Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics?

Nowadays, rights are frequently ascribed to groups distinguished by their nationality, culture, religion or language. Rights are also commonly ascribed to institutionalised groups, such as states, businesses, trade unions and private associations. Yet the ascription of rights to groups remains deeply controversial. Many people reject the very idea of group rights. Amongst those who do not, there is radical disagreement about which sorts of group might possess rights and why. Some believe that group rights threaten the freedom and well-being of individuals, while others argue that the rights of groups can complement them. Some claim that group rights can also be human rights; others find that claim incoherent. The contributions making up this volume wrestle with these and many other of the issues that surround group rights. This volume brings together twenty-four of the journal articles that have contributed most significantly to contemporary thinking on group rights.

Latin America is a region with high levels of recognition for Indigenous collective rights. Still, legal protections differ considerably among countries. Why do some countries in Latin America have a strong recognition of collective rights for Indigenous people while others do not? What are the factors that help enhance the presence of collective rights? The author argues that while Indigenous social movements are crucial to the protection of Indigenous rights, they are not enough. The recognition of these rights is influenced by organizational factors (such as coalitions between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous allies) as well as institutional conditions (including constitutional replacement and party systems). By employing qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and case studies from Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru, this book explores the ways various elements combine to create conditions for a variety of collective rights.

First published in 1999, this volume examines new forms of cultural diversity which result from migration and globalization. Historically, most liberal democracies have developed on the basis of national cultures – either a single one, or a dominant one, or a federation of several ones. However, political and economic developments have upset traditional patterns and have blurred established boundaries. Ongoing immigration from diverse origins has inserted new ethnic minorities into formerly homogenous populations. Democratic liberties and rights provided opportunities for old and new marginalized minorities to resist assimilation and to assert identities. The resulting pattern of multiculturalism is different from earlier ones. Often cultural boundaries are neither clearly defined nor do they simply dissolve by assimilation into a dominant group – they have become fuzzy and a constant source of real or imagined hostility and anxiety. A proliferation of mixed identities goes together with stronger claims for cultural rights and escalating hostilities between ethnic minorities and national majorities. In many countries multiculturalism is today perceived as a challenge rather than as an enrichment. The book focuses on the question how institution and policies of liberal democracies can cope with these trends. The book addresses two tasks: 1) To compare different national contexts and types of ethnic groups (immigrant and indigenous, linguistic and religious minorities) and to discuss how policies of multicultural integration have to be adapted in order to cope with such differences. 2) To evaluate the impact of common rends of globalization which link societies and encourage convergence between national models of multicultural integration.

Are Nation-states obsolete? Are multination states viable? Can we really create powerful supranational institutions? These are the questions that celebrated authors and specialists attempt to answer in this important collection of articles. The work contains theoretical essays and case studies by philosophers, sociologists, political scientists and governmental analysts that provide state of the art analyses of the situation of the nation-state as it is developing all over the world in the new millennium. There are different concepts of nationhood and different forms of national consciousness: ethnic, civic, cultural, socio-political and diasporic. There are also different ways for nations to be present on any given territory; as immigrant groups, as extensions of neighbouring national majorities, as minority nations or as majority nations. There are also different policies adopted toward different groups: bilingualism, multiculturalism, interculturalism, collective rights, etc. Finally, there are different sorts of political arrangements: nation-state, multination state, confederation of sovereign states, multinational federation, federation of nation-states, supranational institutions, etc. The enormous complexity of these issues explain why nations, nationalism and nation-states have been so difficult to understand. The theoretical essays contained in this volume are sensitive to all those issues. The authors examine the foundations of nationalist thinking and the justifications behind the nation-state model. They also reflect upon the nation building policies, politics of recognition and issues related to globalization. The case studies investigate countries or regions such as Ireland, Scotland, Catalonia, the Balkans, Russia, USA, Finland, India, Indonesia, the European Union and Canada.

Liberal theories have long insisted that cultural diversity in democratic societies can be accommodated through classical liberal tools, in particular through individual rights, and they have often rejected the claims of cultural minorities for group rights as illiberal. Group Rights as Human Rights argues that such a rejection is misguided. Based on a thorough analysis of the concept of group rights, it proposes to overcome the dominant dichotomy between "individual" human rights and "collective" group rights by recognizing that group rights also serve individual interests. It also challenges the claim that group rights, so understood, conflict with the liberal principle of neutrality; on the contrary, these rights help realize the neutrality ideal as they counter cultural biases that exist in Western states. Group rights deserve to be classified as human rights because they respond to fundamental, and morally important, human interests. Reading the theories of Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor as complementary rather than opposed, Group Rights as Human Rights sees group rights as anchored both in the value of cultural belonging for the development of individual autonomy and in each person’s need for a recognition of her identity. This double foundation has important consequences for the scope of group rights: it highlights their potential not only in dealing with national minorities but also with immigrant groups; and it allows to determine how far such rights should also benefit illiberal groups. Participation, not intervention, should here be the guiding principle if group rights are to realize the liberal promise.

Liberal defences of nationalism have become prevalent since the mid-1980’s. Curiously, they have largely neglected the fact that nationalism is primarily about land. Should liberals throw up their hands in despair when confronting conflicting claims stemming from incommensurable national narratives and holy texts? Should they dismiss conflicting demands that stem solely from particular cultures, religions and mythologies in favour of a supposedly neutral set of guidelines? Does history matter? Should ancient injustices interest us today? Should we care who reached the territory first and who were its prior inhabitants? Should principles of utility play a part in resolving territorial disputes? Was John Locke right to argue that the utilisation of land counts in favour of its acquisition? And should Western style settlement projects work in favour or against a nation’s territorial demands? When and how should principles of equality and equal distribution come into play? Territorial Rights examines the generic types of territorial claims customarily put forward by national groups as justification for their territorial demands, within the framework of what has come to be known as ‘liberal nationalism’. The final outcome is a multifarious theory on the ethics of territorial boundaries that supplies a workable set of guidelines for evaluating territorial disputes from a liberal-national perspective, and offers a common ground for discussion (including disagreement) and for the mediation of claims.

Examines the evolution of collective human rights in international relations and argues that the concept of human rights must integrate group rights based on race/ethnicity, gender, class, and sexuality.

This book analyses collective punishment in the context of human rights law. Collective punishment is a concept deriving from the law of armed conflict. It describes the punishment of a group for an act allegedly committed by one of its members and is prohibited in times of armed conflict. Although the imposition of collective punishment has been witnessed in situations outside armed conflict as well, human rights instruments do not explicitly address collective punishment. Consequently, there is a genuine gap in the protection of affected groups in situations outside of or short of armed conflict. Supported by two case studies on collective punishment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Chechnya, the book examines potential options to close this gap in human rights law in a way contributing to the empowerment of affected groups. This analysis centres on the European Convention on Human Rights due to its relevance to the situation in Chechnya. By questioning whether human rights instruments can encompass a prohibition of collective punishment, the book contributes to the broader academic debate on rights held by collectivities in general and on collective human rights in particular. The book will be of interest to students, academics and policy makers in the areas of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law.

A legal-theoretical account of collective rights, grounded in the normative-moral view of 'value collectivism'.