"This revised fifth edition examines the development of the chairmanship as an institution over the last sixty-seven years. It presents an expanded historical essay and four additional career biographies, with associated updates to the supplementary sections and appendices." --p.vii.

By Lorna S. Jaffe, et al. Gives a historical perspective on the development of the chairmanship as an institution as well as on the Chairman’s an d Vice Chairman’s role in the formation and implementation of our national security policy. Sheds light on civil-military relations at the highest level during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Provides valuable insight into the interaction of individuals, circumstances, and law, which produced the chairmanship as we know it today.

In the second half of the twentieth century, strategic and economic conditions compelled the U.S. government to start running budget deficits on a permanent basis. A new role of global leadership in containing communism required a robust military establishment. The federal government overwhelmingly relied for general revenue on an income tax code that also could not impede economic growth. And general revenue increasingly funded transfer payments in an expanding entitlement state. Fiscal overstretch resulted in unending deficits that continue to this day. At first the shift to deficit normality was not obvious. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations attempted to hold the line on deficits, but this commitment gradually waned in subsequent years. Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements: U.S. Deficits in the Cold War, 1945–1991 looks at the Cold War era from a budgetary perspective and how defense spending, income tax reductions, and entitlement programs all contributed to the emergence of the deficit normative state. As national debt continues to climb in the twenty-first century, Arms, Revenue, and Entitlements shows how the U.S. reached this point and how a comprehensive policy approach might again restore fiscal stability.

This book critically examines the origins of American diplomacy in the greater Persian Gulf region, arguing that it was the inability of the United States to contend effectively with the disintegration of British imperial authority in the Gulf that eventually led it to assume its current role in the region.

This study provides an analysis of the role the United States alliance with Nationalist China played in US strategy to contain first the Sino-Soviet alliance and then China during the 1950s and 1960s.