In December 1995, Operation Joint Endeavor--the first-ever ground operation conducted by NATO and the largest military operation in Europe since World War II--sought to implement a peace agreement concluding a bloody, ethnically motivated civil war in Bosnia. The 900 cavalrymen of 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry (Quarterhorse) and its attached units comprised a small but prominent portion of an international task force in Bosnia that numbered more than 57,000 NATO soldiers. Despite austere conditions, mountainous terrain, bad weather, tens of thousands of land mines, and threats of terrorist attack, Quarterhorse upheld the peace in one of the most challenging parts of the American sector. Drawn from interviews, firsthand experiences and contemporary media, this account of the first year of NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia addresses every aspect of the squadron's experience, providing a vivid portrait of American armed forces overseas.

Colonel Pat Proctor’s long overdue critique of the Army’s preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era focuses on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies? Or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information-age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Proctor contends that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to the new strategic reality, a decision that saw it struggle through one low-intensity conflict after another—some inconclusive, some tragic—in the 1980s and 1990s, and leaving it largely unprepared when it found itself engaged—seemingly forever—in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first book-length study to connect the failures of these wars to America’s disastrous performance in the war on terror, Proctor’s work serves as an attempt to convince Army leaders to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

During combat, soldiers make life-and-death choices dozens of times a day. These individual decisions accumulate to determine the outcome of wars. This work examines the theory and practice of military ethics in counterinsurgency operations. Marcus Schulzke surveys the ethical traditions that militaries borrow from; compares ethics in practice in the US Army, British Army and Royal Marines Commandos, and Israel Defense Forces; and draws conclusions that may help militaries refine their approaches in future conflicts. The work is based on interviews with veterans and military personnel responsible for ethics training, review of training materials and other official publications, published accounts from combat veterans, and observation of US Army focus groups with active-duty soldiers. Schulzke makes a convincing argument that though military ethics cannot guarantee flawless conduct, incremental improvements can be made to reduce war’s destructiveness while improving the success of counterinsurgency operations.

In While England Slept Winston Churchill revealed in 1938 how the inadequacy of Britain's military forces to cope with worldwide responsibilities in a peaceful but tense era crippled its ability to deter or even adequately prepare for World War II. In While America Sleeps, historians Donald and Frederick Kagan retrace Britain's international and defense policies during the years after World War I leading up to World War II, showing in persuasive detail how self-delusion and an unwillingness to face the inescapable responsibilities on which their security and the peace of the world depended cost the British dearly. The Kagans then turn their attention to America and argue that our nation finds itself in a position similar to that of Britain in the 1920s. For all its emergency interventions the U.S. has not yet accepted its unique responsibility to take the lead in preserving the peace. Years of military cutbacks-the "peace dividend" following the buildup and triumph over Communism of the Reagan years-have weakened our armed forces and left us with too few armed forces to cover too many possible threats. This has caused us to bank everything on high tech "smart" weapons - some of which have not yet been invented and others that we are not acquiring or deploying - as opposed to the long-term commitment of money, fighting men and women, and planning that the deterrence of a major war would require. This failure to shape a policy and to commit the resources needed to maintain peace has cost valuable time in shaping a peaceful world and has placed America's long-term security in danger. The policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations have left us in a position where we cannot avoid war and keep the peace in areas vital to our security. Neither have the post-Cold War policies sent clear signals to would-be aggressors that the U.S. can and will resist them. Tensions in the Middle East, instability in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan, the development of nuclear weapons and missiles by North Korea, and the menacing threats and actions of China, with its immense population, resentful sense of grievance and years of military buildup, all hint that the current peaceful era will not last forever. Can we make it last as long as possible? Are we prepared to face its collapse? While America Sleeps is a sobering, fascinating work of history that poses a thoughtful challenge to policy-makers and will interest military buffs as well as readers interested in history and international relations.

This text examines how peacekeeping works, the rash of peacekeeping failures since 1993, and whether peacekeeping can still play a role in US foreign policy. It is a realist assessment designed for US policymakers and politicians.