This volume presents fourteen new essays by leading figures in the fields of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysics, discussing Aristotle's theory of the unity of substances. This topic remains at the centre of metaphysical enquiry.The contributors examine the nature of essences, how they differ from other components of substance, and how they are related to these other components. The central questions discussed here are: What does Aristotle mean by 'potentiality' and 'actuality'? How do these concepts explicate matter andform, and how are they related to the actuality of substance? What is the role of matter and form in accounting for the unity, identity, and individuation of substances? These questions are crucial to an understanding of the unity of composite substances and their identity over time.The aim of the volume is both exegetical and philosophical: to address central issues in Aristotle's Metaphysics, and to stimulate further investigation of the problems and controversies that arise from these.

This book explores a fundamental tension in Aristotle's metaphysics: how can an entity such as a living organisma composite generated through the imposition of form on preexisting matterhave the conceptual unity that Aristotle demands of primary substances? Mary Louise Gill bases her treatment of the problem of unity, and of Aristotle's solution, on a fresh interpretation of the relation between matter and form. Challenging the traditional understanding of Aristotelian matter, she argues that material substances are subverted by matter and maintained by form that controls the matter to serve a positive end. The unity of material substances thus involves a dynamic relation between resistant materials and directive ends. Aristotle on Substance offers both a general account of matter, form, and substantial unity and a specific assessment of particular Aristotelian arguments. At every point, Gill engages Aristotle on his own philosophical ground through the detailed analysis of central, and often controversial, texts from the Metaphysics, Physics, On Generation and Corruption, De Anima, De Caelo, and the biological works. The result is a coherent, firmly grounded rethinking of Aristotle's central metaphysical concepts and of his struggle toward a fully consistent theory of material substances.

Aristotle maintains that biological organisms are compounds of matter and form and that compounds that have the same form are individuated by their matter. According to Aristotle, an object that undergoes change is an object that undergoes a change in form, i.e. form is imposed upon something material in nature. Aristotle therefore identifies organisms according to their matter and essential forms, forms that are arguably essential to an object's existence. Jeremy Kirby addresses a difficulty in Aristotle's metaphysics, namely the possibility that two organisms of the same species might share the same matter. If they share the same form, as Aristotle seems to suggest, then they seem to share that which they cannot, their identity. By taking into account Aristotle's views on the soul, its relation to living matter, and his rejection of the possibility of resurrection, Kirby reconstructs an answer to this problem and shows how Aristotle relies on some of the central themes in his system in order to resist this unwelcome result that his metaphysics might suggest.

Reale's monumental work establishes the exact dimensions of Aristotle's concept of first philosophy and proves the profound unity of concept that exists in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Reale's opposition to the genetic interpretation of the Metaphysics is an updated return to a more traditional view of Aristotle's work, one which runs counter to nearly all contemporary scholarship. Reale argues that Aristotle's first philosophy includes a study of being, a study of substance, a study of divine substance, and a study of principles and causes, all of which are integrated and dialectically reconciled.

Aristotle maintains that biological organisms are compounds of matter and form and that compounds that have the same form are individuated by their matter. According to Aristotle, an object that undergoes change is an object that undergoes a change in form, i.e. form is imposed upon something material in nature. Aristotle therefore identifies organisms according to their matter and essential forms, forms that are arguably essential to an object's existence. Jeremy Kirby addresses a difficulty in Aristotle's metaphysics, namely the possibility that two organisms of the same species might share the same matter. If they share the same form, as Aristotle seems to suggest, then they seem to share that which they cannot, their identity. By taking into account Aristotle's views on the soul, its relation to living matter, and his rejection of the possibility of resurrection, Kirby reconstructs an answer to this problem and shows how Aristotle relies on some of the central themes in his system in order to resist this unwelcome result that his metaphysics might suggest.

Hylomorphism is a metaphysical theory that explains the unity of material objects through a special immaterial part, a 'form'. While contemporary accounts of hylomorphism appeal to structure, and advocate that material substances can have other substances as parts, James Dominic Rooney highlights the flaws in this Neo-Aristotelian way of thinking. Instead, he draws on medieval European and Chinese traditions to put forward that the classical approach to the unity of material objects in terms of 'form' remains theoretically superior. Rooney shows how Thomas Aquinas' account of form gives a more coherent version of hylomorphism, eliminating the need for substance parts. He also studies the Song dynasty Confucian thinker Zhu Xi's hylomorphic intuition that whatever accounts for the composition of some parts into a material whole is a metaphysical part of that object. By appealing to the same non-Aristotelian considerations as Zhu Xi, Rooney explains why all those who believe in the unity of material objects will appeal to a form, enabling hylomorphism to remain a plausible framework. In doing so, this book shines new light on a classic philosophical problem in contemporary metaphysics and demonstrates the far-reaching points of theoretical contact between Western and Confucian thought.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. Aristotle studies are represented particularly strongly in this issue, the first of 2001.'standard reading among specialists in ancient philosopy'Brad Inwood, Bryn Mawr Classical Review

Christopher Shields investigates and evaluates Aristotle's approach to questions about homonymy, characterizing the metaphysical and semantic commitments necessary to establish the homonymy of a given concept. Then, in a series of case-studies, Shields examines in detail some of Aristotle's principal applications of homonymy - to the body, sameness and oneness, life, goodness, and being. Shields's aim is not only to give a fuller understanding of Aristotle's methodology and to illuminate his specific doctrines in a variety of areas, but to show that this methodology remains fruitful today.

Aristotles' 'Metaphysics' is one of the most important texts in Ancient Philosophy. This GuideBook looks at the Metaphysics thematically and takes the student through the main arguments found in the text. The book introduces and assesses Aristotle's life and the background to the Metaphysics, the ideas and text of the Metaphysics and Aristotle's philosophical legacy.