FROM our entry into the war at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 until the Japanese surrender in September 1945, every major offensive campaign launched by the United States was initiated by an amphibious assault. Our landings at North Africa in November 1942, at Sicily and Italy in July and September 1943, and at Normandy and Southern France in June and September 1944 ended in the defeat of the German armies in Western Europe by the Allied Expeditionary Force in May 1945. The Pacific offensive, which began in the South Pacific with the landings at the Solomons in August 1942 and in the Central Pacific at the Gilberts in November 1943, carried us 3,000 miles to the Philippine Islands and 5,000 miles through to the inner defenses of the empire in the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands....Amphibious warfare was the primary offensive tactic in our conduct of global war. The tactics and techniques of our landing operations represent a new and significant development in the art of war. Although military history contains many instances of landing operations conducted by both military and navy forces in all parts of the world, from the early time man first crossed the sea to wage war, the landings were generally either limited in scope and purpose or unopposed. The feasibility of amphibious raids, in which assault forces landed from the sea are withdrawn after limited operations, and of unopposed landings, relying on surprise and conducted for the purpose of subsequent military operations ashore, has long been recognized. Until the recent war, however, the effect of modern defensive weapons was considered too decisive to permit successful assault from the sea. The development of radar, aviation, coast defense guns, torpedoes, submarines, mines, defensive obstructions and obstacles, automatic weapons, highly mobile reserves, and the necessary communication facilities to coordinate and control them seemed to present insurmountable difficulties to amphibious attack.

Although the U.S. had conducted amphibious operations since the Revolutionary War, it was not until after the Spanish-American War that the military services attempted to codify procedures in doctrine. Early emphasis focused on command relationships and the responsibilities of commanders, eventually expanding to incorporate operational concepts, tactical techniques, and the necessary equipment. In an environment characterized by inter-service rivalry, as well as monetary and materiel constraints, dedicated individuals and organizations overcame numerous obstacles to develop, practice, and successfully execute amphibious operations in World War II. This thesis examines the evolutionary development of amphibious doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Navy, and the employment of that doctrine during Operations Watchtower and Torch in World War II. The examination includes an analysis of the historical efforts to develop innovative solutions to a wide range of challenges the services faced at the beginning of the 20th Century leading up to World War II. How the leadership solved those challenges informs the efforts of current leadership in addressing contemporary doctrinal, operational, and tactical challenges and those of the future.

This compelling text explores the international, professional, local and personal historiography of the campaign.

Transformation has become a buzz word in today's military, but what are its historical precursors—those large scale changes that were once called Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA)? Who has gotten it right, and who has not? The Department of Defense must learn from history. Most studies of innovation focus on the actions, choices, and problems faced by individuals in a particular organization. Few place these individuals and organizations within the complex context where they operate. Yet, it is this very context that is a powerful determinant of how actions are conceived, examined, and implemented, and of how errors are identified and corrected. The historical cases that Mandeles examines reveal how different military services organized to learn, accumulate, and retrieve knowledge; and how their particular organization affected everything from the equipment they acquired to the quality of doctrine and concepts used in combat. In cases where more than one community of experts was responsible for weighing in on decisionmaking, the service benefited from enhanced application of evidence, sound inference, and logic. These cases demonstrate that, for senior leadership, participating in such a system should be a strategic and deliberate choice. In each of the cases featured in this book, no such deliberate choice was made. The interwar U.S. Navy (USN) aviation community and the U.S. Marine Corps amphibious operation community were lucky that, in a time of rapid technological advance and strategic risk, their decisions in framing and solving technological and operational problems were made within a functioning multi-organizational system. The Army Air Corps and the Royal Marines were unfortunate, with corresponding results. It is characteristic of 20th-century military history that no senior civilian or military leader suggested a policy to handle overlapping responsibilities by multiple departments. Today's policymakers have not learned this lesson. In the present time, while a great deal of thought is devoted to proper organizational design and the numbers of persons required to perform necessary functions, there is still no overarching framework guiding these designs.

An examination of Holland Smith's career in the Marine Corps follows its evolution from an insular constabulary at the turn of the 20th century to a juggernaut, landing American troops island by island in vital amphibious engagements up to 1945. Serving in important assignments from the Philippines to China to Latin America, Smith became deeply involved in the development of amphibious strategy and tactics, as well as in the creation of proper landing craft by the early 1930s. After Pearl Harbor, the Marines would turn to him to plan and lead operations in the Gilberts, the Marianas, and the Volcano Islands, culminating in the epic operation at Iwo Jima. Venzon details the life of this quiet, modest man who, she contends, deliberately cultivated the persona of an irascible, unreasonable perfectionist, in an effort to do everything possible to protect the Marines under his command. Smith braved malaria and dengue fever in the Philippines, sailed through the backwaters of post-Manchu China, and fought in the earliest banana wars in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. After World War I, he was the first Marine to attend the General Staff College at Langres, and from then on became am important member of 4th Marine Brigade Staff, and later on the staff of the army's I Corps. Here, he learned that war in the new century would be as much about planning, logistics, communications, and intelligence as it was about brute force. Upon his return to the United States, he attended both the Naval War College and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. By 1940, he commanded the First Marine Division. His deliberately explosive behavior, however, would ultimately push him out of the circle of legendary World War II leaders.

Today's Best Military Writing is the first-ever collection of the finest articles on the military published in recent years. Esteemed military historian and bestselling author Walter J. Boyne has gathered twenty-one writers, both military and civilian, and their published articles and essays on all aspects of the various branches of the armed forces and on the military history of the United States. From searching analyses of wars spanning two centuries to examinations of how our country's modern armed forces are coping with new threats that are more dangerous than any they've faced before, these articles represent the best of the best---incisive, thoughtful, and probing opinions and information, often written by the people who have lived and breathed their topics. Article subjects in this volume include: *A chillingly logical hypothesis that could be the next step in terrorism--mating cruise missiles with biological warfare *A call to assign coastal U.S. defense to the branch of the armed forces that is most equipped to deal with it--the Coast Guard *The history and development of the F-15 Eagle, one of the most famous jet fighters in the world *Little known facts about the use and deployment of artillery pieces during the Indian Wars of 1860-1890 *The role of U.S. Army chaplains tending to German war criminals during the Nuremberg Trials. At the Publisher's request, this title is being sold without Digital Rights Management Software (DRM) applied.

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology—and ignore the security risk—in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.