The First World War, which began in 1914 (July 28, 1914), divided Ukrainian territories between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. During this time, a political movement called the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" was initiated by a six-member administrative team that gathered on August 4, 1914, with the aim of Ukraine's liberation. The names of these six individuals were Volodymyr Doroshenko, Marian Melenevsky, Andrii Zhuk, Mykola Zalizniak, Oleksander Skoropys-Yoltukhovsky, and Dmytro Dontsov. Based in Vienna, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine made various publications to raise awareness in European public opinion and appealed for military support as well. While they particularly sought to gain the attention of Germany, states reluctant to antagonize Russia provided financial support, albeit reluctantly. The society's headquarters in Vienna were later moved to Berlin. They also had offices in places like Switzerland and Romania and distributed political brochures and books to convey their concerns to all countries. The organization's goal was to establish an independent Ukraine. However, as mentioned in the previous sentence, Ukraine was not officially recognized as an independent country due to its non-compliance with the policies of states. Indeed, at no point did many states wish to engage in activities that did not align with their policies. As we frequently encounter in historical cases, this policy can be summarized as follows: The rebellious group approaches a state and, by being recognized by that state, gains a legitimate ground to engage in the struggle. In this way, they achieve recognition and acquire allies. Information about the publishing activities mentioned briefly by the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine is undoubtedly found in the archives of many countries. However, each should be evaluated separately because these publications vary from one country to another. Therefore, making this book available to our readers in Turkey, especially in Turkish, has brought us special joy. This work, which will serve as an example of how such events unfolded, is dedicated to the Ukrainian people who are once again struggling with war these days.

This book analyses the rapidly unfolding events that have impacted on the European energy dynamics, in the light of the way in Ukraine and the energy crisis that have reconfigured, since 2022, the European and the global geopolitical scene, dislocating not only crucial natural resources but also the pace of the energy transition and the continent’s existential security, its basic trust and sense of continuity. It introduces an innovative interpretation of the conflict and cooperation dynamics in Europe, by challenging the reader to look beyond the material aspects of energy security, related to supply and demand, consumption, production and prices dynamics, which I nonetheless explain in detail. Thus, it invites the audience to explore the deeper layer of motivations that underpin the actors’ decision to engage in conflict and cooperation, by exploring their cognitive and psychological considerations, in addition to the material ones. For this purpose, it presents a new conceptual tool, the conflict-cooperation perpetuum, in order to explain why the same players, in this case the EU, Russia and Turkey, may choose to simultaneously perceive each other as security threats and trade partners, engaging in both conflict and cooperation simultaneously with the same ‘Other’. In addition, it proposes to apply the framework of ontological security, in order to understand the responses of the EU, Russia and Turkey to the major existential crises that have affected them in past years, culminating with the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis of 2022.

Eight years after annexing Crimea, Russia embarked on a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Vladimir Putin viewed this attack on a neighbour as a legacy-defining mission, which sought to restore a central element of Russia’s sphere of influence and undo Ukraine’s surprisingly resilient democratic experiment. These aspirations were swiftly eviscerated, as the conflict degenerated into a bloody war of attrition and the Russian economy crumbled under the weight of sanctions. This book argues that Putin’s desire to unite Russians around a common set of principles and consolidate his personal brand of authoritarianism prompted him to pursue a policy of global counter-revolution; it was this which inspired Russia’s military interventions in Crimea, Donbas and Syria, later steering Putin to war against Kyiv. Samuel Ramani explores why Putin opted for all-out regime change in Ukraine, rather than a smaller-scale intervention in Donbas, and considers the impact on his own regime’s legitimacy. This focus on the domestic drivers of invasion contrasts with alternative theories that highlight systemic factors, such as preventing NATO expansion. Ramani concludes by assessing the invasion’s implications for Russia’s long-term political and foreign policy trajectory, and how the international response to the conflict will reshape the global order.

CHOSEN AS A BOOK OF THE YEAR BY THE FINANCIAL TIMES AND TELEGRAPH Do you know what is at stake in Ukraine? Urgent, compelling reading from the author of Chernobyl on the defining conflict of our times On 24 February 2022, Russia stunned the world by launching an invasion of Ukraine. In the midst of checking on the family and friends who were now on the front lines of Europe's largest conflict since the outbreak of the Second World War, acclaimed Ukrainian-American historian Serhii Plokhy inevitably found himself attempting to understand the deeper causes of the invasion, analysing its course and contemplating the wider outcomes. The Russo-Ukrainian War is the comprehensive history of a war that has burned since 2014, and that, with Russia's attempt to seize Kyiv, exploded a geo-political order that had been cemented since the end of the Cold War. With an eye for the gripping detail on the ground, both in the halls of power and down in the trenches, as well as a keen sense of the grander sweep of history, Plokhy traces the origins and the evolution of the conflict, from the collapse of the Russian empire to the rise and fall of the USSR and on to the development in Ukraine of a democratic politics. Based on decades of research and his unique insight into the region, he argues that Ukraine's defiance of Russia, and the West's demonstration of unity and strength, has presented a profound challenge to Putin's Great Power ambition, and further polarized the world along a new axis. A riveting, enlightening account, this is present-minded history at its best. BEST BOOKS OF SUMMER 2023: FINANCIAL TIMES * THE TIMES * SUNDAY TIMES CULTURE * TLS

“Compelling.… [E]rudite, objective and immensely readable.” —Ben Hall, Financial Times An authoritative history of Europe’s largest military conflict since World War II, from the New York Times best-selling author of The Gates of Europe. Despite repeated warnings from the White House, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked the world. Why did Putin start the war—and why has it unfolded in previously unimaginable ways? Ukrainians have resisted a superior military; the West has united, while Russia grows increasingly isolated. Serhii Plokhy, a leading historian of Ukraine and the Cold War, offers a definitive account of this conflict, its origins, course, and the already apparent and possible future consequences. Though the current war began eight years before the all-out assault—on February 27, 2014, when Russian armed forces seized the building of the Crimean parliament—the roots of this conflict can be traced back even earlier, to post-Soviet tensions and imperial collapse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Providing a broad historical context and an examination of Ukraine and Russia’s ideas and cultures, as well as domestic and international politics, Plokhy reveals that while this new Cold War was not inevitable, it was predictable. Ukraine, Plokhy argues, has remained central to Russia’s idea of itself even as Ukrainians have followed a radically different path. In a new international environment defined by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disintegration of the post–Cold War international order, and a resurgence of populist nationalism, Ukraine is now more than ever the most volatile fault line between authoritarianism and democratic Europe.

Conflict and cooperation are two dynamics that have shaped the political economy and international relations around the Black Sea since the early nineties. Despite the negative structural environment and the persistence of a high security dilemma, cooperative efforts among Black Sea actors (primarily state elites but increasingly non-state actors) have been advancing, even though slowly. Representing a new development in the study of contemporary regionalism, Panagiota Manoli examines the process of institutionalized subregional cooperation and casts new light on the factors influencing the reconfiguration of subregional structures in the region. Focusing on the primary initiative in the region, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Manoli traces how subregionalism has evolved since the early nineties and what has been driving and conditioning this process. Questioning whether there is a definitive nature to subregionalism, Manoli then discusses Black Sea subregionalism within the European integration process, examining the impact of the European Union. Contributing to the conceptualization of the subregional phenomenon, this book should be read by scholars and policy-makers alike unclear on how local elements interface with extra-regional forces in the shaping of a subregion.

"As Turkey's regional and global roles and influence growth, this volume provides a critical understanding of how the current Turkish foreign policy within the "Enterprising and Humanitarian Framework" operates in practice to achieve Turkey's foreign policy ambitions"--

This book addresses the treaties, crises and other issues that seem to be turning points in Russian-Turkish relations, reflecting on Russian and Turkish archival documents and resources. Over six chapters, it analyses Russian-Turkish relations from the First World War up to the present time, presenting information on issues that include the causes of the First World War and Turkey’s entrance into the War, internal power struggles, establishment of I.V. Stalin’s rule, Turkey-Soviet relations from 1960 to 1980, and also Glasnost and Perestroika and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s rise to power.

In March and April 2021, Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military to deploy thousands of people and equipment along its border with Ukraine and in Crimea, the greatest mobilization since the 2014 invasion of Crimea. This caused a crisis and invasion fears. Satellite photography indicated armour, missiles, and heavy weapons. The forces were largely evacuated by June 2021, but in October and November 2021, over 100,000 Russian troops massed around Ukraine on three sides. The 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War and the War in Donbas caused the problem. In December 2021, Russia advanced two draft treaties containing "security guarantees," including a legally binding promise that Ukraine would not join NATO and a reduction in NATO troops and military hardware in Eastern Europe, and threatened an unspecified military response if those demands were not met in full. NATO rejected these recommendations, and the US threatened Russia with "swift and punishing" economic consequences if it invaded Ukraine further. Many observers called it Europe's worst crisis since the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russia recognised Donetsk and Luhansk as separate republics and sent soldiers to Donbas, a move viewed as Russia's departure from the Minsk Protocol. The breakaway republics were recognized inside their Ukrainian oblasts, which stretch beyond the line of contact. Putin declared the Minsk accords invalid on February 22. The Federation Council authorised military force the same day. On February 24, Putin declared a "special military operation" in the Donbas and a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on March 1.