Abstract: Real GDP and oil prices are decomposed into common stochastic trend and cycle processes using structural time series models. Potential real GDP is represented by the level of the trend component of real GDP. The potential rate of growth of real GDP is represented by the stochastic drift element of the trend component. Cuevas finds that there is a strong association at the trend and cycle frequencies between real GDP and the real price of oil. This association is also robust in the presence of key economic policy variables. From 1970-80, when the underlying annual rate of increase of the real price of oil was 12 percent, the underlying annual rate of increase of potential GDP in Venezuela was 2.6 percent. By contrast, from 1981-2000 when the underlying rate of increase of the real price of oil was -5 percent, the underlying growth rate of potential GDP fell 1.5 percent. However, the strength of association between the underlying growth of oil prices and real GDP has fallen considerably since the early 1980s, suggesting that oil cannot be relied on as an engine for future growth in Venezuela. This paper"a product of the Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela Country Management Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region"is part of a larger effort in the region to encourage research on macroeconomic issues. The author may be contacted at mcuevas@@worldbank.org.

With inflation increasing all over the world, central banks have to consider with some care how quickly to re-establish price stability. A key issue in this context is the short-run cost in terms of foregone output and higher unemployment. The aim of this paper is to determine the 'sacrifice ratio' for the Euro Area and for the United States. The main findings are: the cost of reducing inflation is in most cases higher in the US than in the EA. For example, reducing (headline) inflation by 1% point requires a decline of output of 1.4% in the EU, but 2.3% for the US. Considering core inflation, the sacrifice ratio in terms of output is somewhat higher for the Euro Area (around 4) compared to 3.2 for the US. However, the sacrifice ratios in terms of unemployment are always much larger for the US. Reducing headline inflation by 1% requires an increase in unemployment of little more than 1% in the EA, compared to 8% in the US.However, there is also a long-run 'hysterisis' cost that is specific to the Euro Area since the reaction of unemployment to output depends on the state of the economy. During downturns this relationship worsens. This implies that a recession engineered to combat inflation will have an additional cost in terms of lower unemployment later, even after the recovery of the economy.

This paper employs several econometric techniques to estimate the Armenian output gap. The findings indicate that the output gap is significantly positive in 2007 and 2008 and decreased dramatically in 2009. The paper uses these results to estimate a New Keynesian Phillips curve for Armenia, suggesting a significant role of the output gap and inflation expectations in determining current inflation. Finally, the underlying fiscal stance over the period 2000-09 is assessed by estimating the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance. Most of Armenia’s fiscal deficit is found to be structural. Fiscal policy, while providing counter-cyclical support in 2009, has been largely pro-cyclical in the past.

This paper studies the problems of estimation and inference in the linear trend model: yt=̉+þt+ut, where ut follows an autoregressive process with largest root þ, and þ is the parameter of interest. We contrast asymptotic results for the cases þþþ

This paper presents capital utilization corrected measures of technology shocks for aggregate and disaggregated (two digit Standard Industrial Classification code) industries. We correct for variations in capital utilization by employing industrial electrical use as a measure of capital services. In contrast, the standard measures of technology shocks used in the Real Business Cycle literature are based on economy wide data and assume that capital services are proportional to the stock of measured capital. To assess the impact of these differences, we contrast selected properties of the competing technology shock measures. We argue that the properties of technology shocks for the manufacturing sector are quite different than those used in the RBC literature. We also find that correcting for capital utilization has important implications for the properties of the Solow residual.

This paper studies economic and financial spillovers from the euro area to Poland in a two-country semi-structural model. The model incorporates various channels of macrofinancial linkages and cross-border spillovers. We parameterize the model through an extensive calibration process, and provide a wide range of model properties and evaluation exercises. Simulation results suggest a prominent role of foreign demand shocks (euro area and global) in driving Poland’s output, inflation and interest rate dynamics, particularly in recent years. Our model also has the capability for medium-term conditional forecasting and policy analysis.

This paper studies the implications of procyclical capital utilization rates for inference regarding cyclical movements in labor productivity and the degree of returns to scale. We organize our investigation around five questions that we study using a measure of capital services based on electricity consumption: (1) Is the phenomenon of near or actual short run increasing returns to labor (SRIRL) an artifact of the failure to accurately measure capital utilization rates? (2) Can we find a significant role for capital services in aggregate and industry level production technologies? (3) Is there evidence against the hypothesis of constant returns to scale? (4) Can we reject the notion that the residuals in our estimated production functions represent technology shocks? (5) How does correcting for cyclical variations in capital services affect the statistical properties of estimated aggregate technology shocks? The answer to the first two questions is: yes. The answer to the third and fourth questions is: no. The answer to the fifth question is: a lot.