandalism of infrastructure and targeting of police forces that came in the wake of the late President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster.

The organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, with its institutional and administrative structures, is of exceptional importance to the leaders of the Group. On the one hand it represents the main tool for translating the Group's principles and ideas into practice on the ground, whilst on the other it serves to implement its political project to assume power and achieve empowerment within society. Ever since its inception, the Group has been intent on linking its organizational structure to its ideological character on the basis that maintaining the cohesion and continuity of its structure would require a belief in the Group's ideology and the values it champions. It has also been keen to secure a pivotal role for the Supreme Guide (Murshid) in the construction of its organization and movement, though the nature of that role has differed from one Supreme Guide to another, subject to his charisma, leadership qualities and ability to influence Group members. The Group has relied on organizational units such as offices, committees and departments to boost its penetration of society, and accorded special priority to social causes, which in turn has furnished it with a social backing to be employed in support of its political agenda, as was the case with the 2012 legislative and presidential elections in Egypt. Although the Muslim Brotherhood exploited the 25 January uprising in 2011 to assume power, it failed in the test of governance, and it became evident that its organizational and administrative structure could not furnish the expertise, cadres and leaders required to enable it to exercise power on the ground. This ultimately led to the 30 June uprising against it in 2013 and the subsequent developments and repercussions that weakened the Group’s organizational and administrative structure, which has subsequently stagnated, blighted by fragmentation and division.