German army deficiencies are often cited as the reason for the failure of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes region of France, Belgium and Luxembourg in December of 1944 to January 1945 which the Germans called Operation Wacht am Rhein, the Allies named the Ardennes Counteroffensive, and was also commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge. It is certainly true that the three German armies regrouped for the offensive were in differing states; only the 5th Panzer Army was in something resembling good condition, with the 6th and the 7th mediocre at best. The divisions were also often not mobile enough because of the lack of automotive equipment and were short on tanks and artillery. But these cannot be considered the only reasons for the German failure: it was also the speed of the Allied reaction, and especially the conduct of the Americans, who experienced some of the fiercest combat of the war, and suffered over 100,000 casualties. This volume in the Casemate Illustrated series, with over 100 photographs and 24 color profiles describes in detail the different events that caused the German defeat, from the beginning of the offensive on December 16, 1944 to the retreat behind the Siegfried Line. It looks at several topics in particular: the American resistance at St. Vith; the resistance of the 101st Airborne in Bastogne; German obstinacy in persisting with the siege at Bastogne; the airlift and the intervention of the 9th US Air Force; the rapid regrouping of the 3rd US Army; Patton's counterattack; the British counterattack; and finally how the Allies failed to transform the German withdrawal into rout, missing an opportunity to cross the Siegfried line and the Rhine on the heels of the Germans, leading to an incomplete victory.

The prizewinning historian and bestselling author of D-Day, Stalingrad, and The Battle of Arnhem reconstructs the Battle of the Bulge in this riveting new account On December 16, 1944, Hitler launched his ‘last gamble’ in the snow-covered forests and gorges of the Ardennes in Belgium, believing he could split the Allies by driving all the way to Antwerp and forcing the Canadians and the British out of the war. Although his generals were doubtful of success, younger officers and NCOs were desperate to believe that their homes and families could be saved from the vengeful Red Army approaching from the east. Many were exultant at the prospect of striking back. The allies, taken by surprise, found themselves fighting two panzer armies. Belgian civilians abandoned their homes, justifiably afraid of German revenge. Panic spread even to Paris. While some American soldiers, overwhelmed by the German onslaught, fled or surrendered, others held on heroically, creating breakwaters which slowed the German advance. The harsh winter conditions and the savagery of the battle became comparable to the Eastern Front. In fact the Ardennes became the Western Front’s counterpart to Stalingrad. There was terrible ferocity on both sides, driven by desperation and revenge, in which the normal rules of combat were breached. The Ardennes—involving more than a million men—would prove to be the battle which finally broke the back of the Wehrmacht. In this deeply researched work, with striking insights into the major players on both sides, Antony Beevor gives us the definitive account of the Ardennes offensive which was to become the greatest battle of World War II.

A comprehensive, photo-filled account of the six-week-long Battle of the Bulge, when panzers slipped through the forest and took the Allies by surprise. In December 1944, just as World War II appeared to be winding down, Hitler shocked the world with a powerful German counteroffensive that cracked the center of the American front. The attack came through the Ardennes, the hilly and forested area in eastern Belgium and Luxembourg that the Allies had considered a “quiet” sector. Instead, for the second time in the war, the Germans used it as a stealthy avenue of approach for their panzers. Much of US First Army was overrun, and thousands of prisoners were taken as the Germans forged a fifty-mile “bulge” into the Allied front. But in one small town, Bastogne, American paratroopers, together with remnants of tank units, offered dogged resistance. Meanwhile, the rest of Eisenhower’s “broad front” strategy came to a halt as Patton, from the south, and Hodges, from the north, converged on the enemy incursion. Yet it would take an epic, six-week-long winter battle, the bloodiest in the history of the US Army, before the Germans were finally pushed back. Christer Bergström has interviewed veterans, gone through huge amounts of archive material, and performed on-the-spot research in the area. The result is a large amount of previously unpublished material and new findings, including reevaluations of tank and personnel casualties and the most accurate picture yet of what really transpired from the perspectives of both sides. With nearly four hundred photos, numerous maps, and thirty-two superb color profiles of combat vehicles and aircraft, it provides perhaps the most comprehensive look at the battle yet published.

From the earliest planning stages of the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, Hitler was convinced of the importance of taking the Meuse bridges. He resolved that, when his forces broke through the US lines, one special unit should be dressed in American uniforms and issued with American weapons and vehicles. In this guise they could take advantage of the surprise and shock of the breakthrough, and move forward to the Meuse bridges as if they were retreating Americans. Jean-Paul Pallud details their organisation and the fateful sequence of events that followed.

This study examines the nature of the defense at the operational level of war by analyzing the Battle of the Bulge in Dec. 1944 using the concepts of blitzkrieg and "web" defense. The monograph begins by discussing the influence of defensive theory on the operational concepts of blitzkrieg and "web" defense. The German concept of blitzkrieg incorporates Clausewitz’s theory of the offense by emphasizing surprise, speed, and concentration at the decisive point. The counter to the blitzkrieg offense is found in COL F.O. Miksche’s concept of "web" defense. The Battle of the Bulge provides an excellent example of a "web" defense pitted against a blitzkrieg offense. The German blitzkrieg in the Ardennes in 1944 failed for many reasons: 1) Army Group B did not concentrate its strength against the most vulnerable section of the Allied line; 2) The rugged Ardennes terrain could be easily defended against attacks by mechanized forces; 3) Key American commanders (Eisenhower, Gerow, and Middleton) quickly recognized the value of holding several key road junctions (St. Vith, Malmedy, Bastogne, Marche, and Rochefort) which dominated movement through the Ardennes; 4) The Allies held the shoulders of the German penetration; 5) The Allies quickly concentrated armored and motorized units to blunt the German penetration; and 6) Army Group B lacked operational reserves and adequate logistic support. The analysis of the Ardennes shows that the defense is indeed the stronger form of war and that a "web" defense can be employed effectively against a blitzkrieg offense...The Allies effectively used a "web" defense to counter these threats. If NATO is to defeat a Soviet attack without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, it must adopt a viable operational defensive concept. "Web" defense is such a concept.

A major new approach to Hitler's much-studied famous last-gasp counteroffensive in late December 1944 that illuminates American command leadership at the "corps" level. Focuses on the performance of six generals in the war's most famous battle to give a new perspective of the crucial--but often neglected--level between "division" and "army."

"Conversino's story is as interesting as it is unfamiliar and succeeds in opening up "Frantic's" many dimensions, including the personal as well as the political, strategic, and operational. His revelations regarding the interactions between American servicemen and Ukrainian Russians are especially valuable and underscore the immense difficulties of implementing alliances at the grass roots level". -- Dennis Showalter, author of Tannenberg: Clash of Empires

"Institute for National Strategic Studies"--Cover of pbk. printing.

The task of securing the southern shoulder of Hitler's great offensive in the Ardennes, and delaying any counter-attack by the much-feared General George Patton, fell to VII Armee, commanded by the dogged yet unimaginative General Erich Brandenberger. Brandenburger knew that outright victory was impossible: resources were slender, and VII Armee's manpower and materiel were stretched to the limit. The key task was to stop Patton ruining the game plan. The volatile American's rapid reaction times were well known: could he react quickly enough to prevent the assault on Hodge's First Army achieving its objectives? This title recounts how VII Armee fought a series of bitter battles attempting to protect the vulnerable flank of the attack, as US Third Army drove into the southern flank of the 'Bulge'. Also covered is Operation 'Nordwind', I Armee's ambitious offensive to recapture the Alsace region.