Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

Most of the Cypriot population, especially the lower classes, remained loyal to the British cause during the Great War and the island contributed significantly to the First World War, with men and materials. The British acknowledged this yet failed to institute political and economic reforms once the war ended. The obsession of Greek Cypriot elites with enosis (union with Greece), which only increased after the war, and the British dismissal of increasing the role of Cypriots in government, bringing the Christian and Muslim communities closer, and expanding franchise to all classes and sexes, led to serious problems down the line, not least the development of a democratic deficit. Andrekos Varnava studies the events and the impact of this crucial period.

1914-1918, David Stevenson's history of the First World War, has been acclaimed as the definitive one-volume account of the conflict In the summer of 1914 Europe exploded into a frenzy of mass violence. The war that followed had global repercussions, destroying four empires and costing millions of lives. Even the victorious countries were scarred for a generation, and we still today remain within the conflict's shadow. In this major analysis David Stevenson re-examines the causes, course and impact of this 'war to end war', placing it in the context of its era and exposing its underlying dynamics. His book provides a wide-ranging international history, drawing on insights from the latest research. It offers compelling answers to the key questions about how this terrible struggle unfolded: questions that remain disturbingly relevant for our own time. 'It's harder to imagine a better single-volume comprehensive history of the conflict than this superb study' Ian Kershaw 'Perhaps the best comprehensive one-volume history of the war yet written' New Yorker 'David Stevenson is the real deal ... His defining characteristic is his outstanding rigour as an historian ... tremendously clever' Niall Ferguson 'This history of the 1914-1918 conflict surpasses all others. It is tough, erudite and comprehensive' Independent

The first introduction to writing about intelligence and intelligence services. Secrecy has never stopped people from writing about intelligence. From memoirs and academic texts to conspiracy-laden exposes and spy novels, writing on intelligence abounds. Now, this new account uncovers intelligence historiography's hugely important role in shaping popular understandings and the social memory of intelligence. In this first introduction to these official and unofficial histories, a range of leading contributors narrate and interpret the development of intelligence studies as a discipline. Each chapter showcases new archival material, looking at a particular book or series of books and considering issues of production, censorship, representation and reception.

Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt examines the use and exploitation of intelligence in formulating Britain’s strategy for the Arab Revolt during the First World War. It also presents a radical re-examination of the achievements of T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) as an intelligence officer and guerrilla leader. Modern intelligence techniques such as Sigint, Imint and Humint were incorporated into strategic planning with greater expertise and consistency in Arabia than in any other theatre during the war, and their deployment as tactical support for the Arab forces was decisive. Using much previously unpublished material, this study shows conclusively how Britain’s intelligence community in Arabia influenced the conduct of the Arab campaign, promoted a full-scale guerrilla war and thereby facilitated the Arab armies’ march north into Syria, Palestine and the modern Middle East. Polly A. Mohs contributes to the unveiling of another hidden corner of the history of the Middle East and to a better understanding of the significance of intelligence in formulating strategic processes in the modern era. Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, military history, Middle East history, British imperial history, guerrilla warfare and insurgency.

What exactly is military history? Forty years ago it meant battles, campaigns, great commanders, drums and trumpets. It was largely the preserve of military professionals and was used to support national history and nationalism. Now, though, the study of war has been transformed by the war and society approach, by the examination of identity, memory and gender, and a less Euro-centric and more global perspective. Generally it is recognised that war and conflict must be integrated into the wider narrative of historical development, and this is why Ian Becketts research guide is such a useful tool for anyone working in this growing field. It introduces students to all the key debates, issues and resources. While European and global perspectives are not neglected, there is an emphasis on the British experience of war since 1500. This survey of British military history will be essential reading and reference for anyone who has a professional or amateur interest in the subject, and it will be a valuable introduction for newcomers to it.

This is a study of the British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's, need for information on the enemy, and traces the subsequent development of the system.

Haig's Intelligence is an important study of Douglas Haig's controversial command during the First World War. Based on extensive new research, it addresses a perennial question about the British army on the Western Front between 1916 and 1918: why did they think they were winning? Jim Beach reveals how the British perceived the German army through a study of the development of the British intelligence system, its personnel and the ways in which intelligence was gathered. He also examines how intelligence shaped strategy and operations by exploring the influence of intelligence in creating perceptions of the enemy. He shows for the first time exactly what the British knew about their opponent, when and how and, in so doing, sheds significant new light on continuing controversies about the British army's conduct of operations in France and Belgium and the relationship between Haig and his chief intelligence officer, John Charteris.

An exact reproduction of the landmark British assessment of German military capability in the final months of World War I. Compiled by British Intelligence, for restricted official issue by the General Staff, The German Army Handbook of April 1918 is a comprehensive assessment of the German Army during the latter stages of the First World War. Illustrated throughout with plates, diagrams, charts, tables, and maps, it provides a detailed breakdown of the army, covering all aspects from recruiting and training, mobilization, command and organization, weapons and signals to transportation, medical and veterinary services, and uniform. There are also two maps, showing Army Corps Districts, and Zones of Administration and Lines of Command in June 1917. The German Army Handbook of 1918 was a remarkable achievement. It provides solutions to many questions that histories of the First World War and accounts of its battles are unable to answer. It shows how the static conventions of trench warfare usurped the traditional role of cavalry, and how the German Army was able to take advantage of the dominance of the machine gun on the Western Front in 1915.

This volume examines how the Ottoman Army was able to evolve and maintain a high level of overall combat effectiveness despite the primitive nature of the Ottoman State during the First World War. Structured around four case studies, at the operational and tactical level, of campaigns involving the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire: Gallipoli in 1915, Kut in 1916, Third Gaza-Beersheba in 1917, and Megiddo in 1918. For each of these campaigns, particular emphasis is placed on examining specific elements of combat effectiveness and how they affected that particular battle. The prevalent historiography attributes Ottoman battlefield success primarily to external factors - such as the presence of German generals and staff officers; climate, weather and terrain that adversely affected allied operations; allied bumbling and amateurish operations; and inadequate allied intelligence. By contrast, Edward J. Erickson argues that the Ottoman Army was successful due to internal factors, such as its organizational architecture, a hardened cadre of experienced combat leaders, its ability to organize itself for combat, and its application of the German style of war. Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I will be of great interest to students of the First World War, military history and strategic studies in general.