This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called ‘rogue states’ and terror groups. James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the ‘three pillars’ of the Bush administration’s national security policy: missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001 pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan homeland security, which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars. Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States asserts that bad offences and defences have been endemic to the current US policy approach, leading US policy makers to pursue policies that require them to do everything without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, national and international security, terrorism and international relations in general.

During the Cold War, deterrence theory was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, popular wisdom dictated that terrorist organizations and radical fanatics could not be deterred—and governments shifted their attention to combating terrorism rather than deterring it. This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when and where terrorism can be deterred. It first identifies how and where theories of deterrence apply to counterterrorism, highlighting how traditional and less-traditional notions of deterrence can be applied to evolving terrorist threats. It then applies these theoretical propositions to real-world threats to establish the role deterrence has within a dynamic counterterrorism strategy—and to identify how metrics can be created for measuring the success of terrorism deterrence strategies. In sum, it provides a foundation for developing effective counterterrorism policies to help states contain or curtail the terrorism challenges they face.

Concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship and, in the past, Iraq’s apparent pursuit of WMD have captured the world’s attention, and dominated the agenda of the American foreign policy establishment. But, what led policymakers and the US military to emphasise the threat of rogue states at the end of the Cold War? Going behind the vivid language of the ‘axis of evil’ and portrayals of undeterrable and reckless rogue states, this work demonstrates how the rogue state doctrine satisfied both domestic and international goals in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, underpinning efforts to maintain US leadership and hegemony. It offers a clear picture of the policymaking process, taking a broad, historical approach that places the actions of US officials towards Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Cuba in a wider context. Through an understanding of the long-standing influences on the US approach we are better able to appreciate why, for instance, regime change dominated the post-9/11 agenda and led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Explaining in detail how the tackling of rogue states became a central aim of US foreign policy, Miles examines whether there was continuity between the Clinton and Bush approach. He moves on to highlight the influence of Congress on the implementation of US policies and the difficulties the US faced in ‘selling’ its approach to allies and adapting its hard-line strategies to reflect developments within the targeted states. By considering the impulses and drivers behind the development of the rogue states approach, this work will extend the scope of existing work in the field and will be of interest to scholars and policymakers alike.

This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state’s counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor’s grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization’s strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.

This volume moves beyond Cold War deterrence theory to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security: in space, in cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

As the costs of a preemptive foreign policy in Iraq have become clear, strategies such as containment and deterrence have been gaining currency among policy makers. This comprehensive book offers an agenda for the contemporary practice of deterrence—especially as it applies to nuclear weapons—in an increasingly heterogeneous global and political setting. Moving beyond the precepts of traditional deterrence theory, this groundbreaking volume offers insights for the use of deterrence in the modern world, where policy makers may encounter irrational actors, failed states, religious zeal, ambiguous power relationships, and other situations where the traditional rules of statecraft do not apply. A distinguished group of contributors here examines issues such as deterrence among the Great Powers; the problems of regional and nonstate actors; and actors armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Complex Deterrence will be a valuable resource for anyone facing the considerable challenge of fostering security and peace in the twenty-first century.

Offering full coverage of major subthemes and subfields within political science this reference handbook includes entries on topics from theory and methodology to international relations and institutions.

In this volume, leading scholars of U.S. foreign policy, international relations, and political psychology examine one of the most consequential and controversial statements of national security policy in contemporary American history. Unlike other books which focus only on unilateralism or preventive war, Stanley A. Renshon and Peter Suedfeld provide a comprehensive framework with which to analyze the Bush Doctrine by identifying five central and interrelated elements of the doctrine: American pre-eminence assertive realism equivocal alliances selective multilateralism democratic transformation. Given its centrality to American national security, and the fact that the effects of it are likely to be felt well into the twenty-first century, Understanding the Bush Doctrine provides a critically balanced and pointed assessment of the Bush Doctrine and its premises, as well as a fair appraisal of its implications and prospects.

Terrorism Now Has Become A World-Wide Phenomenon. During The Last Two Decades The World Has Witnessed An Increasing Number Of Terrorist Attacks. There Are Now Over One Lakh Jehadis All Over The Islamic World, In Afghanistan, Kashmir, Albania, Chechnaya (Russia), Xin-Jiang (China), Central Asia And Elsewhere.The Book Comprises Nine Papers Examining In Detail And Depth A Variety Of Subjects Like Nuclear, Chemical And Biological Terrorism, Islam And Terrorism, Military Strategy Adopted By The United States To Counter Terrorism, Terrorism Faced By India, Role Of Pakistan, Bangladesh And Other Countries In Terrorism, Measures To Counter Terrorism Etc. Unfortunately Islam And Muslims Have Been Associated With Terrorism. In Fact, This Confusion Of Associating The Two Has Been Created By Some Of The Muslim Countries Who Practice Terrorism And Ask For Support In The Name Of Islam.If Global Terrorism Is To Be Fought Effectively, An All Out Strike Has To Be Made. It Cannot Be Fought In The Way The United States Is Trying By Fighting Terrorism In One Country And Supporting The Same In Another Country. Terrorism Is A Single Organism And Attempts To Strike Only On Some Parts Are Bound To Fail.India Has To Fight Cross Border Terrorism On Its Own Strength. It Can Not Expect Much Help From The International Community, Particularly From The United States Or The United Kingdom.It Is Hoped That The Book Would Be Found Useful By The Executives Of The World And Regional Organisations, Non-Government Organisations Concerned With World Peace And Security, Police And Military Forces, Government Executives And Parliamentarians In Different Countries Concerned With Tackling Terrorism, Students Of Political Science And The Common Man Interested In Day-To-Day World Affairs.