Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics?

Using Italy and the Roma as a case study, this book proves that non-discrimination provisions are not sufficient to protect the cultural identity of minorities: a system encompassing also the use of collective rights is better suited for this purpose.

A legal-theoretical account of collective rights, grounded in the normative-moral view of 'value collectivism'.

Race and Racial Prejudice.

Nowadays, rights are frequently ascribed to groups distinguished by their nationality, culture, religion or language. Rights are also commonly ascribed to institutionalised groups, such as states, businesses, trade unions and private associations. Yet the ascription of rights to groups remains deeply controversial. Many people reject the very idea of group rights. Amongst those who do not, there is radical disagreement about which sorts of group might possess rights and why. Some believe that group rights threaten the freedom and well-being of individuals, while others argue that the rights of groups can complement them. Some claim that group rights can also be human rights; others find that claim incoherent. The contributions making up this volume wrestle with these and many other of the issues that surround group rights. This volume brings together twenty-four of the journal articles that have contributed most significantly to contemporary thinking on group rights.

The Concept of Group Rights in International Law offers a critical appraisal of the concept of group rights in international law on the basis of an extensive survey of existing group rights in contemporary international law. Among some of its findings is the observation that an ideological way of arguing about this legal category is widespread among scholars as well as practitioners; it sees this ideological framing as one of the main reasons why international law has so far been very reluctant to provide group rights and to call them by their name. Accordingly, the book re-evaluates the concept based on the experience with existing group rights in international law and pleads for a more pragmatic approach. Despite limitations with the concept, the overall thesis is that there is a role for group rights as a pragmatic tool allowing for a principled approach to substate groups through international law. Such an approach could turn group rights into an arguably minor, but nevertheless, highly relevant legal category of international law.

This book presents an argument for the existence of moral rights held by groups and a resulting account of how to reconcile group rights with individual rights and with the rights of other groups. Throughout, the author shows applications to actual legal and political controversies, thus tying the normative theory to actual legal practice. The author presents collective moral rights as an underlying normative explanation for various legal norms protecting group rights in domestic and international legal contexts. Examples at issue include rights held by indigenous peoples, by trade unions, and by religious and cultural minority groups. The account also bears on contemporary discussions of multiculturalism and recognition, on debates about reasonable accommodation of minority communities, and on claims for third generation human rights. The book will thus be relevant both to theorists and to legal and human rights practitioners interested in related areas.

Liberal theories have long insisted that cultural diversity in democratic societies can be accommodated through classical liberal tools, in particular through individual rights, and they have often rejected the claims of cultural minorities for group rights as illiberal. Group Rights as Human Rights argues that such a rejection is misguided. Based on a thorough analysis of the concept of group rights, it proposes to overcome the dominant dichotomy between "individual" human rights and "collective" group rights by recognizing that group rights also serve individual interests. It also challenges the claim that group rights, so understood, conflict with the liberal principle of neutrality; on the contrary, these rights help realize the neutrality ideal as they counter cultural biases that exist in Western states. Group rights deserve to be classified as human rights because they respond to fundamental, and morally important, human interests. Reading the theories of Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor as complementary rather than opposed, Group Rights as Human Rights sees group rights as anchored both in the value of cultural belonging for the development of individual autonomy and in each person’s need for a recognition of her identity. This double foundation has important consequences for the scope of group rights: it highlights their potential not only in dealing with national minorities but also with immigrant groups; and it allows to determine how far such rights should also benefit illiberal groups. Participation, not intervention, should here be the guiding principle if group rights are to realize the liberal promise.

In the 1990s inter-ethnic conflicts threaten the stability of many states. As a result the issue of minority rights has become an urgent concern for international lawyers. Minority and Group Rights in the New Millennium examines the way in which existing international law and human rights instruments protect the rights of minorities. In addition the essays in this volume address current debates on the fundamental issue of defining a minority, the complex arguments for expanding existing definitions and the legitimacy of claims by specific groups to qualify for minority status.

Collective cultural rights are commonly perceived as the most neglected or least developed category of human rights. Cultural Rights as Collective Rights – An International Law Perspective endeavours to challenge this view and offers a comprehensive, critical analysis of recent developments in distinct areas of international law and jurisprudence, from every region of the world, in relation to the scope, legal content, and enforceability of such rights. Leading international scholars explore the conceptualisation and operationalisation of collective cultural rights as human rights, encompassing community rights, and discuss the ways in which such rights may collide with other, mostly individual, human rights. As such, Cultural Rights as Collective Rights – An International Law Perspective offers a cross-cutting and original overview on how the protection, recognition and enforcement of collective cultural rights affect the development, changes and formation of general international law norms.