In a world that has returned to great power rivalry, understanding the grand strategy of these powers is crucial. This book introduces ten key terms for analysing grand strategy and shows how the world’s great powers – the United States, China, Russia and the European Union (EU) – shape their strategic decisions today. Outlining the steps needed for a less confrontational grand strategy and a more peaceful and stable world order, this lively and accessible introduction shows how the choices made in each of these ten areas will determine the course of world politics in the first half of the 21st century.

What if successful strategies are sometimes formed through an emergent process of learning and adaptation? Is following a coherent grand strategy the key to achieving successful outcomes in American foreign policy? For many experts in academia and Washington, the answer is yes. Policymakers usually face criticism when they take incremental actions based on short-term considerations. But could such actions actually converge into a successful emergent strategy over time? Ionut Popescu conclusively shows that in some cases, an emergent learning model leads to better overall strategic performance than a long-term strategic plan or framework. Popescu argues that it is time to rethink the origins of some of the most important successes and failures of America’s tenure as a global superpower after World War II. Presenting empirical data culled from archival research and interviews with higher-ups, Popescu covers eight US presidential administrations, ranging from Truman to Obama, to demonstrate that senior policymakers should be skeptical of the idea that formulating and implementing a long-term grand strategy is the road to a successful foreign policy legacy. Instead, the book asserts, leaders should prioritize learning from the almost unavoidable mistakes they will make early in their careers and adapting their plans to unanticipated events and changes in the international environment. Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy thus offers both scholars and practitioners of foreign policy an original theoretical framework to explain strategic success.

In 'The End of Grand Strategy', Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge this common view. They eschew prescription in favour of describing and explaining what America's military actually does. They argue that each presidental administration inevitably resorts to each of the six variant of grand strategy that they implement simultaneously as a result of a series of fundamental recent changes - what they term 'calibrated strategies.' Reich and Dombrowski support their controversial argument by examining six major maritime operations, stretching from America's shores to every region of the globe. Each of these operations reflects one major variant of strategy. They conclude that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead.

This book develops a new approach in explaining how a nation's Grand Strategy is constituted, how to assess its merits, and how grand strategies may be comparatively evaluated within a broader framework. The volume responds to three key problems common to both academia and policymaking. First, the literature on the concept of grand strategy generally focuses on the United States, offering no framework for comparative analysis. Indeed, many proponents of US grand strategy suggest that the concept can only be applied, at most, to a very few great powers such as China and Russia. Second, characteristically it remains prescriptive rather than explanatory, ignoring the central conundrum of why differing countries respond in contrasting ways to similar pressures. Third, it often understates the significance of domestic politics and policymaking in the formulation of grand strategies - emphasizing mainly systemic pressures. This book addresses these problems. It seeks to analyze and explain grand strategies through the intersection of domestic and international politics in ten countries grouped distinctively as great powers (The G5), regional powers (Brazil and India) and pivotal powers hostile to each other who are able to destabilize the global system (Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). The book thus employs a comparative framework that describes and explains why and how domestic actors and mechanisms, coupled with external pressures, create specific national strategies. Overall, the book aims to fashion a valid, cross-contextual framework for an emerging research program on grand strategic analysis.

This book looks at the evolution of the role of Europe in US grand strategy, and unpacks how US administrations have instrumentalized this relationship in pursuit of extra-European objectives. The work considers geopolitical pressures in conjunction with leaders’ strategic ideas to provide an account of the evolution of the role of Europe in the context of US grand strategy. Observers generally agree on the vague notion that Europe has been de-prioritized in Washington’s external affairs. Against this background, the book makes the case that such de-prioritization of Europe in the context of US grand strategy also entails a reconceptualization of the transatlantic relationship, namely as a region featuring long-standing relationships that can at times be leveraged in pursuit of non-European goals. The United States has a long history of seeking European support or acquiescence for its role as the leader of the international system, but whereas during the Cold War Washington enlisted its European allies in a grand strategic struggle against a European power, more recently, it has sought to enlist European allies in extra-European struggles of different types. Thinking about the role of Europe in US grand strategy now requires new theoretical and empirical tools that allow for the recognition of this very fact. Accordingly, this book proposes that strategic ideas on the viability of international cooperation held within the White House crucially shape what – if any -- type of support the United States seeks from Europe on the global stage. In doing so, the book adds important nuance to other accounts proclaiming either the proverbial death of the transatlantic relationship or the eternal and unchanging nature thereof. This book will be of much interest to students of European security, US foreign policy, and International Relations.

Based upon work supported by the Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration) under Award Number DE-FG52-03SF22724.

Why do great powers sometimes favor one country over another in the conduct of their foreign economic policies?

This book attempts to identify change and continuity in PRC grand strategy, and the extent to which Chinese imperial history complicates PRC global outreach in the Xi Jinping era. Empires convey the wish to make the world a better place – even in the midst of oppression – and are eschatological in their rhetoric. However, empires that last longer have been more pragmatic in their grand strategy; sometimes appropriating the aura of past golden ages, and at other times learning from the mistakes of their predecessors. To date, Chinese strategic thinkers are preoccupied with learning lessons from the disintegration of the USSR and fascinated by the secrets of American power. Interdisciplinary in its reach, analysing grand strategy through both rhetoric and praxis, this book unpacks the Chinese world view through critical examination of the latest history textbooks currently in use in PRC middle schools. It also brings new evidence to bear on the debate in the West about Chinese strategic culture. Finally, it compares historical Japanese OFDI patterns with China in order to understand what makes the Chinese economy unique. China’s Grand Strategy Under Xi Jinping is aimed towards students and scholars of history, international business and wider Chinese studies.