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The United States overall developments in weapons technology has not kept abreast of the times since the termination of World War II. A tremendous savings in manpower, equipment and national resources could have been possible if the US Air Force had entered the Vietnam War with a variety of accurate and effective conventional weapons and penetration aids. In evaluating the influence of weapon technology on military strategy, this paper discusses three factors: Soviet threat and challenge to Free World security; U.S. concept of deterrence; and the Soviet and US Views of limited war. It concludes that America must not become apathetic, but maintain its technological superiority over the Soviet Union. Further, that in order to counter 'national wars of liberation, ' consideration should be given to developing more effective conventional weaponry, while at the same time sustaining the much needed sophisticated deterrent nuclear forces in-being. (Author).

Dr. Gray examines the currency conversion between tactical behavior and its strategic consequences. All strategy is comprised of tactical actions and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are often tasked with tactical operations with the expectation they will have desired strategic effect. A SOF community seeking to explain its functions needs to be crystal clear in distinguishing between the fundamentally distinctive meanings. If there is confusion about these two concepts-and the author believes there is-then charting a sensible relationship between them is then impossible. The author explains as an example that, "there are no, indeed there cannot be, any 'strategic' troops, forces, or weapons, for the simple reason that all troops, forces, and weapons have strategic meaning, be it ever so slight, or even arguable." This monograph attempts to reinforce the understanding of strategy and tactics by using historical examples where the two have failed each other. In the end, there must be the necessary direction and leadership that provides solid strategic sense so that SOF may achieve the effects needed to advance U.S. policy.

The purpose of this book is to provide graduate students, professional engineers, military officers, and weapons-systems planners with a comprehensive grounding in the technology, evolution, functions, costs, impacts on society, utility, and limi tations of modern strategic weapons systems. Since the subject is often left to the specialists, this work should introduce the general reader to the fundamentals of such systems in an informed manner. Nowadays the intense interaction of means and ends sym bolized by strategic weapons has stimulated a changing dis cipline in which new missile systems and the intricate logic of nuclear force and counterforce hold the stage alongside the truths of conflict, alliances, fears, games, and subtle gains and losses. Many readers with new personal interest or public responsibility in this complex field will require an overall guide to it. This book will not prepare the reader to become an expert in the vast subject of strategic weapons systems. It will, however, enable him to understand, evaluate, and form reasonable opinions about these systems, their capabilities and effective ness. The subject is dealt with more from the viewpoint of the user (investor) rather than the architect (systems engineer) and builder (design engineer). While the user will be concerned with both political as well as technical options which may be available to solve a problem, the systems and design engineers are concerned with analyzing and building technological weapons devices once their requirements are generally known.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has emerged as a major topic of international security in the post-Cold War world. This compendium of articles, published in The Washington Quarterly between 1991 and 1995, describes the changing nature of the problem, dissusses new trends in nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy, identifies new arms control challenges at the regional and global levels, and concludes by addressing the global politics of proliferation.