This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

Gottlob Frege is one of the greatest logicians ever and also a philosopher of great significance. In this book Rosado Haddock offers a critical presentation of the main topics of Frege's philosophy, including, among others, his philosophy of arithmetic, his sense-referent distinction, his distinction between function and object, and his criticisms of formalism and psychologism. More than just an introduction to Frege's philosophy this book is also a highly critical and mature assessment of it as a whole in which the limitations, confusions and other weaknesses of Frege's thought are closely examined. The author is also a Husserlian scholar and this book contains valuable discussions of Husserl's neglected views and comparisons between the two great philosophers.

This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

The relationship between thought and language has been of central importance to philosophy ever since Plato characterised thinking as 'a dialogue the soul has with itself'. In this volume, several major twentieth-century philosophers of mind and language make further contributions to the debate. Among the questions addressed are: is language conceptually prior to thought, or vice versa? Must thought take place 'in' a medium? To what extent can creatures without language be credited with thoughts? Do we have to suppose that thinking involves the use of concepts? What does it mean to have and deploy a concept? How do recent psychological experiments bear on these issues? Are beliefs, desires, hopes and fears rightly construed as 'attitudes towards propositions'? Should twentieth-century philosophy be conceived of in terms of Michael Dummett's distinction between 'analytical philosophy' and the 'philosophy of thought'?

Pieranna Garavaso and Nicla Vassallo investigate Gottlob Frege's notion of thinking (das Denken) to provide a new analysis of a largely unexplored area of the philosopher's work. Confronting Frege's deeply seated and widely emphasized anti-psychologism, Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance claims that the objective human science that Frege proposed can only be possible through a nuanced notion of thinking as neither merely psychological nor merely logical. Focusing on what Frege says about thinking in many passages from his works, Garavaso and Vassallo argue that Frege was engaged with issues that are still alive in contemporary debates, such as the definition of knowledge and the necessary role of language in conceptual thinking and in the expression of thoughts. Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance is essential not only for those interested in a new and original reading of Frege’s philosophy, but also for anyone engaged in epistemology, logic, psychology, philosophy of language, and the history of analytic philosophy.

This collection of classic and contemporary essays in philosophy of language offers a concise introduction to the field for students in graduate and upper-division undergraduate courses. It contains some of the most important basic sources in philosophy of language, including a number of classic essays by philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Grice, Davidson, Strawson, Austin, and Putnam, as well as more recent contributions by scholars including John McDowell, Stephen Neale, Ruth Millikan, Stephen Schiffer, Paul Horwich, and Anthony Brueckner, among others, who are on the leading edge of innovation in this increasingly influential area of philosophy. The result is a lively mix of readings, together with the editors' discussions of the material, which provides a rigorous introduction to the subject.

Austinian Themes offers a reconstruction of philosophical views on several themes developed by J. L. Austin. Exploring Austin's work in detail through a series of thematically organized chapters, Marina Sbis? draws on both published work as well as unpublished manuscript notes to offer a defence of Austin's speech act theory, characterized by a specific notion of illocution, against some important criticisms. Sbis? offers a reconstruction of Austin's responsibility-based conception of action drawing on his remarks on acts and actions in How to Do Things with Words and in later papers. Exploring Austin's contributions to epistemology and the philosophy of perception (including his realist stance, anti-scepticism, and presentational view of perception), Sbis? analyses the roles that he assigns to knowledge in the dynamics of assertion. On the theme of truth, Austin's claims are expounded and explained as worthy of reassessment. Other chapters explore the ways in which Austin deals with sense, reference, 'family resemblances', truth-falsity assessments, and context-dependence. Austin's most famous statement of method, as outlining a 'linguistic phenomenology', is cast as analogous to Husserl's phenomenology in adopting an epoch? which isolates language (rather than consciousness), a reading which helps to clarify several characteristic positions adopted by Austin. On metaphilosophical themes, Sbis? analyses the notion of ordinariness, distinguishing it from common sense and the endorsement of the 'Linguistic Turn', approaching it instead in terms of the by-default nature of the social bond and conversational cooperation. Various recurrent aspects of Austin's philosophy are illuminated: the opposition to dichotomies, the attention paid to intersubjectivity, the commitment to a 'sober' philosophy, and a strong sense of human situatedness.

The challenge presented by the recent tendencies to "naturalize" phenomenology, on the basis of the progress in biological and neurological sciences, calls for an investigation of the traditional mind-body problem. The progress in phenomenological investigation is up to answering that challenge by placing the issues at stake upon a novel platform, that is the ontopoiesis of life.

Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) was one of the founders of analytical philosophy and the greatest innovator in logic since Aristotle. He introduced many influential philosophical ideas, such as the distinctions between function and argument, or between sense and reference. However, his thought is not readily accessible to the non- expert. His conception of logic, which was crucial to his grand project, the reduction of arithmetic to logic, is especially difficult to grasp. This book provides a lucid and critical introduction to Frege's logic, as he developed it in his groundbreaking first book Begriffsschrift (Conceptual Notation, 1879). It guides the reader directly to the core of Frege's philosophy, and to some of the most pertinent issues in contemporary philosophy of language, logic, mathematics, and mind. Unlike most other books, this commentary explains Frege's own logical notation, allowing students to study and appreciate those aspects of his work that he valued most but are least understood today.