Virtue theory has become an important development in Christian ethics. Efforts are made in this volume to bring pastoral theology into conversation with these developments. This book probes the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards, who proposed that virtue is a form of beauty defined as "consent to being." This leads to the notion of compassion as ontological consent. Since language is the vehicle by which our experiences are conveyed, the book probes the issue of how moral vision is expressed in "experience-near" language through parable, poem, and lament. Moral vision is articulated most adequately through such language, and finding it is a kind of quest. The last chapter is a proposal for a mature pastoral theology of virtue as an expansion of Edwards's concept of "consent to being" from the vantage point of pastoral theology. A dynamic vision of virtue requires some connection between the experience of suffering and the inward striving toward the greatest good. The essence of virtue can be best understood, from a pastoral theological perspective, as the relational dynamic of "suffering with" another human being.

This book explores recent developments in ethics of virtue. While acknowledging the Aristotelian roots of modern virtue ethics – with its emphasis on the moral importance of character – this collection recognizes that more recent accounts of virtue have been shaped by many other influences, such as Aquinas, Hume, Nietzsche, Hegel and Marx, Confucius and Lao-tzu. The authors also examine the bearing of virtue ethics on other disciplines such as psychology, sociology and theology, as well as attending to some wider public, professional and educational implications of the ethics of virtue. This pioneering book will be invaluable to researchers and students concerned with the many contemporary varieties and applications of virtue ethics.

Virtues are in, but the work of Bill Bennett and others says little about specifically Christian virtues. Jonathan Wilson now recounts the recent rise of virtue ethics and provides a compelling Christian account and justification of them. Wilson engages such key figures as Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas. Focusing especially on the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, he not only sets forth a closely reasoned intellectual argument but suggests how an embrace of virtue ethics might change the nitty-gritty practice of the church's education, worship, and hospitality. Accessible, informed, and faithful, 'Gospel Virtues' is important reading for all who care about issues of character and community.

Towards Justice and Virtue challenges the rivalry between those who advocate only abstract, universal principles of justice and those who commend only the particularities of virtuous lives. Onora O'Neill traces this impasse to defects in underlying conceptions of reasoning about action. She proposes and vindicates a modest account of ethical reasoning and a reasoned way of answering the question 'who counts?', then uses these to construct linked accounts of principles by which we can move towards just institutions and virtuous lives.

What is a virtue, and how are virtues different from vices? Do people with virtues lead better lives than the rest of us? Do they know more? Can we acquire virtues if so, how? In this lively and engaging introduction to this core topic, Heather Battaly argues that there is more than one kind of virtue. Some virtues make the world a better place, or help us to attain knowledge. Other virtues are dependent upon good intentions like caring about other people or about truth. Virtue is an original approach to the topic, which carefully situates the fields of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology within a general theory of virtue. It argues that there are good reasons to acquire moral and intellectual virtues virtuous people often attain greater knowledge and lead better lives. As well as approaching virtue in a novel and illuminating way, Battaly ably guides the reader through the dense literature surrounding the topic, deftly moving from important specific and technical points to more general issues and questions. The final chapter proposes strategies for helping university students acquire intellectual virtues. Battaly’s insights are complemented by entertaining examples from popular culture, literature, and film, really bringing this topic to life for readers. Virtue is the ideal introduction to the topic. It will be an equally vital resource for students who are encountering the topic for the first time, and for scholars who are deeply engaged in virtue theory.

Faith and Virtue starts with the traditional metaphor and departs dramatically from tradition: ‘Faith and hope and love are not some late and miraculous addition to existence, comforting and exhilarating but finally gratuitous. They are the indispensable foundation for everything else.’ Professor Harned insists that the clue to moral life is vision, for among all the senses it is the eye that serves as the architect of our decisions. In its emphasis on the importance of imagination and oon the integral relationship between the moral and aesthetic aspects of existence, Faith and Virtue provides a salutary remedy for our too often manipulative and instrumental approach to the world and its citizens. In an earlier book, Grace and common Life, the author traced some intimations of grace in ordinary experience, times when the self is surprised by gifts that it could neither expect nor deserve. Now, he examines the effects of grace. In this exploration of the moral life, he argues that the metaphor is no less important now than it used to be, for its consistent focus on the problem of time and the emergency of habit can remind a world which has lost its sense of rhythm that there is more to reality than the present moment, greater rewards than instant gratification, higher values than relevance to the contemporary scene. Virtue cannot be satisfactorily examined without reference to the Church. While virtue is not an exclusive Christian attribute, it would be puzzling to refer to Christian virtue without any reference to a Christian context, since virtues are born from our social experience. This has been the greatest flaw in earlier studies of the metaphor. The old notion, that the theological virtues crown the natural, should be stood on its head, writes the author. He acknowledges the Christian origin of natural theology.

The 21st century offers a dizzying array of new technological developments: robots smart enough to take white collar jobs, social media tools that manage our most important relationships, ordinary objects that track, record, analyze and share every detail of our daily lives, and biomedical techniques with the potential to transform and enhance human minds and bodies to an unprecedented degree. Emerging technologies are reshaping our habits, practices, institutions, cultures and environments in increasingly rapid, complex and unpredictable ways that create profound risks and opportunities for human flourishing on a global scale. How can our future be protected in such challenging and uncertain conditions? How can we possibly improve the chances that the human family will not only live, but live well, into the 21st century and beyond? This book locates a key to that future in the distant past: specifically, in the philosophical traditions of virtue ethics developed by classical thinkers from Aristotle and Confucius to the Buddha. Each developed a way of seeking the good life that equips human beings with the moral and intellectual character to flourish even in the most unpredictable, complex and unstable situations--precisely where we find ourselves today. Through an examination of the many risks and opportunities presented by rapidly changing technosocial conditions, Vallor makes the case that if we are to have any real hope of securing a future worth wanting, then we will need more than just better technologies. We will also need better humans. Technology and the Virtues develops a practical framework for seeking that goal by means of the deliberate cultivation of technomoral virtues: specific skills and strengths of character, adapted to the unique challenges of 21st century life, that offer the human family our best chance of learning to live wisely and well with emerging technologies.

A Christian Education in the Virtues examines the connection between human nature and human flourishing. It draws on ancient and medieval sources to explore the formation of the person based on a Christian anthropology, emphasising the communal nature of the virtuous life and provides a richer approach to the question of contemporary character education. The book argues that the only way to understand and construct our character virtues is to have a clear picture of what is the purpose and meaning of human life. It highlights the importance of engaging with moral issues and makes the case that, for Christian educators, human flourishing is inseparable from God’s active relationship to human beings. The book also explores a teleological approach to character education goals. To educate the whole person in the light of an all-embracing Christian worldview is challenged by secular and liberal ideology and is often seen as irrational to the modern mind. Overall, the text seeks to demonstrate that many aspects of a Neo-Aristotelian-Thomist theoretical underpinning for Christian character education holds out a viable option for Christians. It therefore argues the case for the educational potential of Christian character education. This important book will be essential reading for academics, researchers and students in the fields of character and virtue education, religious education and the philosophy of education. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-mono/10.4324/9781003141877, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are for. The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, with a special emphasis on our practical lives. In essence, the essays here put epistemic virtues to work.