This paper analyzes the drivers of cross-border bank lending to 49 Emerging Markets (EMs) during the period 1990Q1-2014Q4, by assessing the impact of monetary, financial and real sector shocks in both the US and the euro area. The literature has traditionally highlighted the influence of US monetary policy on driving cross-border bank flows, and more recently the importance of both US and Euro Area (EA) financial/banking sectors’ related variables. Our contribution is the simultaneous analysis of the role of these US and EA drivers, as well as their interactions with real sector shocks. We corroborate the negative impact of US monetary policy tightening on cross-border lending to EMs, but we find that EA monetary policy seems to have an impact mostly on Emerging Europe, reflecting the fact that cross-border lending to most other EM regions is dollar denominated. We also find that real sector shocks in both the US and EA trigger an increase in cross-border lending, but less in EA when modeling the financial sector. Finally, for financial sector shocks, such as those associated with a decrease in bank leverage, our results indicate a broad-based overall contraction of cross-border lending if the shock originates in the US, and heterogenous effects across borrowing regions if the shock originates in the EA.

Superficial examination of aggregate gross cross-border capital inflow data suggests that there was no substitution between portfolio inflows and bank loans in recent years. However, our novel analysis of disaggregate inflows (both by types of instrument and borrower) shows interesting heterogeneity. There has been substitution of bank loans for portfolio debt securities not only in the case of corporate and sovereign borrowers in advanced countries, but also sovereign borrowers in emerging countries. In the case of corporate borrowers in emerging markets, the relationship corresponds to complementarity across types of gross capital inflows, especially during periods of positive capital gross inflows after the global financial crisis. A large part of these patterns does not seem to be driven by a common phenomenon across countries associated with the global financial cycle, but rather by country-specific factors.

Economic growth is broadening in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. Further ahead, however, growth prospects are tested by a dwindling workforce and weak productivity. Reaching Western European income levels would thus take longer, says the IMF in its Regional Economic Issues update on the region.

This paper maps cross-border financial linkages and identifies factors that drive them, contributing to the discussion on the appropriate design of a global financial safety net (GFSN). It builds on previous staff work and complements the findings of the companion paper on the Analytics of Systemic Crises and the Role of Global Financial Safety Nets. This paper notes the growing roles of financial linkages and complexity in injecting latent instability into the global financial system, underscoring the value of a GFSN design that is effective in forestalling the risk that a localized liquidity shock propagates through the global financial network turning into a large-scale systemic crisis.

Why are there so many crises in the world? Is it true that the global system is today riskier and more dangerous than in past decades? Do we have any tools at our disposal to bring these problems under control, to reduce the global system's proneness to instability? These are the tantalizing questions addressed in this book. Using a variety of demographic, economic, financial, social, and political indicators, the book demonstrates that the global system has indeed become an 'architecture of collapse' subject to a variety of shocks. An analysis of the global financial crisis of 2008, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and China, and the European sovereign debt crisis illustrates how the complexity and tight coupling of system components creates a situation of precarious stability and periodic disruption. This state of affairs can only be improved by enhancing the shock-absorbing components of the system, especially the capacity of states and governments to act, and by containing the shock-diffusing mechanisms. In particular, those related to phenomena such as trade imbalances, portfolio investment, cross-border banking, population ageing, and income and wealth inequality.

Global spillovers have entered a new phase. With crisis-related spillovers and risks fading, changing growth patterns are the main source of spillovers in the global economy at this juncture. Two key trends are highly relevant here. First, signs of self-sustaining recovery in some advanced economies indicate that the unwinding of exceptional monetary accommodation will proceed and lead to a tightening of global financial conditions in the coming years. An uneven recovery, though, suggests normalization will proceed at different times in different countries, with possible spillover implications. Second, growth in emerging markets is slowing on a broad basis since its precrisis peak and can carry noticeable spillover effects at the global level. Model code and programs used for the spillover simulations can be made available. Data used for the empirical analysis can be made available unless restricted by copyright or confidentiality issues.

This progress report provides a short update on the first year of implementation of the 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review (TSR) in line with the Managing Director’s Statement on Strengthening Surveillance of October 2011. The report does not provide a comprehensive review of surveillance—which will be done in the 2014 TSR. Instead, its purpose is to establish, at an early stage, whether the new operational priorities are being implemented, set out key areas of progress, and discuss the challenges raised in their implementation. The report also identifies areas where further efforts may need to be directed—particularly following the change to the legal framework—to ensure even implementation and delivery of effective surveillance. The report recognizes that, while some measures have been implemented over the past year, others will take more time to come to fruition.

This paper assesses the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom as a whole, not that of individual institutions. Since the last Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), the U.K. financial system has put the legacy of the crisis behind it and has become stronger and more resilient. This FSAP found the system to be much stronger and thus better able to serve the real economy. Like all systems, the U.K. financial system is exposed to risks. Its position as a global hub exposes the U.K. financial system to global risks. In addition, the uncertainties associated with the possibility of British exit from the EU weigh heavily on the outlook.

The IMF’s principal statistical publication, International Financial Statistics (IFS) Online, is the standard source of international statistics on all aspects of international and domestic finance. For most countries, IFS Online reports data on balance of payments, international investment position, international liquidity, monetary and financial statistics, exchange rates, interest rates, prices, production, government accounts, national accounts, and population. Updated monthly.

This 2016 Article IV Consultation highlights that Morocco’s macroeconomic conditions have improved since 2012, but growth has remained sluggish. In 2016, growth slowed owing to a sharp contraction in agricultural output and subdued nonagricultural activity. The unemployment rate decreased to 9.6 percent in the third quarter of 2016 while youth unemployment remains high at 21.8 percent. Morocco’s medium-term prospects are favorable, with growth expected to rebound to 4.4 percent in 2017 and reach 4.5 percent by 2021. However, risks remain substantial, and relate mainly to growth in advanced and emerging market economies, geopolitical tensions in the region, world energy prices, and global financial market volatility.