Kant's 'practical philosophy' comprehends a diverse group of his writings on ethics, politics, law, religion, and the philosophy of history and culture. Kristi E. Sweet demonstrates the unity and interdependence of these writings by showing how they take as their animating principle the human desire for what Kant calls the unconditioned - understood in the context of his practical thought as human freedom. She traces the relationship between this desire for freedom and the multiple forms of finitude that confront human beings in different aspects of practical life, and stresses the interdependence of the pursuit of individual moral goodness and the formation of community through the state, religion, culture and history. This study of Kant's approach to practical life discovers that doing our duty, itself the realization of our individual freedom, requires that we set for ourselves and pursue a whole constellation of social, political and other communal ends.

Kant and the Feeling of Life positions Kant's concept of life as a guiding thread for understanding not only Kant's approach to aesthetics and teleology but the underlying unity of the Critique of Judgment itself. The "feeling of life," which Kant describes as affecting us in various ways—as animating, enlivening, and quickening the mind—lies at the heart of Kant's philosophical project, but it has remained understudied for a theme of such centrality. This volume brings together, for the first time, essays focused on the topic of life in Kant's work, providing a wealth of perspectives and analyses ranging from the Critique of Judgment to Kant's early aesthetics, his social and political philosophy, his work connected to the body and health, and his moral theory.

A milestone in Kant scholarship, this interpretation of his critical philosophy makes sense of his notorious 'synthetic judgments a priori'.

Recent interpreters of Kant's philosophy and contemporary advocates of broadly neo-Kantian views generally minimize the importance of Kant's metaphysical beliefs. This volume re-evaluates these minimizing approaches with particular reference to Kant's moral philosophy, exploring Kantian positions on such topics as moral corruption, the relation between God and ethics, the metaphysics of human freedom, and the possibility of knowledge of God. This volume is the first to place these topics within the context of the Critical philosophy as a whole, encouraging not only a more metaphysical, but also a more holistic reading of Kant.

In a short chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason entitled “On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgment,” Kant addresses a crucial problem facing his theory of moral judgment: How can we represent the supersensible moral law so as to apply it to actions in the sensible world? Despite its importance to Kant's project, previous studies of the Typic have been fragmentary, disparate, and contradictory. This book provides a detailed commentary on the Typic, elucidating how it enables moral judgment by means of the law of nature, which serves as the 'type', or analogue, of the moral law. In addition, the book situates the Typic, both historically and conceptually, within Kant's theory of symbolic representation. While many commentators have assimilated the Typic to the aesthetic notion of 'symbolic hypotyposis' in the third Critique, the author contends that it has greater continuities with the theoretical notion of 'symbolic anthropomorphism' in the Prolegomena. As the first comprehensive, book-length study of the Typic that critically engages with the secondary literature, this monograph fills an important gap in the research on Kant's ethics and aesthetics and provides a starting point for further inquiry and debate.

Although Kant was involved in the education debates of his time, it is widely held that in his mature philosophical writings he remained silent on the subject. In her groundbreaking Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy, G. Felicitas Munzel finds extant in Kant’s writings the so-called missing critical treatise on education. It appears in the Doctrines of Method with which he concludes each of his major works. In it, Kant identifies the fundamental principles for the cultivation of reason’s judgment when it comes to cognition, beauty, nature, and the exercise of morality while subject to the passions and inclinations that characterize the human experience. From her analysis, Munzel extrapolates principles for a cosmopolitan education that parallels the structure of Kant’s republican constitution for perpetual peace. With the formal principles in place, the argument concludes with a query of the material principles that would fulfill the formal conditions required for an education for freedom.

This is the first book-length study in any language to examine in detail and critically assess the second part of Kant's ethics--an empirical, impure part, which determines how best to apply pure principles to the human situation. Drawing attention to Kant's under-explored impure ethics, this revealing investigation refutes the common and long-standing misperception that Kants ethics advocates empty formalism. Making detailed use of a variety of Kantian texts never before translated into English, author Robert B. Louden reassesses the strengths and weaknesses of Kantian ethics as a whole, once the second part is re-admitted to its rightful place within Kant's practical philosophy.

This book addresses the topic of 'being bound' from a philosophical and a sociological perspective. It examines several ways in which we are bound. We are bound to acknowledge the truth and to follow laws; we are bound to others and to the world. Who we are is partly defined by those bonds, regardless of whether we live up to them – or even of whether we acknowledge them. Puzzling questions arise from the fact that we are bound, such as: How are those bonds binding? Wherein lies their normative character? A venerable philosophical tradition, particularly since Kant, has provided an account of normativity that crucially appeals to such notions as “self-legislation.” But can our normative bonds be properly understood in these essentially first-personal terms? Many argue that our social condition resists any account of those bonds that fails to acknowledge the perspectives of the second and the third person. The first part of the book explores these themes from a historical perspective in the tradition of transcendental philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger); it examines the phenomenon of “being bound”, i.e., why and how we are bound. The second part of the book offers a sociological analysis of social bonds that is both historical and systematic. Based on sociological approaches to “solidarity” and “reflexivity”, it explores the way in which the phenomenon of “being bound” manifests through the concept of a “social relation”.

Karl Ameriks here collects his most important essays to provide a uniquely detailed and up-to-date analysis of Kant's main arguments in all three major areas of his work: theoretical philosophy (Critique of Pure Reason), practical philosophy (Critique of Practical Reason), and aesthetics (Critique of Judgment). A substantial, specially written introduction sets out common themes in the structure and interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy. The first part of the book includes several of the author's well-known essays on the Critique of Pure Reason , emphasizing Kant's central theoretical notions of a transcendental deduction and transcendental idealism, and providing an extensive review of recent English and German scholarship in this area. Part II includes new discussions of the Critique of Practical Reason and its relation to Kant's other main work in moral theory, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Part III focuses on taste and the Critique of Judgment, and on the controversial hypothesis that even in this area Kant's position is fundamentally objective and conceptual. This collection has two distinctive characteristics. First, it demonstrates in detail how, for understanding the basic structure of any one of Kant's Critiques, it is extremely important and helpful to keep in mind its logical and historical relation to Kant's other Critiques - and hence to track the parallels and differences between theoretical, practical, and aesthetic forms of judgment and reason. Secondly, the book makes interpretation itself a central issue. That is, not only does it offer a series of interrelated interpretations of Kant's main works, along with a detailed comparison and assessment of other interpretations, but it also argues that the difficulty of interpretation is itself a central feature of the Critical philosophy, and that the difficulties of that philosophy have become paradigmatic for modern philosophy in general. Interpreting Kant's Critiques complements and extends the arguments of the author's earlier books, Kant's Theory of Mind and Kant and the Fate of Autonomy. It will find a wide readership not just amongst Kant specialists but among the many philosophers following in his footsteps.

Hope is understood to be a significant part of human experience, including for motivating behaviour, promoting happiness, and justifying a conception of the self as having agency. Yet substantial gaps remain regarding the development of the concept of hope in the history of philosophy. This collection addresses this gap by reconstructing and analysing a variety of approaches to hope in late 18th- and 19th-century German philosophy. In 1781, Kant's idea of a “rational hope” shifted the terms of discussion about hope and its role for human self-understanding. In the 19th century, a wide-ranging debate over the meaning and function of hope emerged in response to his work. Drawing on expertise from a diverse group of contributors, this collection explores perspectives on hope from Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, J. S. Beck, J. C. Hoffbauer, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Georg Friedrich Creuzer, Kierkegaard and others. Chapters consider different aspects of the concept of hope, including the rationality of hope, appropriate and inappropriate applications of hope and the function of hope in relation to religion and society. The result is a valuable collection covering a century of the role of hope in shaping cognitive attitudes and constructing social, political and moral communities. As an overview of philosophical approaches to hope during this period, including by philosophers who are seldom studied today, the collection constitutes a valuable resource for exploring the development of this important concept in post-Kantian German philosophy.