Transformation should lie at the heart of our new approach to defense. The development of transformational capabilities, processes, and force structures should be given strategic focus to meet the principal challenges under our defense strategy. India is already ceased with the necessity of transformation albeit without any documented national security guidelines or operating instructions, which are legislated or have the validation of at least the 'Cabinet Committee on Security'(CCS). In other words the first step would be to create a draft security strategy based on many assumptions, like the foreign policy or the cumulative emerging threat scenario as appreciated by the Defence Intelligence Agency(DIA). This well researched book is a result of the project allotted by the USI under the Field Marshal K. M. Cariappa chair. The book is therefore more as an idea or a theoretical construct, basically to bring in more clarity to the various options available for this great transformation of the Indian military. The author has deliberated upon various landmarks of transformation milestones achieved so far by the three services and given recommendations to further build upon ongoing modernization plan and shift to a higher plane of transformational activities.

The Allied victory at Omaha Beach was a costly one. A direct infantry assault against a defense that was years in the making, undertaken in daylight following a mere thirty-minute bombardment, the attack had neither the advantage of tactical surprise nor that of overwhelming firepower. American forces were forced to improvise under enemy fire, and although they were ultimately victorious, they suffered devastating casualties. Why did the Allies embark on an attack with so many disadvantages? Making extensive use of primary sources, Adrian Lewis traces the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy to explain why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were. Although blame for the Omaha Beach disaster has traditionally been placed on tactical leaders at the battle site, Lewis argues that the real responsibility lay at the higher levels of operations and strategy planning. Ignoring lessons learned in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, British and American military leaders employed a hybrid doctrine of amphibious warfare at Normandy, one that failed to maximize the advantages of either British or U.S. doctrine. Had Allied forces at the other landing sites faced German forces of the quality and quantity of those at Omaha Beach, Lewis says, they too would have suffered heavy casualties and faced the prospect of defeat.

Blaxland traces the shift from ties with the British Empire, which led Canadian and Australian forces to fight in the Boer War, the two World Wars, and Korea, to their contribution alongside the United States in Afghanistan. Using late twentieth-century concepts of policy, military strategy, operations, and tactics, he reveals that Canada and Australia have had remarkably comparable experiences while supporting their key allies. Although the two nations have at times chosen divergent courses, their paths since the end of the Cold War have largely converged – and closer collaboration could increase their influence and effectiveness and benefit their allies.

Compared to armies and navies, which have existed as professional fighting services for centuries, the technology that makes air forces possible is much newer. As a result, these services have had to quickly develop methods of preparing aviators to operate in conditions ranging from peace or routine security to full-scale war. The first book to address the history and scope of air power professionalization through learning programs, Educating Air Forces offers valuable new insight into strategy and tactics worldwide. Here, a group of international experts examine the philosophies, policies, and practices of air service educational efforts in the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the UK. The contributors discuss the founding, successes, and failures of European air force learning programs between the Great War and World War II and explore how the tense Cold War political climate influenced the creation, curriculum, and results of various programs. They also consider how educational programs are adapting to soldiers' needs and the demands of modern warfare. Featuring contributions from eminent scholars in the field, this volume surveys the learning approaches globally employed by air forces in the past century and evaluates their effectiveness. Educating Air Forces reveals how experiential learning and formal education are not only inextricably intertwined, but also necessary to cope with advances in modern warfare.

WINNER OF THE TEMPLER MEDAL BOOK PRIZE 2020 A SPECTATOR, FINANCIAL TIMES AND DAILY TELEGRAPH BOOK OF THE YEAR 2020 'A stunning achievement' Max Hastings, Sunday Times Part Two of Daniel Todman's epic history of the Second World War opens with one of the greatest disasters in British military history - the fall of Singapore in February 1942. Unlike the aftermath of Dunkirk, there was no redeeming narrative available here - Britain had been defeated by a far smaller Japanese force in her grandly proclaimed, invincible Asian 'fortress'. The unique skill of Daniel Todman's history lies in its never losing sight of the inter-connectedness of the British experience. The agony of Singapore, for example, is seen through the eyes of its inhabitants, of its defenders, of Churchill's Cabinet and of ordinary people at home. Each stage of the war, from the nadir of early 1942 to the great series of victories in 1944-5 and on to Indian independence, is described both as it was understood at the time and in the light of the very latest historical research. Britain's War is a triumph of narrative, empathy and research, as gripping in its handling of individual witnesses to the war - those doomed to struggle with bombing, rationing, exhausting work and above all the absence of millions of family members - as of the gigantic military, social, technological and economic forces that swept the conflict along. It is the definitive account of a drama which reshaped our country. 'I cannot recommend this history highly enough' Keith Lowe, Literary Review

The protection of the homeland is the top priority for U.S. national security strategy. Strategic defense, however, has been an overlooked dimension in the vast literature on the U.S. strategic posture, with even less attention given to the necessity and dynamics of security collaboration within North America. Drawing on the expertise of scholars from the U.S., Canada and Mexico, the book offers a wide range of perspectives on recent trends in, and future prospects for, the military and political evolution of North American strategic defense. North American strategic defense is a topic too often taken for granted: as this excellent book shows, that is a mistake. In the 21st century, perhaps even more than the 20th, it will be an issue of cardinal importance to both the United States and Canada. Eliot A. Cohen Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies NORAD’s binational command is unique, and this timely and ambitious book examines its continued relevance to North American defense against a host of new global threats. It broadens the focus of what we mean by North American defense, contemplates how we might include Mexico in various regional security arrangements, and considers the dynamics of expanded North American interdependence in the Trump era. Laura Dawson Director of the Canada Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century is an important book. This edited volume brings together a galaxy of stars, both rising and established, with outstanding credentials regarding NORAD and associated matter in the study of security. This original and well-written volume is the first of its kind since the Cold War – long overdue and impressive in contents. The chapters cover both panoramic issues and more specific matters, and the collection is essential reading for academics, policy-makers and the general public. Patrick James Dornsife Dean’s Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California