This influential book makes sense of abstract debates about the nature of law and the rule of law by situating them in the real-world context of apartheid-era South Africa. The new edition examines the transformation in South Africa since the end of apartheid, and the shift in debates surrounding the rule of law post 9/11.

Dyzenhaus deals with the urgent question of how governments should respond to emergencies and terrorism by exploring the idea that there is an unwritten constitution of law, exemplified in the common law constitution of Commonwealth countries. He looks mainly to cases decided in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada to demonstrate that even in the absence of an entrenched bill of rights, the law provides a moral resource that can inform a rule-of-law project capable of responding to situations which place legal and political order under great stress. Those cases are discussed against a backdrop of recent writing and judicial decisions in the United States of America in order to show that the issues are not confined to the Commonwealth. The author argues that the rule-of-law project is one in which judges play an important role, but which also requires the participation of the legislature and the executive.

Contains papers and comments from the conference on the Foundations of Judicial Review, held in Cambridge, England, May 22, 1999, and some previously published papers.

Explores how the central question of philosophy of law is the legal subject's: how can that be law for me?

Judges sometimes hear cases in which the law, as they honestly understand it, requires results that they consider morally objectionable. Most people assume that, nevertheless, judges have an ethical obligation to apply the law correctly, at least in reasonably just legal systems. This is the view of most lawyers, legal scholars, and private citizens, but the arguments for it have received surprisingly little attention from philosophers. Combining ethical theory with discussions of caselaw, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard challenges arguments for the traditional view, including arguments from the fact that judges swear oaths to uphold the law, and arguments from our duty to obey the law, among others. He then develops an alternative argument based on ways in which the rule of law promotes the good. Patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, even when morally motivated, can damage the rule of law. Brand-Ballard explores the conditions under which individual judges are morally responsible for participating in destructive patterns of lawless judging. These arguments build upon recent theories of collective intentionality and presuppose an agent-neutral framework, rather than the agent-relative framework favored by many moral philosophers. Defying the conventional wisdom, Brand-Ballard argues that judges are not always morally obligated to apply the law correctly. Although they have an obligation not to participate in patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, an individual departure from the law so as to avoid an unjust result is rarely a moral mistake if the rule of law is otherwise healthy. Limits of Legality will interest philosophers, legal scholars, lawyers, and anyone concerned with the ethics of judging.

This arrestingly novel work develops a normative synthesis of medical humanities, virtue ethics, medical ethics, health law and human rights. It presents an ambitious, complex and coherent argument for the reconceptualisation of the doctor-patient relationship and its regulation utilising approaches often thought of as being separate, if not opposed (virtue-based ethics and universal human rights). The case is argued gracefully, with moderation, but also with respect for opposing positions. The book's analysis of the foundational professional virtue of therapeutic loyalty is an original departure from the traditional discourse of "patient autonomy," and the ethical and legal "duties" of the medical practitioner. The central argument is not merely presented, as bookends, in the introduction and conclusion. It is cogently represented in each chapter and section and measured against the material considered. A remarkable feature is the use of aptly selected "canonical" literature to inform the argument. These references run from Hesse's "The Glass Bead Game" in the abstract, to Joyce's "Ulysses" in the conclusion. They include excerpts from and discussion about Bergman, Borges, Boswell, Tolstoy, de Beauvoir, Chekhov, Dostoevsky, Samuel Johnson, Aristotle, Orwell, Osler, Chaucer, Schweitzer, Shakespeare, Thorwalds, Kafka and William Carlos Williams. Such references are used not merely as an artistic and decorative leitmotif, but become a critical, narrative element and another complex and rich layer to this work. The breadth and quality of the references are testimony to the author's clear understanding of the modern law and literature movement. This work provides the basis of a medicalschool course. As many medical educators as possible should also be encouraged to read this work for the insights it will give them into using their own personal life narratives and those of their patients to inform their decision-making process. This thesis will also be of value to the judiciary, whose members are often called upon to make normatively difficult judgments about medical care and medical rules. The human rights material leads to a hopeful view of an international movement toward a universal synthesis between medical ethics and human rights in all doctor-patient relationships.

Since its first publication in 1996, Law and Morality has filled a long-standing need for a contemporary Canadian textbook in the philosophy of law. Now in its third edition, this anthology has been thoroughly revised and updated, and includes new chapters on equality, judicial review, and terrorism and the rule of law. The volume begins with essays that explore general questions about morality and law, surveying the traditional literature on legal positivism and contemporary debates about the connection between law and morality. These essays explore the tensions between law as a protector of individual liberty and as a tool of democratic self-rule, and introduce debates about adjudication and the contribution of feminist approaches to the philosophy of law. New material on the Chinese Canadian head tax case is also featured. The second part of Law and Morality deals with philosophical questions as they apply to contemporary issues. Excerpts from judicial decisions as well as essays by practicing lawyers are included to provide theoretically informed legal analyses of the issues. Striking a balance between practical and more analytic, philosophical approaches, the volume's treatment of the philosophy of law as a branch of political philosophy enables students to understand law in its function as a social institution. Law and Morality has proved to be an essential text in both departments of philosophy and faculties of law and this latest edition brings the debates fully up to date, filling gaps in the previous editions and adding to the array of contemporary issues previously covered.

This collection of essays on the rule of law focuses on the traditional question whether the rule of law is necessarily the rule of moral principles, the question of the legitimacy of law. Essays by lawyers, philosophers, and political theorists illuminate and take forward both that question and debate about issues to do with the reach of the rule of law which complicate its answer. The essays are divided into sections which deal, first, with legal orders where the rule of law is under severe stress, second, with the question of the value of the rule of law as a conceptual problem, and, third, with the question of the limits of legal order. Contributors: Richard Abel, Jody Freeman, Robert Alexy, Neil MacCormick, Kenneth Winston, Andras Sajo, Alon Harel, Anton Fagan, Anthony Sebok, Christine Sypnowich, Allan Hutchinson, Bill Scheuerman, John MacCormick, Julian Rivers, Henry Richardson, David Dyzenhaus.

Many are familiar with the concept of a moral dilemma - a situation where a person faces a choice between two mutually exclusive actions. This book considers whether situations of this kind could and should exist within the sphere of international law.

This book assembles leading legal, political, and moral philosophers to examine the legacy of the work of Ronald Dworkin. They provide the most comprehensive critical treatment of Dworkin's accomplishments focusing on his work in all branches of philosophy, including his theory of value, political philosophy, philosophy of international law, and legal philosophy. The book's organizing principle and theme reflect Dworkin's self-conception as a builder of a unified theory of value, and the broad outlines of his system can be found throughout the book. The first section addresses the most abstract and general aspect of Dworkin's work--the unity of value thesis. The second section explores Dworkin's contributions to political philosophy, and discusses a number of political concepts including authority, civil disobedience, the legitimacy of states and the international legal system, distributive justice, collective responsibility, and Dworkin's master value of dignity and the associated values of equal concern and respect. The third section addresses various aspects of Dworkin's general theory of law. The fourth and final section comprises accounts of the structure and defining values of discrete areas of law.