This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

Pieranna Garavaso and Nicla Vassallo investigate Gottlob Frege's notion of thinking (das Denken) to provide a new analysis of a largely unexplored area of the philosopher's work. Confronting Frege's deeply seated and widely emphasized anti-psychologism, Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance claims that the objective human science that Frege proposed can only be possible through a nuanced notion of thinking as neither merely psychological nor merely logical. Focusing on what Frege says about thinking in many passages from his works, Garavaso and Vassallo argue that Frege was engaged with issues that are still alive in contemporary debates, such as the definition of knowledge and the necessary role of language in conceptual thinking and in the expression of thoughts. Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance is essential not only for those interested in a new and original reading of Frege’s philosophy, but also for anyone engaged in epistemology, logic, psychology, philosophy of language, and the history of analytic philosophy.

This monograph is a defence of the Fregean take on logic. The author argues that Frege ́s projects, in logic and philosophy of language, are essentially connected and that the formalist shift produced by the work of Peano, Boole and Schroeder and continued by Hilbert and Tarski is completely alien to Frege's approach in the Begriffsschrift. A central thesis of the book is that judgeable contents, i.e. propositions, are the primary bearers of logical properties, which makes logic embedded in our conceptual system. This approach allows coherent and correct definitions of logical constants, logical consequence, and truth and connects their use to the practices of rational agents in science and everyday life.

The volume is the first collection of essays that focuses on Gottlob Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893/1903), highlighting both the technical and the philosophical richness of Frege's magnum opus. It brings together twenty-two renowned Frege scholars whose contributions discuss a wide range of topics arising from both volumes of Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The original chapters in this volume make vivid the importance and originality of Frege's masterpiece, not just for Frege scholars but for the study of the history of logic, mathematics, and philosophy.

Offering a bold new vision on the history of modern logic, Lukas M. Verburgt and Matteo Cosci focus on the lasting impact of Aristotle's syllogism between the 1820s and 1930s. For over two millennia, deductive logic was the syllogism and syllogism was the yardstick of sound human reasoning. During the 19th century, this hegemony fell apart and logicians, including Boole, Frege and Peirce, took deductive logic far beyond its Aristotelian borders. However, contrary to common wisdom, reflections on syllogism were also instrumental to the creation of new logical developments, such as first-order logic and early set theory. This volume presents the period under discussion as one of both tradition and innovation, both continuity and discontinuity. Modern logic broke away from the syllogistic tradition, but without Aristotle's syllogism, modern logic would not have been born. A vital follow up to The Aftermath of Syllogism, this book traces the longue durée history of syllogism from Richard Whately's revival of formal logic in the 1820s through the work of David Hilbert and the Göttingen school up to the 1930s. Bringing together a group of major international experts, it sheds crucial new light on the emergence of modern logic and the roots of analytic philosophy in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

This book offers a historical explanation of important philosophical problems in logic and mathematics, which have been neglected by the official history of modern logic. It offers extensive information on Gottlob Frege’s logic, discussing which aspects of his logic can be considered truly innovative in its revolution against the Aristotelian logic. It presents the work of Hilbert and his associates and followers with the aim of understanding the revolutionary change in the axiomatic method. Moreover, it offers useful tools to understand Tarski’s and Gödel’s work, explaining why the problems they discussed are still unsolved. Finally, the book reports on some of the most influential positions in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, i.e., Maddy’s mathematical naturalism and Shapiro’s mathematical structuralism. Last but not least, the book introduces Biancani’s Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics as this is considered important to understand current philosophical issue in the applications of mathematics. One of the main purposes of the book is to stimulate readers to reconsider the Aristotelian position, which disappeared almost completely from the scene in logic and mathematics in the early twentieth century.