During his first term in office, Pres. George W. Bush made reference to the "unitary executive" ninety-five times, as part of signing statements, proclamations, and executive orders. Pres. Barack Obama's actions continue to make issues of executive power as timely as ever. Unitary executive theory stems from interpretation of the constitutional assertion that the president is vested with the "executive power" of the United States. In this groundbreaking collection of studies, eleven presidential scholars examine for the first time the origins, development, use, and future of this theory. The Unitary Executive and the Modern Presidency examines how the unitary executive theory became a recognized constitutional theory of presidential authority, how it has evolved, how it has been employed by presidents of both parties, and how its use has affected and been affected by U.S. politics. This book also examines the constitutional, political, and even psychological impact of the last thirty years of turmoil in the executive branch and the ways that controversy has altered both the exercise and the public’s view of presidential power.

“I have an Article II,” Donald Trump has announced, citing the US Constitution, “where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.” Though this statement would have come as a shock to the framers of the Constitution, it fairly sums up the essence of “the unitary executive theory.” This theory, which emerged during the Reagan administration and gathered strength with every subsequent presidency, counters the system of checks and balances that constrains a president’s executive impulses. It also, the authors of this book contend, counters the letter and spirit of the Constitution. In their account of the rise of unitary executive theory over the last several decades, the authors refute the notion that this overweening view of executive power has been a common feature of the presidency from the beginning of the Republic. Rather, they show, it was invented under the Reagan Administration, got a boost during the George W. Bush administration, and has found its logical extension in the Trump administration. This critique of the unitary executive theory reveals it as a misguided model for understanding presidential powers. While its adherents argue that greater presidential power makes government more efficient, the results have shown otherwise. Dismantling the myth that presidents enjoy unchecked plenary powers, the authors advocate for principles of separation of powers—of checks and balances—that honor the Constitution and support the republican government its framers envisioned. A much-needed primer on presidential power, from the nation’s founding through Donald Trump’s impeachment, The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government makes a robust and persuasive case for a return to our constitutional limits.

This book is the first to undertake a detailed historical and legal examination of presidential power and the theory of the unitary executive. This theory--that the Constitution gives the president the power to remove and control all policy-making subordinates in the executive branch--has been the subject of heated debate since the Reagan years. To determine whether the Constitution creates a strongly unitary executive, Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo look at the actual practice of all forty-three presidential administrations, from George Washington to George W. Bush. They argue that all presidents have been committed proponents of the theory of the unitary executive, and they explore the meaning and implications of this finding.

The theory of the unitary executive is one of the most controversial and significant constitutional doctrines of the past several decades. It holds that the U.S. president alone embodies all executive power and therefore has unlimited ability to direct the many people and institutions within the federal government’s vast executive branch. It thus justifies the president’s prerogative to organize the executive branch and to direct its activities, to tell executive personnel what to do and to fire them if desired, to control the flow of information, and to issue signing statements that make judgments about constitutionality and determine the extent to which laws will be implemented. In some versions, it also endorses implied or inherent powers and permits the president to completely control foreign policy and military action. Proponents say this conception of the presidential office is faithful to the Constitution, facilitates the sort of energetic executive that Alexander Hamilton argued for, and enhances administrative efficacy and political accountability for governance. Critics say this arrangement is constitutionally inaccurate, is belied by historical practice and legal precedents, and is dangerously close to the monarchical power that provoked the American Revolution – and can be especially threatening in the era of Donald Trump. This book examines how controversies about unitary executive power have played out from the founding era to the present day with a focus on recent presidents, it explores arguments both for and against the unitary executive theory, and it looks ahead to future implications for American politics.

The January 2014 issue (Volume 127, Number 3) includes the following articles and student contributions: * Article, "For-Profit Public Enforcement," by Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner * Book Review, "Technological Determinism and Its Discontents," by Christopher S. Yoo * Note, "More than a Formality: The Case for Meaningful Substantive Reasonableness Review" * Note, "Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive" * Note, "The Devil Wears Trademark: How the Fashion Industry Has Expanded Trademark Doctrine to Its Detriment" In addition, student case notes explore recent cases on misleading law school employment data, the First Amendment religious rights of for-profit corporations, regulation of nuclear energy, forensic search of laptops at the border, search of cellphone date incident to arrest, obscene or lewd student speech, and access to polling places for news-gathering purposes. Finally, the issue includes several summaries of Recent Publications. The issue is offered in a quality digital edition, featuring active Contents, linked notes, active URLs in notes, and proper ebook formatting. The contents of Number 3 include scholarly essays by leading academic figures, as well as substantial student research. The Review is a student-run organization whose primary purpose is to publish a journal of legal scholarship. The organization is formally independent of the Harvard Law School; student editors make all editorial and organizational decisions.

It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector. Independent Agencies in the United States provides a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US, focusing on traditional multi-member agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Trade Commission. It recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create innovative and idiosyncratic administrative structures including government corporations, government sponsored enterprises governance, public-private partnerships, systems for "contracting out," self-regulation and incorporation by reference of private standards. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. They provide a unique comparative review of the internal operations of US agencies and offer contrasts between US, EU, and certain UK independent agencies. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography.

A scathing critique of President Bush's legal advisors, who expanded the reach of his executive powers while creating highly controversial policies for fighting the War on Terror. Argues that these advisors, blinded by ideology, provided largely bad legal advice that caused great harm, and ultimately was unnecessary for national security.

If John F. Kennedy, Tip O’Neill, or even Bill Clinton were to run as Democrat candidates today, their own party would cancel them in a heartbeat. If the Joe Biden of 1992 were to run today, MSNBC would label him “MAGA Joe.” How did JFK’s party of Catholics and union workers become AOC’s party of privileged Ivy Leaguers with “Queers for Palestine” signs and purple hair? Over the past few decades, Democrats have swung so far to the left that they have little in common with past generations of progressives. In Progressively Worse, bestselling author and Fox News contributor Joe Concha highlights how the Democrats used to: · Care about blue collar workers · Protest against new wars · Defend free speech · Criticize the elites and Wall Street · Want limits on immigration Now, the party of the hippies is now the party of Hamasniks, and the party of feminists now celebrates male athletes in women’s sports. Though spotlights of key influencers like Gavin Newsom, Rashida Tlaib, Keith Olbermann, and Pete Buttigieg, Progressively Worse lays out the facts every American should know about the Democrat party. It’s not even a party anymore. It’s more like the hangover the day after.