Coxe's main argument is that the "Constitution contains express texts providing for judicial competency to decide questioned legislation to be constitutional or unconstitutional and to hold it valid or void accordingly" (4). There are four subordinate arguments: First, that the framers of the constitution specifically granted the courts the power to hold a law unconstitutional by dint of the Supremacy Clause and by Article III, Section 2 defining judicial power. Second, that documents written before the constitution were influential in framing the text and establishing the idea of judicial review. The third looks at the era before and during the confederation with an eye toward the court's power to rule on constitutionality. The fourth argument finds analogies and precedents in foreign law, including Roman and Canon law.

This book examines the constitutional principles governing the relationship between legislatures and courts at that critical crossroads of their power where legislatures may seek to intervene in the judicial process, or to interfere with judicial functions, to secure outcomes consistent with their policy objectives or interests. Cases of high political moment are usually involved, where the temptation, indeed political imperative, for legislatures to intervene can be overwhelming. Although the methods of intervention are various, ranging from the direct and egregious to the subtle and imperceptible, unbridled legislative power in this regard has been a continuing concern in all common law jurisdictions. Prominent examples include direct legislative interference in pending cases, usurpation of judicial power by legislatures, limitations on the jurisdiction of courts, strategic amendments to law applicable to cases pending appeal, and attempts directly to overturn court decisions in particular cases. Because the doctrine of the separation of powers, as an entrenched constitutional rule, is a major source of principle, the book will examine in detail the jurisprudence of the United States and Australia in particular. These jurisdictions have identical constitutional provisions entrenching that doctrine as well as the most developed jurisprudence on this point. The legal position in the United Kingdom, which does not have an entrenched separation of powers doctrine, will be examined as a counterpoint. Other relevant jurisdictions (such as Canada, Ireland and India) are also examined in the context of particular principles, particularly when their respective jurisprudence is rather more developed on discrete points. The book examines how the relevant constitutional principles strive to maintain the primacy of the law-making role of the legislature in a representative democracy and yet afford the decisional independence of the judiciary that degree of protection essential to protect it from the legislature's 'impetuous vortex', to borrow the words of James Madison from The Federalist (No 48).

Philip Hamburger’s Law and Judicial Duty traces the early history of what is today called “judicial review.” Working from previously unexplored evidence, Hamburger questions the very concept of judicial review. Although decisions holding statutes unconstitutional are these days considered instances of a distinct judicial power of review, Hamburger shows that they were once understood merely as instances of a broader judicial duty. The book’s focus on judicial duty overturns the familiar debate about judicial power. The book is therefore essential reading for anyone concerned about the proper role of the judiciary. Hamburger lays the foundation for his argument by explaining the common law ideals of law and judicial duty. He shows that the law of the land was understood to rest on the authority of the lawmaker and that what could not be discerned within the law of the land was not considered legally binding. He then shows that judges had a duty to decide in accord with the law of the land. These two ideals—law and judicial duty—together established and limited what judges could do. By reviving an understanding of these common law ideals, Law and Judicial Duty calls into question the modern assumption that judicial review is a power within the judges’ control. Indeed, the book shows that what is currently considered a distinct power of review was once understood as a matter of duty—the duty of judges to decide in accord with the law of the land. The book thereby challenges the very notion of judicial review. It shows that judges had authority to hold government acts unconstitutional, but that they enjoyed this power only to the extent it was required by their duty.In laying out the common law ideals, and in explaining judicial review as an aspect of judicial duty, Law and Judicial Duty reveals a very different paradigm of law and of judging than prevails today. The book, moreover, sheds new light on a host of misunderstood problems, including intent, manifest contradiction, the status of foreign and international law, the cases and controversies requirement, and the authority of judicial precedent.

This book, first published in 1914, contains five historical essays. Three of them are on the concept of judicial review, which is defined as the power of a court to review and invalidate unlawful acts by the legislative and executive branches of government. One chapter addresses the historical controversy over states’ rights. Another concerns the Pelatiah Webster Myth—the notion that the US Constitution was the work of a single person. In "Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review," Edward S. Corwin analyzes the legal source of the power of the Supreme Court to review acts of Congress. "We, the People" examines the rights of states in relation to secession and nullification. "The Pelatiah Webster Myth" demolishes Hannis Taylor’s thesis that Webster was the "secret" author of the constitution. "The Dred Scott Decision" considers Chief Justice Taney’s argument concerning Scott’s title to citizenship under the Constitution. "Some Possibilities in the Way of Treaty-Making" discusses how the US Constitution relates to international treaties. Matthew J. Franck’s new introduction to this centennial edition situates Corwin’s career in the history of judicial review both as a concept and as a political reality.

Haines shows the gradual development of judicial power and authority through this study of conflicting opinions over the right of the judiciary to nullify legislative acts, which includes discussion of resistance from the states, attitudes about the slavery controversy and the effects of Jacksonian democracy. This title was originally published in the Columbia University series Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Contents Chapter I: Judicial Powers Before the Adoption of the Federal Constitution Chapter II: Early Conflicts Over Judicial Nullification by Federal Courts Chapter III: Extension of Federal Judicial Authority Chapter IV: Conflicts Over the Extension of Judicial Authority Chapter V: Principles of the Jacksonian Democracy Chapter VI: Judicial Powers from 1856 to 1870 180 pp.

American Judicial Power: The State Court Perspective is a welcome addition to the breadth of studies on the American legal system and provides an accessible and highly illuminating overview of the state courts and their functions. The study of America’s courts is overwhelmingly skewed toward the federal government, and therefore often overlooks state courts and their importance. Michael Buenger and Paul De Muniz fill this gap in the study of American constitutionalism, as they examine the wide and distinctive powers these courts exercise, and their role in administering the bulk of the nation’s justice system. This groundbreaking work covers many critical topics pertaining to the state courts, including: a comparison of the role of state and federal courts, the history of America’s state courts, the judicial selection processes utilized in the states, the unique roles assigned to state courts and the varying structure of those courts, the relationship between state judicial power and state legislative power, and the opportunities and challenges that are and will be facing the state courts. With an insightful foreword from Sanford Levinson, this revolutionary book will be of interest to students, educators, and researchers in the fields of law, political science, and government. Constitutional law experts will also benefit from an analysis of the state courts and their powers.