In this volume, we examine the challenges and opportunities created by global migration at the start of the 21st century. Our focus extends beyond economic impact to questions of international law, human rights, and social and political incorporation. We examine immigrant outcomes and policy questions at the global, national, and local levels. Our primary purpose is to connect ethical, legal, and social science scholarship from a variety of disciplines in order to raise questions and generate new insights regarding patterns of migration and the design of useful policy.While the book incorporates studies of the evolution of immigration law globally and over the very long term, as well as considerations of the magnitude and determinants of immigrant flows at the global level, it places particular emphasis on the growth of immigration to the United States in the 1990s and early 2000s and provides new insights on the complex relationships between federal and state politics and regulation, popular misconceptions about the economic and social impacts of immigration, and the status of 'undocumented' immigrants.

This book looks at the history of the US Air Force through the lens of its (lack of) preparedness for major wars, which is shown to be a result of its organizational culture. The U.S. Air Force is probably the most powerful military force in history, both in its destructive firepower and in its ability to project it globally. Yet, despite its unparalleled power, the Air Force entered its first three pivotal conflicts – World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War – unprepared. But surprisingly, it was remarkably well prepared for its fourth major war: the Gulf War of 1991. Could there be an underlying trait or characteristic, which influenced the Air Force between the wars, that historically caused the US Air Force to be unprepared for war or prepared for the wrong type of war? Surprisingly, there is such a factor which was quite prominent in the Air Force’s complex identity – its organizational culture. Besides providing a historical description of the Air Force, this book demonstrates clearly how its organizational culture evolved and how it caused the US Air Force to be prepared for the wrong war. It also shows that when the organizational culture changed, the Air Force changed its focus and arrived prepared for the following war: the 1991 Gulf War. This book will be of interest to students of air power, strategic studies, US public policy, and security studies in general.

"The fielding of automated flight controls and weapons systems in fighter aircraft from 1950 to 1980 challenged the significance ascribed to several of the pilots' historical skillsets, such as superb hand-eye coordination--required for aggressive stick-and-rudder maneuvering--and perfect eyesight and crack marksmanship--required for long-range visual detection and destruction of the enemy. Highly automated systems would, proponents argued, simplify the pilot's tasks while increasing his lethality in the air, thereby opening fighter aviation to broader segments of the population. However, these new systems often required new, unique skills, which the pilots struggled to identify and develop. Moreover, the challenges that accompanied these technologies were not restricted to individual fighter cockpits, but rather extended across the pilots' tactical formations, altering the social norms that had governed the fighter pilot profession since its establishment. In the end, the skills that made a fighter pilot great in 1980 bore little resemblance to those of even thirty years prior, despite the precepts embedded within the "myth of the fighter pilot." As such, this history illuminates the rich interaction between human and machine that often accompanies automation in the workplace. It is broadly applicable to other enterprises confronting increased automation, from remotely piloted aviation to Google cars. It should appeal to those interested in the history of technology and automation, as well as the general population of military aviation enthusiasts."--Provided by publisher.

In The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning, one of our most distinguished military historians argued that the conflict on the Korean peninsula in the middle of the twentieth century was first and foremost a war between Koreans that began in 1948. In the second volume of a monumental trilogy, Allan R. Millett now shifts his focus to the twelve-month period from North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, through the end of June 1951-the most active phase of the internationalized "Korean War." Moving deftly between the battlefield and the halls of power, Millett weaves together military operations and tactics without losing sight of Cold War geopolitics, strategy, and civil-military relations. Filled with new insights on the conflict, his book is the first to give combined arms its due, looking at the contributions and challenges of integrating naval and air power with the ground forces of United Nations Command and showing the importance of Korean support services. He also provides the most complete, and sympathetic, account of the role of South Korea's armed forces, drawing heavily on ROK and Korea Military Advisory Group sources. Millett integrates non-American perspectives into the narrative—especially those of Mao Zedong, Chinese military commander Peng Dehuai, Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung, and Syngman Rhee. And he portrays Walton Walker and Matthew Ridgway as the heroes of Korea, both of whom had a more profound understanding of the situation than Douglas MacArthur, whose greatest flaw was not his politics but his strategic and operational incompetence. Researched in South Korean, Chinese, and Soviet as well as American and UN sources, Millett has exploited previously ignored or neglected oral history collections-including interviews with American and South Korean officers—and has made extensive use of reports based on interrogations of North Korean and Chinese POWs. The end result is masterful work that provides both a gripping narrative and a greater understanding of this key conflict in international and American history.

This sweeping reference work covers every aspect of the Cold War, from its ignition in the ashes of World War II, through the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis, to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Cold War superpower face-off between the Soviet Union and the United States dominated international affairs in the second half of the 20th century and still reverberates around the world today. This comprehensive and insightful multivolume set provides authoritative entries on all aspects of this world-changing event, including wars, new military technologies, diplomatic initiatives, espionage activities, important individuals and organizations, economic developments, societal and cultural events, and more. This expansive coverage provides readers with the necessary context to understand the many facets of this complex conflict. The work begins with a preface and introduction and then offers illuminating introductory essays on the origins and course of the Cold War, which are followed by some 1,500 entries on key individuals, wars, battles, weapons systems, diplomacy, politics, economics, and art and culture. Each entry has cross-references and a list of books for further reading. The text includes more than 100 key primary source documents, a detailed chronology, a glossary, and a selective bibliography. Numerous illustrations and maps are inset throughout to provide additional context to the material.

This book combines short military biographies and operational analyses to reveal how the personalities, attitudes, and life experiences of twelve outstanding U.S. airmen shaped the central air campaigns in American history. These case studies illuminate the character of these airmen, the challenges they confronted in widely disparate armed conflicts, and the solutions that they crafted and implemented. Their achievements proved decisive not only in the campaigns they led, but also in shaping the U.S. Air Force and the dominant role of airpower in modern warfare.

In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War, the official history offices of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and their respective historical associations collaborated to sponsor as comprehensive a symposium as possible, including as participants some of the coalition partners who contributed forces and weapons to the war. The intent of this symposium, titled Coalition Air Warfare during the Korean War, 1950 -1953, was to focus not only on the contributions made by the armed forces of the United States, but also on those of America's allies. The diverse group of panelists and speakers included not only scholars with subject matter expertise, but also veteran soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had served in that conflict. It was hoped that the melding of these diverse perspectives would provide interesting, if sometimes conflicting, views about the Korean War. The symposium organizers designated an agenda of six specific panels for investigation, including Planning and Operations; Air Superiority, Air Support of Ground Forces; Air Interdiction and Bombardment, Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence, and Logistical Support of Air Operations. Each session began with commentary by the panel chairman, which was followed by formal papers, and in some instances included a lively question and answer session. The papers and most of the proceedings found their way into print and are recorded here in an effort to permanently capture the activities, challenges, contributions, and heroics of the coalition air forces and the airmen who fought during the Korean conflict.

This part of the book reviews the state of American airpower biography and autobiography. I have set certain parameters to define the boundaries of my discussion. I discuss biographies and autobiographies, anthologies, and oral histories of military officers who served in senior positions. Thus, although the stories of great aviators like Eddie Rickenbacker, Charles Lindbergh, and Chuck Yeager are important, those men did not command large forces either in combat or in peace; they had only a temporary effect on the development of strategy and doctrine. Similarly excluded are civilian political leaders and industrialists like Stuart Symington and Donald Douglas, even though they played key roles In their own spheres. What follows are the stories, some published, some not of America's greatest military airmen-some told by themselves, others by biographers. The order of presentation is roughly chronological, according to the time during which these men served. The fact that a surprising number of air luminaries do not appear here means that much work remains to be done.