Working from the phenomenological tradition, the author takes the “form of life” as the central ontological unit. We are our form of life, but as a transcendental-immanent notion. This is not directly equivalent to culture or society, but to the realisation in the world of an image of the human being shared by a given community. The question explored is the following: If the form of life is what gives us being, what role does language play? Topics explored include the concepts of propaganda and ideology. and how these terms always refer to what others say and do, never to our own actions and discourses. The central part of the book is devoted to an analysis of language itself, including propaganda, emotions, dispositions, and racism and racist discourses. The book also analyses Vladimir Putin’s speeches on the occasion of the Russian war in Ukraine, the elements of their propaganda, and the justifying elements that are part of their ethical discourse, whereby actions taken or to be taken are justified as good because they are necessary from their ontological principle.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings inspired contemporary philosophical thinking and advanced many issues that had been addressed by traditional philosophy. The questions raised by the Viennese philosopher initiated debates on a reconsideration of philosophical terminology. This is especially true for a term that has generated at least three significant controversies since its creation and will probably generate more disputes in the following years. It is the expression “form(s) of life” which translates into German as “Lebensform(en)” and “Form des Lebens”. The present volume contains contributions on forms of life, language games and the influence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on other scholears.

This study defends a version of epistemological relativism, taking as its point of departure some key arguments from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein - especially those concerning rule following and forms of life. An opposition is established between the dominant form of epistemological realism - that which relies upon 'truth-conditions'- and theories in which knowledge and truth are fundamentally dependent upon context. It is argued in Part One that Wittgenstein proves the necessity for a contextual understanding of knowledge. Part Two develops a clearer idea of that context, using Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm. It is argued that this concept has been largely misunderstood (even by Kuhn), but that it can be developed to be remarkably consistent with Wittgenstein's arguments. All those - philosophers, historians, sociologists and others - who wish finally to understand the complex issues involved in debates about epistemological relativism will find this book invaluable.

Humans pose an unprecedented threat to life in all its great diversity of forms. The human-induced extinction rate has been compared to “mass extinctions” of the past. But this language masks the fact that the crisis is due to voluntary, and thus, avoidable choices and actions. “Speaking of Forms of Life” shows that at the root of this crisis is the tragic inadequacy of the language predominantly used to represent and address what we are doing, including the language of “sustainable development,” “rights” for animals and the rest of nature, their “intrinsic value,” and conservation of species as “populations.” This talk alienates us from the other living things, from what they actually are, have and do, and it perpetuates the harm and loss. Campagna and Guevara compellingly argue, on rigorous but accessible grounds, that there is an alternative language to guide conservation, in confronting the radically urgent, ethical issues it faces. This is a language with which we are all familiar, mastered by naturalists, from Aristotle to Audubon. It articulates the primary value in life and the standard that must guide how human beings should live, as one form of life, among countless others. This book is a homecoming for those who practice conservation to, above all else, secure a creature’s ability to satisfy the necessities of its form of life.

For many liberals, the question “Do others live rightly?” feels inappropriate. Liberalism seems to demand a follow-up question: “Who am I to judge?” Peaceful coexistence, in this view, is predicated on restraint from morally evaluating our peers. But Rahel Jaeggi sees the situation differently. Criticizing is not only valid but also useful, she argues. Moral judgment is no error; the error lies in how we go about judging. One way to judge is external, based on universal standards derived from ideas about God or human nature. The other is internal, relying on standards peculiar to a given society. Both approaches have serious flaws and detractors. In Critique of Forms of Life, Jaeggi offers a third way, which she calls “immanent” critique. Inspired by Hegelian social philosophy and engaged with Anglo-American theorists such as John Dewey, Michael Walzer, and Alasdair MacIntyre, immanent critique begins with the recognition that ways of life are inherently normative because they assert their own goodness and rightness. They also have a consistent purpose: to solve basic social problems and advance social goods, most of which are common across cultures. Jaeggi argues that we can judge the validity of a society’s moral claims by evaluating how well the society adapts to crisis—whether it is able to overcome contradictions that arise from within and continue to fulfill its purpose. Jaeggi enlivens her ideas through concrete, contemporary examples. Against both relativistic and absolutist accounts, she shows that rational social critique is possible.

The wide-ranging work of Rahel Jaeggi, a leading voice of the new generation of critical theorists, demonstrates how core concepts and methodological approaches in the tradition of the Frankfurt School can be updated, stripped of their dubious metaphysical baggage, and made fruitful for critical theory in the twenty-first century. In this thorough introduction to Jaeggi’s work for English-speaking audiences, scholars assess and critique her efforts to revitalize critical theory. Jaeggi’s innovative work reclaims key concepts of Hegelian-Marxist social philosophy and reads them through the lens of such thinkers as Adorno, Heidegger, and Dewey, while simultaneously putting them into dialogue with contemporary analytic philosophy. Structured for classroom use, this critical introduction to Rahel Jaeggi is an insightful and generative confrontation with the most recent transformation of Frankfurt School–inspired social and philosophical critical theory. This volume features an essay by Jaeggi on moral progress and social change, essays by leading scholars engaging with her conceptual analysis of alienation and the critique of forms of life, and a Q&A between Jaeggi and volume coeditor Amy Allen. For scholars and students wishing to engage in the debate with key contemporary thinkers over the past, present, and future(s) of critical theory, this volume will be transformative.

The book is exceptional because it applies the notion of foms of life to the context of human action. It provides answers to the following questions: Why do we act in a specific way? Why do we make particular decisions? Does one's form of life and language games determine our actions and decisions? Wittgenstein proposes a holistic method which enables us to give coherent answers to these questions. To answer the question of the contents of actions and decisions we have to explain how we have institutionalized these actions or decisions. To this aim we shall reveal the frame within which language games are introduced and have come to function as practice and custom. The scheme of order underlying the language games is illustrated. Human actions and decisions follow particular rules. By highlighting the underlying scheme of order we may gain a perspicuous view of these rules. The aim of this book is to show that actions and decisions generate rational choice. This choice is explained by demonstrating the particular functions of the language games involved.

Why do we act as we do? Why do we assume that the way of being and behaving in our community is right, good, and common sense? Why do we fail to understand those who are, act, and feel differently? These are some of the questions that this book raises and attempts to answer. This ontology is rooted in the phenomenological tradition but with the innovation of taking the "form of life" as the central ontological unit. We are our form of life, but, as a transcendental-immanent reality, this is not directly equivalent to culture or society; it is rather the "political" realisation in the world of an image of the human being shared by a given community. This overcomes the traditional dualities of individual and society, consciousness and body, facticity and freedom, actuality and possibility. The subject is a subject because it identifies with that image, which is equivalent to the intersubjective consciousness of how one should act and be in the world. This gives rise to multiple forms of life. The latter implies a certain power to be who one wants to be. In this way, the book is an invitation to self-examination, for if our form of life is voluntary (i.e., capitalism), it shatters the illusion that one cannot live in any other way, and places us before the anguished but inevitable task of justifying its adoption or resorting to its abandonment. The book offers a dynamic analysis of human existence as the actualisation of a form of life that is, at the same time, the exercise of a certain power over those who seek to live otherwise, especially when that form is institutionalised by a government as the essence of the national or transnational community.

"In Practice, Power, and Forms of Life, philosopher Terry Pinkard interprets Sartre's late work as a fundamental reworking of his earlier work, especially in terms of his understanding of the possibility of communal action as genuinely free, which the French philosopher had previously argued was impossible. Pinkard shows how Sartre figured in contemporary debates about the use of the first-person and how this informed his theory of action. Pinkard reveals how Sartre was led back to Hegel, which itself was spurred on by his newfound interest in Marxism in the 1950s. Pinkard also argues that Sartre took up Heidegger's critique of existentialism, developing a new post-Marxist theory of the way actors exhibit the class relations of their form of life in their actions, and showing how genuine freedom is present only in certain types of "we" relationships. Pinkard argues that Sartre constructed a novel position on freedom that has yet to be adequately taken up and thought through in philosophy and political theory. Through Sartre, Pinkard advances an argument that contributes to the history of philosophy as well as contemporary and future debates on action and freedom"--

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by 'forms of life' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein's reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein's time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein's employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein's wider inquiries into the workings of our language.