In September 2011, scientists announced new experimental findings that would not only threaten the conduct and publication of influenza research, but would have significant policy and intelligence implications. The findings presented a modified variant of the H5N1 avian influenza virus (hereafter referred to as the H5N1 virus) that was transmissible via aerosol between ferrets. These results suggested a worrisome possibility: the existence of a new airborne and highly lethal H5N1 virus that could cause a deadly global pandemic. In response, a series of international discussions on the nature of dual-use life science arose. These discussions addressed the complex social, technical, political, security, and ethical issues related to dual-use research. This Research Topic will be devoted to contributions that explore this matrix of issues from a variety of case study and international perspectives.

This publication presents the findings of an international horizon scan on dual-use research of concern (DURC) in the life sciences. The scan was based on structured elicitation of information from a group of international and multidisciplinary experts convened by the Science Division of the World Health Organization (WHO).

With the World Health Organization (WHO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the U.S. Blue Ribbon panel publishing reports on the emerging risks of biological weaponry in past months, there is a new sense of urgency regarding biological weapons. In August 2016, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon told the Security Council that “non-state actors are actively seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.” This report presents the changing dynamics of the development and use of biological weapons and the preparation against them. The dynamics relate to technological advances in biotechnology and the concomitant attraction to non-state actors to use biological agents as weapons due to their financial appeal and diverse impact. The relative ease with which biological weapons can be produced, and the intent of non-state actors to use biological weapons- based on historical precedent and recent surge in international terrorism- call for a renewed focus on this field and an increased effort to respond to these developments. We provide illustrations of new policy initiatives in a variety of countries and outline the current state of play in the Netherlands, providing a point of departure to discuss whether the current approach is sufficient to tackle the upcoming issues.

This new Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of contemporary extensions and alternatives to the just war tradition in the field of the ethics of war. The modern history of just war has typically assumed the primacy of four particular elements: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, the state actor, and the solider. This book will put these four elements under close scrutiny, and will explore how they fare given the following challenges: • What role do the traditional elements of jus ad bellum and jus in bello—and the constituent principles that follow from this distinction—play in modern warfare? Do they adequately account for a normative theory of war? • What is the role of the state in warfare? Is it or should it be the primary actor in just war theory? • Can a just war be understood simply as a response to territorial aggression between state actors, or should other actions be accommodated under legitimate recourse to armed conflict? • Is the idea of combatant qua state-employed soldier a valid ethical characterization of actors in modern warfare? • What role does the technological backdrop of modern warfare play in understanding and realizing just war theories? Over the course of three key sections, the contributors examine these challenges to the just war tradition in a way that invigorates existing discussions and generates new debate on topical and prospective issues in just war theory. This book will be of great interest to students of just war theory, war and ethics, peace and conflict studies, philosophy and security studies.

The Corona pandemic kills people, endangers families, friends, communities, companies, institutions, societies, economies and global networks. It brings about triage, unemployment, social distancing, and home schooling. Countries respond differently, often set aside civil and basic human rights. Families and friends cannot get together, visiting the sick, nor attending funerals. This pestilence is clearly a cultural, economic and political disease. 40 leaders in medical and sociological research, in politics, religion, and consulting from 24 countries offer diverse, sometimes controversial answers, collected by Martin Woesler and Hans-Martin Sass .

Synthetic biology -- unlike any research discipline that precedes it -- has the potential to bypass the less predictable process of evolution to usher in a new and dynamic way of working with living systems. Ultimately, synthetic biologists hope to design and build engineered biological systems with capabilities that do not exist in natural systems -- capabilities that may ultimately be used for applications in manufacturing, food production, and global health. Importantly, synthetic biology represents an area of science and engineering that raises technical, ethical, regulatory, security, biosafety, intellectual property, and other issues that will be resolved differently in different parts of the world. As a better understanding of the global synthetic biology landscape could lead to tremendous benefits, six academies -- the United Kingdom's Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, the United States' National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering, and the Chinese Academy of Science and Chinese Academy of Engineering -- organized a series of international symposia on the scientific, technical, and policy issues associated with synthetic biology. Positioning Synthetic Biology to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century summarizes the symposia proceedings.

As asymmetric ’wars among the people’ replace state-on-state wars in modern armed conflict, the growing role of military medicine and medical technology in contemporary war fighting has brought an urgent need to critically reassess the theory and practice of military medical ethics. Military Medical Ethics for the 21st Century is the first full length, broad-based treatment of this important subject. Written by an international team of practitioners and academics, this book provides interdisciplinary insights into the major issues facing military-medical decision makers and critically examines the tensions and dilemmas inherent in the military and medical professions. In this book the authors explore the practice of battlefield bioethics, medical neutrality and treatment of the wounded, enhancement technologies for war fighters, the potential risks of dual-use biotechnologies, patient rights for active duty personnel, military medical research and military medical ethics education in the 21st Century.

This book provides a current review of Medical Research Ethics on a global basis. The book contains chapters that are historically and philosophically reflective and aimed to promote a discussion about controversial and foundational aspects in the field. An elaborate group of chapters concentrates on key areas of medical research where there are core ethical issues that arise both in theory and practice: genetics, neuroscience, surgery, palliative care, diagnostics, risk and prediction, security, pandemic threats, finances, technology, and public policy.This book is suitable for use from the most basic introductory courses to the highest levels of expertise in multidisciplinary contexts. The insights and research by this group of top scholars in the field of bioethics is an indispensable read for medical students in bioethics seminars and courses as well as for philosophy of bioethics classes in departments of philosophy, nursing faculties, law schools where bioethics is linked to medical law, experts in comparative law and public health, international human rights, and is equally useful for policy planning in pharmaceutical companies.

The increasing emergence, re-emergence, and spread of deadly infectious diseases which pose health, economic, security and ethical challenges for states and people around the world, has given rise to an important global debate. The actual or potential burden of infectious diseases is sometimes so great that governments treat them as threats to national security. However, such treatment potentially increases the risk that emergency disease-control measures will be ineffective, counterproductive and/or unjust. Research on ethical issues associated with infectious disease is a relatively new and rapidly growing area of academic inquiry, as is research on infectious diseases within the field of security studies. This volume incorporates ethical and security perspectives, thus furthering research in both fields. Its unique focus on the intersection of ethical and security dimensions will, furthermore, generate fresh insights on how governments should respond to infectious disease challenges. Readers should include professionals and scholars working in infectious disease, epidemiology, public health, health law, health economics, public policy, bioethics, medical humanities, health and human rights, social/political philosophy, security studies, and international politics.

The objectives of the papers included in this volume were to critically consider the science and technology policies necessary for defence against terrorism and other threats to security; to assess the priorities for governments, universities, national laboratories and industrial firms; to identify how governments and the science and technology community can most effectively work together to enhance our security; and to share the experiences of policy makers and policy analysts. The importance and relevance of this selection of papers to the policy community is reflected in the seniority of the contributors. These included Dr. Parney Albright who held the position of Assistant Secretary for Science & Technology at the US Department of Homeland Security as well as senior figures from the UK Home Office, UK Office of Science & Technology, the European Commission and NATO.