John Collins presents an analysis of the problem of the unity of the proposition - how propositions can be both single things and complexes at the same time. He surveys previous investigations of the problem and offers his own solution, which is defended from both philosophical and linguistic perspectives.

Richard Gaskin presents a work in the philosophy of language. He analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express—what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since he identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, his account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. He argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as 'Bradley's regress'. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but Gaskin argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.

This introduction brings to life the main themes in Indian philosophy of language by using an accessible translation of an Indian classical text to provide an entry into the world of Indian linguistic theories. Malcolm Keating draws on Mukula's Fundamentals of the Communicative Function to show the ability of language to convey a wide range of meanings and introduce ideas about testimony, pragmatics, and religious implications. Along with a complete translation of this foundational text, Keating also provides: - Clear explanations of themes such as reference, figuration and sentence meaning - Commentary illuminating connections between Mukula and contemporary philosophy - Romanized text of the Sanskrit - A glossary of terms and annotated bibliography - A chronology of important figures and dates By complementing a historically-informed introduction with a focused study of an influential primary text, Keating responds to the need for a reliable guide to better understand theories of language and related issues in Indian philosophy.

Playing a key role in our lives, as a vehicle for our thoughts and a powerful medium of communication, language is at the centre of philosophical investigation. The fifteen specially commissioned essays in this book introduce and explore the ideas of major philosophers who have shaped philosophical thinking about language, providing insights into crucial developments in this fascinating field over the last 140 years. Chapters examine the work of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Austin, Quine, Chomsky, Grice, Davidson, Dummett, Kripke and Derrida. This second edition broadens coverage of the area with new chapters on Susan Stebbing and on recent developments in feminist philosophy of language. Featuring contributions from Arif Ahmed, Kent Bach, Thomas Baldwin, Michael Beaney, Siobhan Chapman, Kirk Ludwig and other leading experts in the field, Philosophy of Language: The Key Thinkers provides a thorough introduction to the puzzles, debates and ideas that animate contemporary philosophy of language. It is an ideal resource for undergraduate students in philosophy, linguistics and related disciplines.

In this book Christoph Menke attempts to explain art's sovereign power to subvert reason without falling into an error common to Adorno's negative dialectics and Derrida's deconstruction.

What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by leading cognitive scientists as they examine the work of one of cognitive science's most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor. Contributions by Noam Chomsky, Tom Bever, Merrill Garrett, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Zenon Pylyshyn, Janet Fodor, C. Randy Gallistel, Ernie Lepore, Mary C. Potter, Lila R. Gleitman, and others, put in perspective Fodor's contribution to cognitive science by focusing on three main themes: the nature of concepts, the modularity of language and vision, and the language of thought. On Modules, Concepts, and Language: Cognitive Science at Its Core is a one-of-a-kind series of essays on cognitive science and on Fodor. In this volume, Chomsky contrasts, for the first time, his view of modularity with that of Fodor's; Bever--one of the pioneers of modern psycholinguistics--discusses the nature of consciousness in particular with respect to language perception; Garrett--another of the pioneers of psycholinguistics--reassesses his view of modularity in language production; Pylyshyn--one of the leading figures of the modern symbolic, computational view of the mind--presents his view of the connection between visual perception and conceptual attainment; Gallistel--one of the most prominent cognitive neuroscientists--presents a proposal on what the biological bases of the computational theory of mind might be. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini discusses Fodor's views on conceptual nativism, stemming from the epic debate between Chomsky and Piaget, which Piattelli-Palmarini organized. These and many other key figures of cognitive science are brought together, for the first time, constituting the most up-to-date critical view of some of cognitive science's most polemical topics and its prospects as the science of the mind. This volume is aimed at students and advanced researchers in core areas of cognitive science and is bound to become one of the classics in the field.

Explores the stable core of Wittgenstein's philosophy as developed from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.

This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn’t it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

This book explores the influential currents in the philosophy of language and linguistics of the first half of the twentieth century, from the perspective of the English scholar C. K. Ogden (1889 - 1957). It reveals links between early analytic philosophy, semiotics and linguistics in a crucial period of their respective histories.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on the Oxford Academic platform and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Research on concepts has concentrated on how people apply concepts when presented with a stimulus. Equally important, however, is the use of concepts offline, while planning what to do or thinking about what is the case. There is strong evidence that inferences driven by conceptual thought draw heavily on special-purpose resources--sensory, motoric, affective, and evaluative. At the same time, concepts afford general-purpose recombination and support content-general reasoning processes, which have long been the focus of philosophers. There is a growing consensus that a theory of concepts must encompass both kinds of processes. Nicholas Shea shows how concepts can act as an interface between content-general reasoning and special-purpose systems. Concept-driven thinking can take advantage of the complementary costs and benefits of each. This book sets out an empirically-based account of the different ways in which thinking with concepts leads us to new conclusions and underpins planning and decision-making. It also outlines three useful implications of this account. First, it allows us to reconstruct the commonplace idea that thinking draws on the meaning of a concept. Second, it offers insight into how human cognition avoids the frame problem and the complementary, less discussed, 'if-then problem' for dispositions acquired from experience. Third, it shows that metacognition can apply to concepts and concept-driven thinking in various ways. The framework developed in the book elucidates what makes concept-driven thinking an especially powerful cognitive resource.