Even after one of the most severe multi-year crises on record in the advanced economies, the received wisdom in policy circles clings to the notion that high-income countries are completely different from their emerging market counterparts. The current phase of the official policy approach is predicated on the assumption that debt sustainability can be achieved through a mix of austerity, forbearance and growth. The claim is that advanced countries do not need to resort to the standard toolkit of emerging markets, including debt restructurings and conversions, higher inflation, capital controls and other forms of financial repression. As we document, this claim is at odds with the historical track record of most advanced economies, where debt restructuring or conversions, financial Repression, and a tolerance for higher inflation, or a combination of these were an integral part of the resolution of significant past debt overhangs.

The global financial crisis saw many Eurozone countries bearing excessive public debt. This led the government bond yields of some peripheral countries to rise sharply, resulting in the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis. The debt crisis is characterized by its immediate spread from Greece, the country of origin, to its neighbouring countries and the connection between the Eurozone banking sector and the public sector debt. Addressing these interesting features, this book sheds light on the impacts of the crisis on various financial markets in Europe. This book is among the first to conduct a thorough empirical analysis of the European sovereign debt crisis. It analyses, using advanced econometric methodologies, why the crisis escalated so prominently, having significant impacts on a wide range of financial markets, and was not just limited to government bond markets. The book also allows one to understand the consequences and the overall impact of such a debt crisis, enabling investors and policymakers to formulate diversification strategies, and create suitable regulatory frameworks.

We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international “rules of the game” for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF’s lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund’s lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund’s financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012.

The insolvency of states is by no means a rare or new phenomenon. Despite this, it still seems to be widely felt that states do not go bankrupt. As of yet, there are no regulated insolvency proceedings for states. This book examines the current mechanisms for solving sovereign debt crises. It presents an analysis of their weaknesses and shows possibilities for dealing with such crises in the future. In this respect, the work focusses on crisis resolution measures at European level: the aid packages for Greece, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stabilisation Facility and the European Stability Mechanism. These are examined for their appropriateness as well as whether they contain elements of insolvency law. Ultimately, it explores possible insolvency proceedings for states at EU level and their implementation options.

The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Breaking the Vicious Circle between Sovereigns and Banks explains why the euro area’s progress towards reining in the risks arising from the well-documented bi-directional financial contagion transmission mechanism that links sovereigns to commercial banks has been more prominent compared to the channel of contagion moving from banks to sovereigns. Providing an analysis of the legal and regulatory measures that Europe and the euro area have taken to mitigate the exposure of sovereigns to financial crises generated by commercial banks, this book draws attention to areas where improvements to the arsenal of tools hitherto introduced are either desirable or necessary. Chapters further explain – with recourse to economic and legal arguments – why the channel of contagion moving from sovereigns to commercial banks has proven harder to close, and explores ways in which progress could be made in the direction of closing it so as to avert the risk of future banking sector crises. This work provides essential reading for students, researchers and practitioners with an interest in sovereign debt crises and the euro-area banking system.

Contributes to a better understanding of the policy, economic, and legal options of countries struggling with debt problems.

The euro was generally considered a success in its first decade. Nevertheless, the “unanticipated” financial crisis in the summer of 2007 has developed gradually into the worst global economic crisis in post-war economic history and a sovereign debt crisis, calling into question the endurance of positive externalities under the current form of European economic integration. The experience of double-dip recessions in the core of the euro-area and the occurrence of a deflationary spiral in its southern periphery brings into question the wisdom of fiscal consolidation via austerity in the adjustment programmes adopted to exit the crisis. They also put into doubt the adequacy and efficiency of the European Economic and Monetary Union’s core elements, its political instruments and macroeconomic assumptions, as can be seen in the role of the Stability and Growth Pact and the stance of the European Central Bank. The title of this collective volume refers to the country where the European sovereign debt crisis began, while its contents concentrate on the extent to which this crisis should be a national or a European concern. Moreover, the focus on Greece stimulates discussion about the neglected factor of the shadow economy and the potential to boost government revenue through its successful transfer to the formal economy. The chapters address the inefficiencies of both euro-area institutions and policies adopted to exit the current predicament. Experts from several disciplines review the literature and critically evaluate the existence of issues such as contagion effects, domino effects, deflationary spirals, institutional efficiency and the reality of the option to exit the euro-area.

The book analyses the emerging centre-periphery divisions within the European Union which result from the unprecedented conditions created by the 2008-09 global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The multiple layers of policy coordination which emerged in response to the crisis have initiated a process by which the EU is increasingly divided in terms of the level of vertical integration between the Eurozone core group and differentiated peripheries amongst the outsiders. At the same time the sovereign debt crisis has created a periphery of predominantly Southern European countries within the Eurozone that became dependent on external financial support from the other member states. The contributions in this book critically examine various aspects of the emerging internal post-crisis constellation of the EU. The main focus lies on national and supranational governance issues, national dynamics and dynamics in the Eurozone core as well as in the periphery. This book was originally published as a special issue of Perspectives on European Politics and Society.

This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation.

We develop an early-warning model of sovereign debt crises. A country is defined to be in a debt crisis if it is classified as being in default by Standard & Poor's, or if it has access to nonconcessional IMF financing in excess of 100 percent of quota. By means of logit and binary recursive tree analysis, we identify macroeconomic variables reflecting solvency and liquidity factors that predict a debt-crisis episode one year in advance. The logit model predicts 74 percent of all crises entries while sending few false alarms, and the recursive tree 89 percent while sending more false alarms.