This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistan’s warlords, which compromised the country’s stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of America’s logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents – their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalition’s inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistan’s inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latter’s duration, scale, and cost, America’s leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough.

During two decades of fighting in Afghanistan, U.S. service members confronted numerous challenges in their mission to secure the country from the threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and assist in rebuilding efforts. Because the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred simultaneously, much of the American public conflated them or failed to notice the Afghanistan War; and most of the war's archival material remains classified and closed to civilian researchers. Drawing on interviews and letters home, this book relates the Afghanistan War through the experiences of American troops, with firsthand accounts of both combat and humanitarian operations, the environment, living conditions and interactions with the locals.

Afghanistan is an extremely complex and nuanced country that has been one of the centers of imperial conflict at least for 150 years. From the Czarist Russia’s march south in the 19th Century threatening British India, three Anglo-Afghan Wars, the Soviet Invasion and occupation of Afghanistan starting in December 1979 and the resulting anti-Soviet Jihad by the Afghan Mujahideen to Kabul’s and their allies’ (U.S. and NATO) conflict with the Taliban, Afghanistan has been one of the centers of important international and regional conflicts and events. Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, Fifth Edition contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has more than 1,000 cross-referenced entries on important personalities as well as aspects of the country’s politics, economy, foreign relations, religion, and culture. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Afghanistan.

"Through much of the twentieth century Afghanistan seemed to be a distant concern in the U.S. "Afghanistanism" used to be journalistic shorthand for stories about distant places that editors dismissed as irrelevant. Afghanistan's territory does include some remote, barely accessible regions, but it also includes ancient metropolises such as Balkh, Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar that through much of history were crossroads for commerce and the spread of ideas, including religions and artistic styles. Afghanistan's period of isolation was not an inevitable consequence of its location; it was the result of the policies of the British and Russian colonial empires. In the late 19th and 20th century, those empires agreed to make Afghanistan a buffer state separating their two empires. The only foreign representative would be a Muslim representative of British India, which controlled Afghanistan's foreign affairs. That arrangement has broken down so thoroughly, that Afghanistan is now the opposite of a buffer state. Instead of preventing conflict by separating empires or states, it has become an arena where others act out proxy conflicts. The Soviet invasion of December 1979 turned the country into the hottest conflict of a supposedly Cold War. The Afghan state collapsed in the 1990s as a result of that proxy war and the breakup of the USSR, which had been funding the state. The country then became the arena of conflict among regional powers - Pakistan versus Iran, Russia, and India - but also a zone of competition over pipeline routes among the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iran."--

This book explores the role of actors in determining transitional justice in peacebuilding contexts. In recent decades, transitional justice mechanisms and processes have been introduced to a variety of settings, becoming widely regarded as essential elements in the ‘peacebuilding toolbox’. While it has increasingly been suggested that transitional justice is imposed by neo-imperial actors with little regard for the needs and cultures of local populations, evidence suggests that dismissing these policies as neo-imperial or neo-liberal impositions would result in grossly overlooking their dynamics, which involve a whole range of relevant actors operating at multiple levels. This book interrogates this theme through empirical analysis of three sites of peacebuilding that have seen extensive international involvement: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. It proposes a novel framework for analysing and approaching transitional justice in peacebuilding that disaggregates three broad sets of actors operating at different levels in relevant processes: external actors (international and regional levels), transitional justice promoters (local, national, international and transnational levels), and transitional regimes (national and local levels). The book argues that transitional justice in peacebuilding must be conceived of as actor-contingent and malleable due to the significance of agency and (inter)actions of key categories of actors throughout peacebuilding transition. This book will be of interest to students and practitioners of transitional justice, peacebuilding, law, and International Relations.

Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United States to win the “hearts and minds” of its populace, undermining the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases, campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency. Ultimately, elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed for counterinsurgency success. Instead, decisions of key actors in government and elites to prioritize either short term personal and political advantage or respect for political institutions held a central role in counterinsurgency success or failure. In each of the four cases in this study, elected governments pursued policies that benefited members of the government and elites at the expense of boarder legitimacy and improved performance. Expectations that democratization could serve as a key instrument of change led to unwarranted optimism about the likely of success and ultimately to flawed strategy. The United States continued to support regimes that continued to lack the legitimacy and government performance needed for victory in counterinsurgency.

America’s Entangling Alliances challenges the belief that the US resists international alliances. By documenting thirty-four alliances—categorized as defense pacts, military coalitions, or security partnerships—Davidson finds that the US demand for allies is best explained by looking at variance in its relative power and the threats it has faced.

This book introduces an innovative theoretical construct of geopsychology to navigate the complex dynamics of international politics in the 21st century. It explains how geopsychology is different from mainstream international relations theories in terms of primary actors, human behavior, spatial application, instruments, and key issues. It argues that peace and stability in the troubled parts of the world warrants an imperative need for understanding psychological dispositions of non-state actors and authoritarian regimes. In The Geopsychology Theory of International Relations in the 21st Century: Escaping the Ignorance Trap, B.M.Jain unfolds that neither a global hegemon nor a cohort of powers could weaken their resolve and break their morale, as proven in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Korea. Importantly, the regional case studies —India and Pakistan in South Asia; North Korea and China in Northeast Asia; and the U.S. involvement in the Middle East — reveal howthe psyche and thought processes of national and regional actors have been the driving force in triggering interstate conflicts and civil wars. The book brilliantly illuminates how America became a conscious victim of the ignorance trap in Asia’s volatile regions. This must book offers easy solutions to complex conflicts to induce a peaceful change in world politics.

In traditional theory of economic crisis, and in all its manifestations, there is no fundamental difference between economic disorder and economic crisis: the two types of economic turmoil are both considered temporary states. This book is a methodical study of deep-seated causes of economic crises. The aim of the book is to explain the key difference between economic disorder and economic crisis. Its key argument is that economic disorder is a permanent condition, whereas economic crises are a series of transitory periods. Economic crises, unlike economic disorders, are acute and frenzied volatilities that are unpredictable and short-lived. Humans cannot survive in a condition of perpetual economic crises but can only accommodate life under unremitting economic disorders. The book also explores the root cause of economic crisis. Unlike the received wisdom in economics, this book looks at the root cause of such hysterical economic turbulences as a result of an innate propensity of human fallibility. The final section of this book looks at the ramifications of this alternative perspective on macroeconomic policy formation and implementation. This book is a major contribution to the literature on economic disorder and crises and will be of great interest to readers of economic theory, philosophy of economics, and the history of economic thought.

This book examines military and civilian actors in international interventions and offers a new analytical framework to apply on such interventions. While it is frequently claimed that success in international interventions hinges largely on military–civilian coherence, cooperation has proven challenging to achieve in practice. This book examines why this is the case, by analysing various approaches employed by military and civilian actors and discussing the different relationships between the intervening actors and those upon whom they have intervened. The work analyses different military concepts, such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, and the often-troubled relationship between the humanitarian and military intervening actors. It presents a new analytical framework to examine these relationships based on identification theory, which illuminates how the interveners represent those they have been deployed to engage, as well as their own identity and role. As such the book offers an enhanced understanding of the challenges related to civil-military cooperation in international interventions, as well as a theoretical contribution to the study of interventions, more generally. This book will be of much interest to students of international interventions, military studies, peacekeeping, security studies and International Relations.