Although the U.S. had conducted amphibious operations since the Revolutionary War, it was not until after the Spanish-American War that the military services attempted to codify procedures in doctrine. Early emphasis focused on command relationships and the responsibilities of commanders, eventually expanding to incorporate operational concepts, tactical techniques, and the necessary equipment. In an environment characterized by inter-service rivalry, as well as monetary and materiel constraints, dedicated individuals and organizations overcame numerous obstacles to develop, practice, and successfully execute amphibious operations in World War II. This thesis examines the evolutionary development of amphibious doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Navy, and the employment of that doctrine during Operations Watchtower and Torch in World War II. The examination includes an analysis of the historical efforts to develop innovative solutions to a wide range of challenges the services faced at the beginning of the 20th Century leading up to World War II. How the leadership solved those challenges informs the efforts of current leadership in addressing contemporary doctrinal, operational, and tactical challenges and those of the future.

FROM our entry into the war at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 until the Japanese surrender in September 1945, every major offensive campaign launched by the United States was initiated by an amphibious assault. Our landings at North Africa in November 1942, at Sicily and Italy in July and September 1943, and at Normandy and Southern France in June and September 1944 ended in the defeat of the German armies in Western Europe by the Allied Expeditionary Force in May 1945. The Pacific offensive, which began in the South Pacific with the landings at the Solomons in August 1942 and in the Central Pacific at the Gilberts in November 1943, carried us 3,000 miles to the Philippine Islands and 5,000 miles through to the inner defenses of the empire in the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands....Amphibious warfare was the primary offensive tactic in our conduct of global war. The tactics and techniques of our landing operations represent a new and significant development in the art of war. Although military history contains many instances of landing operations conducted by both military and navy forces in all parts of the world, from the early time man first crossed the sea to wage war, the landings were generally either limited in scope and purpose or unopposed. The feasibility of amphibious raids, in which assault forces landed from the sea are withdrawn after limited operations, and of unopposed landings, relying on surprise and conducted for the purpose of subsequent military operations ashore, has long been recognized. Until the recent war, however, the effect of modern defensive weapons was considered too decisive to permit successful assault from the sea. The development of radar, aviation, coast defense guns, torpedoes, submarines, mines, defensive obstructions and obstacles, automatic weapons, highly mobile reserves, and the necessary communication facilities to coordinate and control them seemed to present insurmountable difficulties to amphibious attack.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE LETTER OF PROMULGATION This curriculum guide builds upon the work of many contributors. Intellectual rigor and academic standards demand that the full scope of amphibious warfare be encompassed rather than the tracing of Marine Corps History emphasizing the landings of the Great Pacific War which had forged our modern Corps. The present course structure and content reflect the determination that (1) the history of amphibious warfare remains a valid intellectual endeavor; (2) its scope greatly exceeds the study of the U.S. Marine Corps; and (3) a historical survey of amphibious warfare is best approached from a “Maneuver Warfare” perspective, exploring the various levels of war and their impact on each battle. The levels of war would include the political, strategic, operational, and tactical/technical. This construct of classes will also prepare students to become critical thinkers of warfare, and thus better prepare them for future commissioned service to the Marine Corps. Instructors are cautioned to observe that this manual contains lesson guides, not lesson plans. Instructors must devote time for serious background reading in recommended literature, course texts, and contemplation of a conceptual approach that will capture the imagination of their students. Another important objective of this course must be to stimulate original thought and persistent interest on the part of the student. PROFESSIONAL CORE COMPETENCY OBJECTIVES The primary objectives of this course are to provide prospective merchant marine officers a basic understanding of their role in our national security and to familiarize them with the basic principles and procedures for operating amerchant ship as a naval or military auxiliary in a wartime convoy or independent sailing situation.

Over the Beach, written by historian and retired Army Colonel Donald W. Boose Jr., is the definitive history of the extensive but little known US Army amphibious operations during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Building on its extensive experience in World War II, the Army conducted three major landing operations during the war, including the assault at Inchon in September 1950. After the massive Chinese attacks two months later the Army executed a series of amphibious withdrawals as it fell back to more defensible positions farther down the peninsula. Throughout the war the Army also conducted a number of massive and complex over-the-shore logistical operations, as well as several amphibious special operations along the Korean littoral. Colonel Boose's work, commissioned by DAMO-ODG, Operations and Technology Office, provides the historical context for any subsequent amphibious operations on the Korean peninsula. As such, this thought-provoking study may provide insights to modern planners crafting future joint or combined operations in that part of the world. -- Publisher's Description.

We March Against England tells the thrilling tale of Operation Sea Lion, Hitler's plan to invade Britain and end its involvement in World War II. In May 1940 Nazi Germany was master of continental Europe, the only European power still standing was Great Britain – and the all-conquering German armed forces stood poised to cross the Channel. Following the destruction of the RAF fighter forces, the sweeping of the Channel of mines, and the wearing down of the Royal Naval defenders, two German army groups were set to storm the beaches of southern England. Despite near-constant British fears from August to October, the invasion never took place after first being postponed to spring 1941 before finally being abandoned entirely. Robert Forcyzk, author of Where the Iron Crosses Grow, looks beyond the traditional British account of Operation Sea Lion, complete with plucky Home Guards and courageous Spitfire pilots, at the real scale of German ambition, plans and capabilities. He examines, in depth, how Operation Sea Lion fitted in with German air-sea actions around the British Isles as he shows exactly what stopped Hitler from invading Britain.

A study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s.