In the second half of the twentieth century, strategic and economic conditions compelled the U.S. government to start running budget deficits on a permanent basis. A new role of global leadership in containing communism required a robust military establishment. The federal government overwhelmingly relied for general revenue on an income tax code that also could not impede economic growth. And general revenue increasingly funded transfer payments in an expanding entitlement state. Fiscal overstretch resulted in unending deficits that continue to this day. At first the shift to deficit normality was not obvious. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations attempted to hold the line on deficits, but this commitment gradually waned in subsequent years. Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements: U.S. Deficits in the Cold War, 1945–1991 looks at the Cold War era from a budgetary perspective and how defense spending, income tax reductions, and entitlement programs all contributed to the emergence of the deficit normative state. As national debt continues to climb in the twenty-first century, Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements shows how the U.S. reached this point and how a comprehensive policy approach might again restore fiscal stability.

This book presents a synthesis of strategic planning and diplomacy in the Middle East during a critical period The book explains the pivotal role that the young State of Israel played in Middle East politics Will appeal to students of strategy, middle eastern politics and military history.

This volume analyzes US policy toward communist-ruled Poland in the fields of diplomacy, economy, culture, and public diplomacy. It highlights the limitations in developing cooperation between democratic and nondemocratic countries resulting from the Cold War conflict. No comprehensive account of US policy toward Poland from 1956 to 1968 has emerged in historiography. This book aims to answer why, since the political changes of the Polish October 1956, Washington ceased to see Polish affairs as “Soviet-related matters.” Instead, it recognized communist-ruled Poland as a separate political entity among other Kremlin-dependent states in Eastern Europe. This policy, introduced by the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, was continued by his successors John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Recently declassified US and Polish archival sources allow the presentation of more considerations around the decision-making mechanisms by presidential administrations regarding communist Poland after 1956. They also reveal the dependence of the implementation of US actions on the climate of international relations. Moreover, they can now explain how Poland became an “open window” toward the Soviet bloc and a model example of the changes in the US policy of diversifying its approach to Eastern European countries under Soviet control in the next decades.

Focuses on the Seventh Army in West Germany--the largest and best-prepared field army ever deployed by the U.S. in peacetime--to show how the U.S. army redefined its identity, structure, and mission in order to avoid obsolescence during the Cold War era of nuclear weapons and air power.

"This revised fifth edition examines the development of the chairmanship as an institution over the last sixty-seven years. It presents an expanded historical essay and four additional career biographies, with associated updates to the supplementary sections and appendices." --p.vii.