Gen George S. Patton Jr. remains one of the most storied commanders of World War II. Patton’s spectacularly successful drive across France in August-September 1944 as commander of the US Third Army was perhaps his greatest campaign. Drawing heavily on declassified ULTRA intelligence reports, the records of XIX Tactical Air Command, and postwar interrogations of German commanders, Maj Bradford J. Shwedo’s XIX Tactical Air Command and ULTRA: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France sheds new light on Patton’s generalship and suggests that Patton’s penchant for risk and audacity may have been less the product of a sixth sense than of his confidence in ULTRA and tactical airpower. Timely and highly accurate ULTRA intelligence afforded Patton knowledge of German capabilities and enabled him to shape his operations to exploit mounting German weakness. Airpower provided top cover, punched through German concentrations, guarded Patton’s right flank, and furnished crucial airlift support while disrupting enemy lines of communication. Whatever Patton’s personal intuitive gifts, he deserves full marks for skillfully integrating the ground scheme of maneuver, airpower, and intelligence into the overall strategy of the Third Army and XIX TAC from Normandy to within 50 miles of the German border in less than 45 days. General Patton’s masterful employment of armor, airpower, and intelligence in a campaign fought more than 50 years ago is a textbook example of the sophisticated fusion of airpower, ground power, and information in the planning and execution of a fast-moving military operation. It is also a case study in flexibility, innovation, and boldness at the operational level of war. For all those reasons, Patton’s campaign in France merits the attention of latter-day air and ground warriors who must meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Gen George S. Patton Jr. remains one of the most storied commanders of World War II. Patton's spectacularly successful drive across France in August-September 1944 as commander of the US Third Army was perhaps his greatest campaign. Many biographers have attributed Patton's achievements almost exclusively to his masterful employment of armor and to an innate sixth sense that enabled him to anticipate the moves of his opponents. Drawing heavlly on declassffied ULTRA intelligence reports, the records of XIX Tactical Air Command, and postwar interrogations of German commanders, Maj Bradford J. Shwedo's XIX Tactical Air Command and ULTRA: Patton's Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France sheds new light on Patton's generalship and suggests that Patton's penchant for risk and audacity may have been less the product of a sixth sense than of his confidence in ULTRA and tactical airpower. Timely and highly accurate ULTRA intelligence afforded Patton knowledge of German capabilities and enabled him to shape his operations to exploit mounting German weakness. Airpower provided top cover, punched through German concentrations, guarded Patton's right flank, and furnished crucial airlift support while disrupting enemy lines of communication. Whatever Patton's personal intuitive gifts, he deserves full marks for skillfully integrating the ground scheme of maneuver, airpower, and intelligence into the overall strategy of the Third Army. Major Shwedo shows in some detail how Patton used both ULTRA and conventional operational intelligence to identify German vulnerabilities and then coordinated ground maneuver forces and airpower to exploit those vulnerabilities and create new ones. The synergy between courageous leadership and airpower, highly mobile ground forces, and superb intelligence-each creating opportunities for the other-took the Third Army and XIX TAC from Normandy to within 50 miles of the German border in less than 45 days.

This book combines short military biographies and operational analyses to reveal how the personalities, attitudes, and life experiences of twelve outstanding U.S. airmen shaped the central air campaigns in American history. These case studies illuminate the character of these airmen, the challenges they confronted in widely disparate armed conflicts, and the solutions that they crafted and implemented. Their achievements proved decisive not only in the campaigns they led, but also in shaping the U.S. Air Force and the dominant role of airpower in modern warfare.

This second of three volumes of Patton’s War picks up where the first one left off, examining General George S. Patton’s leadership of the U.S. Third Army. The book follows Patton’s contributions to both the Normandy and Brittany campaigns—the closing of the Falaise Pocket in Normandy, and racing to the port cities in Brittany. It ends with Patton and his corps rescuing the besieged town of Bastogne in the Battle of the Bulge. As he did in the preceding volume, Hymel relies not only on Patton’s diaries and letters, but countless veteran interviews, surveys, and memoirs. He also provides a unique insight missed by previous Patton scholars. Instead of using Patton’s transcribed diaries, which were heavily edited and embellished, he consults Patton’s original, hand-written diaries to uncover previously unknown information about the general. This second volume of Hymel’s groundbreaking work shows Patton at the height of his generalship, successfully leading his army without the mistakes and caustic behavior that almost got him sent home earlier—even if we also see a Patton still guided at times by racism and antisemitism.

The WWII diary of a US soldier and Soviet spy who worked closely with General Patton is presented in this fully annotated edition. Robert S. Allen is one of the more controversial figures of the Second World War. After serving in France during World War I, he left the military to start a career as a syndicated columnist, eventually becoming the Washington, DC, bureau chief for the Christian Science Monitor. In that time, he also developed a sideline as a paid informant for the KGB. When American entered World War II, Allen rejoined the army to serve as General Patton's chief of situation and executive officer for operations. He was considered such an authority on Patton after the war that Twentieth Century-Fox asked him to develop a film script about the general. In Forward with Patton, John Nelson Rickard presents a complete, annotated edition of Colonel Allen's World War II diary for 1944-1945. The entries reflect Allen's private thoughts on the Third Army and provide an invaluable perspective on Patton, whom Allen deeply admired.

In the winter of 1944--1945, Hitler sought to divide Allied forces in the heavily forested Ardennes region of Luxembourg and Belgium. He deployed more than 400,000 troops in one of the last major German offensives of the war, which became known as the Battle of the Bulge, in a desperate attempt to regain the strategic initiative in the West. Hitler's effort failed for a variety of reasons, but many historians assert that Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.'s Third Army was ultimately responsible for securing Allied victory. Although Patton has assumed a larger-than-life reputation for his leadership in the years since World War II, scholars have paid little attention to his generalship in the Ardennes following the relief of Bastogne. In Advance and Destroy, Captain John Nelson Rickard explores the commander's operational performance during the entire Ardennes campaign, through his "estimate of the situation," the U.S. Army's doctrinal approach to problem-solving. Patton's day-by-day situational understanding of the Battle of the Bulge, as revealed through ULTRA intelligence and the influence of the other Allied generals on his decision-making, gives readers an in-depth, critical analysis of Patton's overall effectiveness, measured in terms of mission accomplishment, his ability to gain and hold ground, and a cost-benefit analysis of his operations relative to the lives of his soldiers. The work not only debunks myths about one of America's most controversial generals but provides new insights into his renowned military skill and colorful personality.

These words may seem to have been written by an advance infantry unit or a combat brigade, carrying out an assault against entrenched enemy troops. Instead, this hair-raising narrative comes from the diary of “B” Company of the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment, a “non-combat” unit attached to Patton’s Third Army during his epic pursuit of the retreating German forces across France during August, 1944. Though the 1303rd (called “the thirteen-third” by its soldiers) was supposed to perform its duties outside the zone of armed conflict, these men found themselves acting as the southern flank of Patton’s rapid advance. More than once, they had to re-build bridges the Germans had hastily destroyed in order to permit the continued advance of American troops—often doing so under enemy fire. Twice they were called upon to deploy as infantry in holding back German attacks. Careful editing and annotation by military historian Joseph C. Fitzharris corrects occasional lapses in the diary, clarifies references, and provides important context for following the movements and understanding the importance of Company B, the 1303rd, and its sister regiments. Patton’s Fighting Bridge Builders rewards its readers with a new understanding of both the messiness and the bravery of the Second World War.

This book studies force, the coercive application of power against resistance, building from Thomas Hobbes’ observation that all self-contained political orders have some ultimate authority that uses force to both dispense justice and to defend the polity against its enemies. This cross-disciplinary analysis finds that rulers concentrate force through cooperation, conveyance, and comprehension, applying common principles across history. Those ways aim to keep foes from concerting their actions, or by eliminating the trust that should bind them. In short, they make enemies afraid to cooperate, and now they are doing so in cyberspace as well.