Coxe's main argument is that the "Constitution contains express texts providing for judicial competency to decide questioned legislation to be constitutional or unconstitutional and to hold it valid or void accordingly" (4). There are four subordinate arguments: First, that the framers of the constitution specifically granted the courts the power to hold a law unconstitutional by dint of the Supremacy Clause and by Article III, Section 2 defining judicial power. Second, that documents written before the constitution were influential in framing the text and establishing the idea of judicial review. The third looks at the era before and during the confederation with an eye toward the court's power to rule on constitutionality. The fourth argument finds analogies and precedents in foreign law, including Roman and Canon law.

A thorough analysis of the early history and development of judicial review, this book by a preeminent scholar ranks among the most cited and highly regarded texts on law and government.

Which branch of government should be entrusted with safeguarding individual rights? Conventional wisdom assigns this responsibility to the courts, on the grounds that liberty can only be protected through judicial interpretation of bills of rights. In fact it is difficult for many people even to conceive of any other way that rights might be protected. John Dinan challenges this understanding by tracing and evaluating the different methods that have been used to protect rights in the United States from the founding until the present era. By examining legislative statutes, judicial decisions, convention proceedings, and popular initiatives in four representative states-Massachusetts, Virginia, Michigan, and Oregon-Dinan shows that rights have been secured in the American polity in three principal ways. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rights were protected primarily through representative institutions. Then in the early twentieth century, citizens began to turn to direct democratic institutions to secure their rights. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that judges came to be seen as the chief protectors of liberties. By analyzing the relative ability of legislators, citizens, and judges to serve as guardians of rights, Dinan's study demonstrates that each is capable of securing certain rights in certain situations. Elected representatives are generally capable of protecting most rights, but popular initiatives provide an effective mechanism for securing rights in the face of legislative intransigence, and judicial decisions offer a superior means of protecting liberties in crisis times. Accordingly, rather than viewing rights protection as the peculiar province of any single institution, this task ought to be considered the proper responsibility of all these institutions. By undertaking a comparison of these institutional methods across such a wide expanse of time, Keeping the People's Liberties makes a highly original contribution to the literature on rights protection and provides a new perspective on debates about the contemporary role of representative, populist, and judicial institutions.