The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock’s paintings, Arnold Schöenberg’s music, and Lewis Carroll’s poem “Jabberwocky” are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting “the freedom of speech,” even though none involves what we typically think of as speech—the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court’s conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as “speech” for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of “speech.” While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment.

. Through her analysis of the Supreme Courts opinions, Sullivan reveals distinct and divergent American understandings of the nature of religion, the role of religion in public life, and the relationship and interaction of law and religion. Each of the different discourses about religion represented in the Lynch opinions inadequately represents the nature and diversity of American religions and thus hinders a shared discussion of the First Amendment religion clauses.

The new edition of this text continues to offer an accessible historical survey and analysis of free-speech issues and cases in the US, also providing a history of free speech in England. In the new edition, the expansion of topics such as free press-fair trial makes the book suitable for journalism and media law courses.

Text takes a broad approach to the study of criminal law, combining carefully edited cases with the text analysis (60 percent text, 40 percent cases). Brief Note Cases following the main excerpted cases show variations on the interpretation and application of general principles, not just rules applicable to a single jurisdiction. The texts historical perspective illustrates how the principles of law remain consistent while the laws themselves adapt with the changing times. Part One covers the general part of criminal law, including discussions of the nature and origins of criminal law, the constitutional limits on criminal law, the general principles of criminal liability, the doctrines of complicity and incomplete crimes, and the defenses of justification and excuse. Part Two examines the special part of the criminal law, including crimes against persons, habitation, property, and public order and morals.

Fifty controversial cases decided by the Supreme Court show how the First Amendment protects freedom of speech and freedom of the press.