First published in 1928, this book reproduces the lectures and addresses that John Henry Muirhead gave on various occasions during the two and a half years he spent as Lecturer of Philosophy on the Mills Foundation at the University of California, USA. The different chapters look at the meaning and general place of Philosophy as a subject of study and the application of its leading conceptions to different areas of modern life, including science and politics. The final chapters however, present two short talks of a different nature, which were addressed to Scottish countrymen, gathered on foreign shores. This book outlines Muirhead's philosophical thoughts and conclusions to which he devoted his life.

First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge.

First published in 1989, this book tackles a relatively little-explored area of Wittgenstein’s work, his philosophy of psychology, which played an important part in his late philosophy. Writing with clarity and insight, Budd traces the complexities of Wittgenstein’s thought, and provides a detailed picture of his views on psychological concepts. A useful guide to the writings of Wittgenstein, the book will be of value to anyone concerned with his work as a whole, as well as those with a more general interest in the philosophy of psychology.

First Published in 1951, this outline work on the theory of knowledge and metaphysics is intended both for university students who have recently started on the subject and for any who, without having the advantage of studying it at university, wish by private reading to acquire a general idea of its nature. The book deals with all the main questions arising within the field in so far as they can be stated and discussed profitably and simply. The topics discussed include the place of reason in knowledge and life, the possibility of knowledge beyond sense-experience, the theory of perception, the relation of body and mind, alleged philosophical implications of recent scientific doctrines, the problem of evil and the existence of God.

Philosophers since Descartes have felt themselves compelled to make a choice between mind and body. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mind, first published in 1986, argues that there is no genuine epistemological problem of mind, and that the widespread philosophical scepticism with regard to our knowledge of other minds is without foundation. Ashok Vohra applies Wittgenstein’s method to show that the problem has arisen through a tendency to over-philosophise our simple experiences. Vohra presents a positive account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, arguing that to consider his philosophy entirely destructive is misleading. He shows that knowledge of mind is gained through a large complex of intersubjectively identifiable factors such as the linguistic and non-linguistic past, present and future behaviour of the person concerned. He thus justifies the belief, on which psychology and psychoanalysis are based, that mind is not a mystery to which only the owner has privileged access.

First published in 1959, this volume follows on from Dr. A. C. Ewing’s earlier work, The Definition of Good. The book does not apologize or undermine Ewing’s previous publication but after further consideration on the topic, it explores the issues that were arguably overlooked in the original book. For example, it looks at the possibility of intermediate positions which have been developed since the philosophers Moore and Ross did their main work. Ewing also responds to the criticisms that originated from The Definition of Good and suggests that Secondary Thoughts in Moral Philosophy makes his reading on the topic more balanced.

Wittgenstein’s philosophical achievement lies in the development of a new philosophical method rather than in the elaboration of a particular philosophical system. Dr Paul Johnston applies this innovative method to the central problems of moral philosophy: whether there can be ‘truth’ in ethics, or what the meaning of objectivity might mean in the context of moral deliberation. Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy, first published in 1989, represents the first serious and rigorous attempt to apply Wittgenstein’s method to ethics. The conclusions arrived at differ radically from those dominating contemporary ethical discussion, revealing an immense discrepancy between the ethical concepts employed in everyday moral decision-making and the way in which these are discussed by philosophers. Dr Johnston examines ways of eliminating this discrepancy in order to gain a clearer picture of the proper nature of moral claims, and at the same time provides new insights into Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy.

First published in 1961, this book considers Hume’s request to be judged solely by the acknowledged works of his maturity. It focuses on Hume’s first Inquiry in its own right as a separate book to the likes of his other works, such as the Treatise and the Dialogues, which are here only used as supplementary evidence when necessary. This approach brings out, as Hume himself quite explicitly wished to do, the important bearing of his more technical philosophy on matters of religion and of world-outlook generally: "Be a philosopher; but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man."

First published in 1927, Science and Philosophy: And Other Essays is a collection of individual papers written by Bernard Bosanquet during his highly industrious philosophical life. The collection was put together by Bosanquet’s wife after the death of the writer and remains mostly unaltered with just a few papers added and the order of entries improved. The papers here displayed consist of various contributions Bosanquet made to Mind, the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, the International Journal of Ethics and other periodicals, as well as work from volumes of lectures and essays under his own or other editorship. Throughout the collection, Bosanquet considers the relationship between science and philosophy. The two subject areas became increasingly intertwined during Bosanquet’s lifetime as scientific writers grew more interested in the philosophical investigation of the concepts which underlined their work and philosophical thinkers recognised the importance of the relationship between mathematics and logic as well as that between physics and metaphysics. The first essay in this volume discusses this idea explicitly and all subsequent articles may be regarded as essays in support of the main discussion with which the volume opens.

First published in 1942, Reflections documents the life of John Henry Muirhead and the philosophical age that he observed. The first part of the volume derives from Muirhead’s own autobiographical narrative, left unfinished when he died in May 1940. The second part features two final chapters written by John W. Harvey that comprehensively record the final stages of Muirhead’s life. Harvey’s chapters incorporate Muirhead’s unfinished final years of commentary and begin at the man’s retirement from Birmingham Chair in 1921. As a student and teacher of philosophy, Muirhead’s life ran almost precisely parallel to what he himself refers to as ‘one of the most vivid and important movements in British and American philosophy’. He came into contact with some of the age’s primary thinkers and as such, his own autobiography is important in providing an insight into his contemporary philosophical environment.