Andrew Mumford challenges the notion of a “special relationship” between the United States and United Kingdom in diplomatic and military affairs, the most vaunted and, he says, exaggerated of associations in the post-1945 era. Though they are allies to be sure, national self-interest and domestic politics have often undercut their relationship. This is the first book to combine a history of US-UK interaction during major counterinsurgency campaigns since 1945, from Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan, with a critical examination of the so called special relationship that has been tested during these difficult, protracted, and costly conflicts. Mumford’s assessment of each nation’s internal political discussions and diplomatic exchanges reveals that in actuality there is only a thin layer of specialness at work in the wars that shaped the postcolonial balance of power, the fight against Communism in the Cold War, and the twenty-first-century “war on terror.” This book is especially timely given that the US-UK relationship is once again under scrutiny because of the Trump administration’s “America First” rhetoric and Britain's changing international relations as a result of Brexit. Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance will interest scholars and students of history, international relations, and security studies as well as policy practitioners in the field.

This book discusses “culture” and the origins of the Anglo-American special relationship (the AASR). The bitter dispute between ethnic groups in the US from 1914–17—a period of time characterized as the “culture wars”—laid the groundwork both for US intervention in the European balance of power in 1917 and for the creation of what would eventually become a lasting Anglo-American alliance. Specifically, the vigorous assault on English “civilization” launched by two large ethnic groups in America (the Irish-Americans and the German-Americans) had the unintended effect of causing America’s demographic majority at the time (the English-descended Americans) to regard the prospect of an Anglo-American alliance in an entirely new manner. The author contemplates why the Anglo-American “great rapprochement” of 1898 failed to generate the desired “Anglo-Saxon” alliance in Britain, and in so doing features theoretically informed inquiries into debates surrounding both the origins of the war in 1914 and the origins of the American intervention decision nearly three years later.

The Anglo-American Military Relationship explores military cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Much of the literature on the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' has focused on the personal linkages between American Presidents and British Prime Ministers. This book argues that much of what is special between the two countries has resided in their military cooperation. This has provided the ballast that has underpinned other aspects of the political and economic relationship and given it durability. The book focuses on how the British armed services have worked alongside a superpower, in both peacetime and conflict. This military cooperation has been a challenging task, not least because it has occurred within a dynamic strategic context in which the nature of conflict has been evolving. British armed forces have engaged with their American allies in high intensity warfare, as well as in developing military doctrines to address insurgency, peace enforcement, and nation-building tasks. Working so closely with the US military has generated risks as well as benefits for Britain's armed forces. It has led them to engage in tasks that have weighed heavily upon their resources and has resulted in numerous tensions between the two sides.

Too often, scholarship on Anglo-American political relations has focused on mutual social and economic interests between Britain and the United States as the basis for cooperation. Breaking new ground, Anglo-American Relations and the Transmission of Ideas instead explores how ideas, on either side of the Atlantic have mutually influenced each other. In those transnational interactions, there forms a shared tradition of political ideas, facilitating “a common cast of mind” that has served as the basis for transatlantic relations and socio-political values for decades.

The lethality of conflicts between insurgent groups and counter-insurgent security forces has risen markedly since the Second World War just as those of conventional, or inter-state wars have declined. For several decades, conflicts within states rather than between them have been the prevalent form of organised political violence worldwide. Recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have fired interest in colonial experiences of rebellion, while current western interventions in sub-Saharan Africa have prompted accusations of 'militarist humanitarianism'. Yet, despite mounting interest in counter-insurgency and empire, comparative investigation of colonial responses to insurrection and civil disorder is sparse. Some scholars have written of a 'golden age of counter-insurgency', which began with Britain's declaration of a Malayan Emergency in 1948 and ended with the withdrawal of US ground troops from Vietnam in 1973. It is with this period, if not with any presumed 'golden age' that this volume is concerned. This Handbook connects ideas about contested decolonization and the insurgencies that inspired it with an analysis of patterns and singularities in the conflicts that precipitated the collapse of overseas empires. It attempts a systematic study of the global effects of organized anti-colonial violence in Asia and Africa. The objective is to reconceptualize late colonial violence in the European overseas empires by exploring its distinctive character and the globalizing processes underpinning it.

This timely book offers a history of insurgencies and counterinsurgency beyond a traditional Western-centric narrative. Black probes the linkages between beliefs, events, and people, as well as changes over time. He shows the extent to which politics, technologies, and ideologies have evolved, creating new parameters and paradigms that have framed both governmental and public views.

Separated by the world’s longest land border and engaging in over three billion dollars in trade daily, Canada and the United States share security concerns, cultural interests, and a history spanning more than 250 years. Alan Rock, former Canadian ambassador to the United States, has said that this special relationship represents “a bond that is beyond practical. It borders on mystical.” The rise of nativist sentiment, however, has raised concerns over preserving this relationship. History Has Made Us Friends illuminates the nature and dynamics of Canada-US relations, examining their history, attributed meaning, and conceptualization. Contributors consider many angles and perspectives, including the impact of geopolitical change, to determine whether the relationship warrants the moniker “special.” They explore whether shared values and demographic similarities continue to cement the relationship, and if it still matters whether presidents and prime ministers get along. While things look different today from when President Kennedy declared, “What unites us is far greater than what divides us,” History Has Made Us Friends argues that the Canada-US relationship – often narrowly understood or dismissed as a relic of the past – continues to be unique and resilient.

This book examines terrorist and insurgent organisations and seeks to understand how such groups persist for so long, while introducing a new strategic doctrine for countering these organisations. The work discusses whether familial or meritocratic insurgencies are more resilient to counterinsurgency pressures. It argues that it is not the type of organization that determines resilience, but rather the efficiency functions of social capital and trust, which have different natures and forms, within them. It finds that while familial insurgencies can challenge incumbents from the start, they weaken over time, whereas meritocracies will generally strengthen. The book examines four of the most enduring and lethal insurgent organizations: the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. The author breaks down each group into its formative strengths and vulnerabilities and presents a bespoke model of strategic counterintelligence that can be used to manipulate, degrade and destroy each organization. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, terrorism, intelligence, security and defence studies in general.

Through interviews with key policy practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic, this study reveals the complex picture of counter narcotics strategy in Afghanistan. It highlights the key points of cooperation and contention, and details the often contradictory and competitive objectives of the overall war effort in Afghanistan. Western counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan failed dismally after opium poppy cultivation surged to unprecedented levels. The Anglo-American partnership at the centre of this battleground was divided by competing and opposing views of how to address the opium problem, which troubled the well-established Anglo-American relationship.