After World War I, the U.S. Navy’s brief alliance with the British Royal Navy gave way to disagreements over disarmament, fleet size, interpretations of freedom of the seas, and general economic competition. This go-it-alone approach lasted until the next world war, when the U.S. Navy found itself fighting alongside the British, Canadian, Australian, and other Allied navies until the surrender of Germany and Japan. In The U.S. Navy and Its Cold War Alliances, 1945–1953, Corbin Williamson explores the transformation this cooperation brought about in the U.S. Navy’s engagement with other naval forces during the Cold War. Like the onetime looming danger of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, growing concerns about the Soviet naval threat drew the U.S. Navy into tight relations with the British, Canadian, and Australian navies. The U.S. Navy and Its Cold War Alliances, 1945–1953, brings to light the navy-to-navy links that political concerns have kept out of the public sphere: a web of informal connections that included personnel exchanges, standardization efforts in equipment and doctrine, combined training and education, and joint planning for a war with the Soviets. Using a “history from the middle” approach, Corbin Williamson draws upon the archives of all four nations, including documents only recently declassified, to analyze the actions of midlevel officials and officers who managed and maintained these alliances on a day-to-day basis. His work highlights the impact of domestic politics and security concerns on navy-to-navy relations, even as it integrates American naval history with those of Britain, Canada, and Australia. In doing so, the book provides a valuable new perspective on the little-studied but critical transformation of the U.S. Navy’s peacetime alliances during the Cold War.

Shifting the focus from land to sea when considering the Cold War in East Asia, Kuan-Jen Chen sheds light on the importance of the 'oceanic' lens as a structural imperative in grand strategic thinking. Despite extensive scholarship on postwar US-East Asia relations, questions about the relationship between maritime space, national sovereignty, and geopolitics have not been fully explored. Drawing on archives in Chinese, English, and Japanese, Chen uses the western Pacific as a historical platform, illustrating the relationship between the geopolitical value of the sea and the strategic deliberations of American and East-Asian decision making. The recent deterioration of US-China relations has turned maritime East Asia into a powder keg, with no country in the region able to remain neutral. By anchoring today's maritime East Asia in the past, this book traces the evolution of historical factors that led to the current status quo in the western Pacific, and shows the origins of controversial issues in the region.

The gold standard in college-level American naval history texts, edited by the foremost scholar in the field In the newly revised second edition of America, Sea Power and the World, a team of distinguished researchers delivers an extensive and authoritative survey of American naval history, the place of the United States in world affairs, and the role of that country’s naval forces during peacetime and wartime. Each chapter contains a comprehensive analysis of its subject as well as brief sidebars describing a key weapon or technological development of the era and a short biographical sketch of an influential leader or representative of the navy from that era. The book offers extensive illustration and maps and a throughgoing emphasis on naval policy, strategy, roles, and missions, with careful attention paid to naval operations. These factors given greater focus than the descriptions of battle tactics found in other texts. Readers will also find: A thorough introduction to sea power and the modern state system, as well as the American War for Independence at sea Comprehensive explorations of the genesis of the United States Navy from 1785 to 1806 Practical discussions of the Naval War of 1812 and the Confirmation of Independence from 1807 to 1815 and the Squadron Navy as an agent of the commercial empire until 1890 Fulsome treatments of the Second World War in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Pacific, including defensive actions in the Pacific from 1937 to 1943 and offensive actions from 1943 to 1944. New chapters exclusive to the 2nd edition focused on the history of African Americans and women in the US Navy, the development of joint operations and unified command, and the naval history of the last two decades. Perfect for undergraduate students taking courses on the naval history of the United States, America, Sea Power and the World, Second Edition will also earn a place in the libraries of members of the general public interested in naval and military history.

This book presents a detailed assessment of the role of navies in the Korean War. It highlights that, despite being predominantly a land war, navies played a vital part. Moreover, the naval war was not solely a U.S. operation. Smaller navies from many countries made important contributions both in supporting the United States and carrying out independent and combined naval operations. This subject holds special importance since current Western strategic thinking and capabilities emphasise the necessity of combined naval operations involving multiple navies in any potential future naval conflict. The example set by the Korean War therefore offers valuable insights into the operational and strategic problems, and benefits and opportunities of contemporary and future combined coalition naval operations.

First published in 1999, this edited volume draws together contributors to discuss the end, management, technology and strategy of the Cold War with a focus on the USA and the Soviet Union. Mysteries of the Cold War enhances our view of decision-making by the two nations during the years 1945-1990 by revisiting some of the more important ‘policy puzzles’ or decision-making anomalies of that period. Among the case studies considered by academics and other expert analysts are: the 1961 Berlin crisis at ‘Checkpoint Charlie’; Soviet research and development into post-nuclear advanced technology weapons; US and Soviet maritime strategy; Soviet ‘internationalism’ and its role in Cold War policy; the ‘endgame’ of the Cold War and why it turned out that way. Included among the contributing authors are persons who spent major portions of their careers in the US intelligence community or elsewhere in the government.

The Cold War did not culminate in World War III as so many in the 1950s and 1960s feared, yet it spawned a host of military engagements that affected millions of lives. This book is the first comprehensive, multinational overview of military affairs during the early Cold War, beginning with conflicts during World War II in Warsaw, Athens, and Saigon and ending with the Cuban Missile Crisis. A major theme of this account is the relationship between government policy and military preparedness and strategy. Author Jonathan M. House tells of generals engaging in policy confrontations with their governments’ political leaders—among them Anthony Eden, Nikita Khrushchev, and John F. Kennedy—many of whom made military decisions that hamstrung their own political goals. In the pressure-cooker atmosphere of atomic preparedness, politicians as well as soldiers seemed instinctively to prefer military solutions to political problems. And national security policies had military implications that took on a life of their own. The invasion of South Korea convinced European policy makers that effective deterrence and containment required building up and maintaining credible forces. Desire to strengthen the North Atlantic alliance militarily accelerated the rearmament of West Germany and the drive for its sovereignty. In addition to examining the major confrontations, nuclear and conventional, between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing—including the crises over Berlin and Formosa—House traces often overlooked military operations against the insurgencies of the era, such as French efforts in Indochina and Algeria and British struggles in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Aden. Now, more than fifty years after the events House describes, understanding the origins and trajectory of the Cold War is as important as ever. By the late 1950s, the United States had sent forces to Vietnam and the Middle East, setting the stage for future conflicts in both regions. House’s account of the complex relationship between diplomacy and military action directly relates to the insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and confrontations that now occupy our attention across the globe.

This book presents the ups and downs of the Soviet-Turkish relations during World War II and immediately after it. Hasanli draws on declassified archive documents from the United States, Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan to recreate a true picture of the time when the 'Turkish crisis' of the Cold War broke out. It explains why and how the friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey escalated into enmity, led to the increased confrontation between these two countries, and ended up with Turkey's entry into NATO. Hasanli uses recently-released Soviet archive documents to shed light on some dark points of the Cold War era and the relations between the Soviets and the West. Apart from bringing in an original point of view regarding starting of the Cold War, the book reveals some secret sides of the Soviet domestic and foreign policies. The book convincingly demonstrates how Soviet political technologists led by Josef Stalin distorted the picture of a friendly and peaceful country_Turkey_into the image of an enemy in the minds of millions of Soviet citizens.

In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize these countries as allies and integrate them into the Western defense system. Throughout the 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959 it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus. The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank’s structure and function and relative value in NATO’s overall policy, and the alliance’s response to the challenges in the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank, but also the more controversial political aspects: the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia during 1953-55 and the effects of the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. Thus, it considers how the United States and the U.K. viewed the power balance between the three Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of U.S. bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The book also assesses the threat posed to the Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East. More generally, the book illuminates the complexities of intra-alliance dynamics in a region full of Cold War tensions. However, in its Middle Eastern/Eastern Mediterranean neighborhood, it was not only the Cold War that provided tensions, since the Arab-Israeli dispute and the tensions of decolonization further complicated the picture. Thus, the study of the Southern Flank is a test case of a Cold War theater which was subjected to additional historical pressures, creating a nexus of problems which the Western Alliance needed to address within its effort to respond to the various challenges of the Cold War.

This book discusses the role of the U.S. Navy within the country's national security structure during the first decade of the Cold War from the perspective of the service's senior uniformed officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, and his staff. It examines a variety of important issues of the period, including the Army-Navy fight over unification that led to the creation of the National Security Act of 1947, the early postwar fighting in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, the formation of NATO, the outbreak of the Korean War, the decision of the Eisenhower Administration not to intervene in the Viet Minh troops' siege of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and the initiation of the Eisenhower "New Look" defense policy. The author relies upon information obtained from a wide range of primary sources and personal interviews with important, senior Navy and Army officers. The result is a book that provides the reader with a new way of looking at these pivotal events.

This textbook provides description and analysis of the Cold War and its aftermath. It covers the period from all angles with focus on regional developments as well as global interactions, and also gives due consideration to economic and strategic issues.