"In his new book, Walker offers a radical reassessment of the German realist novel in the nineteenth century. Especially in the English- speaking world, German narrative realism has persistently been interpreted as the literary expression of an ideology of the aesthetic. The German realist novel is alleged to reflect philosophical idealism: to reject the prose of modern society in favour of the poetry of the inner aesthetic life. This book challenges that received view. Walker argues that German narrative realism should be read not only in relation to, but in crucial respects against, the dominant philosophical idiom of nineteenth century Germany. German narrative realism often functions as a critique of the idea and ideology of inwardness in nineteenth century German culture. To understand this, the author argues, we must reread German realist novels above all as narratives, not as the supposed reflection of philosophical categories. The core of the book is therefore the close reading of eight of the best known realist novels in German by Keller, Raabe and Fontane. This reading shows how the German realist novel, far from transposing the assumptions of aesthetic idealism into narrative form, exposes the real consequences of those assumptions in the culture and society of its time. John Walker is Head of the School of Languages, Linguistics and Culture at Birkbeck, University of London."

Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the proper methodology for addressing them, and wonder whether either question is worth pursuing. In so doing, they carry on a long and esteemed tradition - for our two questions are among the oldest of philosophical issues, and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy and original answers to debates which have been the focus of a tremendous amount of interest in the last three decades both within philosophy and the culture at large.

Defending a realism about truth, Fumerton (philosophy, U. of Iowa) argues that the most plausible version of realism is the correspondence theory of truth, and that only by including in one's ontology the critical relation of correspondence between truth bearers and truth makers can one avoid an implausible metaphysics of possibilia in a realist analysis of falsehood. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

In this book distinguished theorist and author Shelby D. Hunt analyzes the major controversies in the "philosophy debates" raging throughout the field of marketing. Using an historical approach, Hunt argues against relativism and for scientific realism as a philosophy for guiding marketing research and theory. He also shows how the pursuit of truth and objectivity in marketing research are both possible and desirable. Specific controversies analyzed in the book include: Does positivism dominate marketing research? Does positivism imply quantitive methods? Is relativism an appropriate foundation for marketing research? Does relativism imply pluralism, tolerance, and openness? Should marketing pursue the goal of objective research? An ideal companion to Hunt's classic text, Foundations of Marketing Theory, this volume will be equally useful on its own in any graduate level course on marketing theory.

In a provocative thesis, philosophy professor Michael Devitt argues for a thoroughgoing realism about the common-sense and scientific physical world and for a corresponding notion of truthcontrary to the opinions of anti-realists such as Putnam, Dummett, van Fraassen, and others. This second edition includes a new Afterword by the author.

Arguing for the necessity of taking art's contribution to contemporary realism seriously, this edited collection intervenes on contemporary debates about realism by demonstrating that the arts do not simply illustrate philosophical theories. The significance of art's realism in times characterised by the normalisation of fake, manipulated and distorted representations of reality can only be fully understood by attending to the ways that the arts mediate, visualise and even shape reality. Each chapter features a different approach to realism and its aesthetic dimensions not only in the visual arts, but also in sound art, film, scientific imaging and literature.

First published in 1988, Modern Anti-Realism and Manufactured Truth examines the forms of anti-realism which have sprouted in analytic philosophy and addresses more directly the grander culture of anti-realism. No attempt is made in these pages to demonstrate the existence of a mind independent world. Part one of the book is devoted to a clarification and defense of Correspondence. In chapter 2, Correspondence is refined by distinguishing what is critical to it from other tenets with which philosophical debate has burdened it. Next in chapter 3, author looks at some of the most common complaints against Correspondence, as well as a novel objection propounded by Hillary Putnam. Chapter 4 deals with the two most prominent alternative truth theories- Coherence and Pragmatism. Chapter 5 details a version of Correspondence. Part two of the book considers not standard theories of truth, but theories in which truth is epistemologized. Chapter 6 begins with an overview of certain generalized positions, including relativism about truth but most of the part two is devoted to the examination of three rather individualized attempts to epistemologize truth. The author concludes that once Correspondence is better understood and the genuine insights of these views are clarified, global realism survives intact. This is a must read for students of philosophy, political philosophy.

Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and contains an original solution to the problem of induction that rests on an appeal to the principle of uniformity of nature.

As a traditional theological issue and in its broader secular varieties, theodicy remains a problem in the philosophy of religion. In this remarkable book, Sami Pihlström provides a novel critical reassessment of the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and suffering. He develops and defends an antitheodicist view, arguing that theodicies seeking to render apparently meaningless suffering meaningful or justified from a ‘God’s-Eye-View’ ultimately rely on metaphysical realism failing to recognize the individual perspective of the sufferer. Pihlström thus shows that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the philosophy of religion is a vital starting point for a re-evaluation of the problem of theodicy. With its strong positions and precise arguments, the volume provides a new approach which is likely to stimulate discussion in the wider academic world of philosophy of religion.

Barry Taylor's book mounts an argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. Part One sets the scene by arguings that traditional realism can be explicated as a doctrine about truth - that truth is objective, that is, public, bivalent, and epistemically independent. Part Two, the centrepiece of the book, shows how a form of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument demonstrates that no such notion of truth can be founded on the idea of correspondence, as explained in model-theoretic terms (more traditional accounts of correspondence having been already disposed of in Part One). Part Three argues that non-correspondence accounts of truth - truth as superassertibility or idealized rational acceptability, formal conceptions of truth, Tarskian truth - also fail to meet the criteria for objectivity; along the way, it also dismisses the claims of the latterday views of Putnam, and of similar views articulated by John McDowell, to constitute a new, less traditional form of realism. In the Coda, Taylor bolsters some of the considerations advanced in Part Three in evaluating formal conceptions of truth, by assessing and rejecting the claims of Robert Brandom to have combined such an account of truth with a satisfactory account of semantic structure. He concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth which preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. So the only question remaining is which form of antirealism to adopt.