Paul M. Pietroski presents an ambitious new account of human languages as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. He argues that meanings are neither concepts nor extensions, and sentences do not have truth conditions; meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort.

I see semantics as one branch of linguistics, which is the study of language: as an area of study parallel to, and interacting with, those syntax and phonology, which deal respectively with the formal patterns of language, and the way in which these are translated into sounds. While syntax and phonology study the structure of expressive possibilities in language, semantics study the meanings that can be expressed. It may convincingly be claimed that viewing semantics as a component discipline of linguistics is the most fruitful and exciting point of departure at the present time. The book of this kind cannot attempt an overall survey of the field of semantics or at least, if it does, it will end up as a superficial compendium of what others have thought about meaning. The only sensible course is to give evidence that linguistics does exist in our life and it is hypocritical not to acknowledge that linguistics is difficult to understand due to its scientificity. Semantics is a non-fiction science through its unique approach to find the meaning of language not by guessing or judging something subjectively. The strength of the integrated view is that it makes possible a transfer to semantics of techniques of analysis which have proved successful with other aspects of language. It has to be conceded that the primary appeal of semantics is an intellectual one, similar in some respects to that of mathematics or any pure science. Only after seeking understanding for understanding’s sake can one acquire the wisdom which consists in using that understanding for good ends.

Most of the papers in this volume bear upon the general question "What is the nature of an acceptable theory of meaning?" taking as their starting point an answer proposed by Donald Davidson. The remaining papers are attempts to work outthe implications of suggested answers to this question, or to solve semantical problems in accordance with them.

The book provides a historical (with an outline of the history of the concept of truth from antiquity to our time) and systematic exposition of the semantic theory of truth formulated by Alfred Tarski in the 1930s. This theory became famous very soon and inspired logicians and philosophers. It has two different, but interconnected aspects: formal-logical and philosophical. The book deals with both, but it is intended mostly as a philosophical monograph. It explains Tarski’s motivation and presents discussions about his ideas (pro and contra) as well as points out various applications of the semantic theory of truth to philosophical problems (truth-criteria, realism and anti-realism, future contingents or the concept of correspondence between language and reality).