A milestone in Kant scholarship, this interpretation of his critical philosophy makes sense of his notorious 'synthetic judgments a priori'.

Using newly translated papers and some of the best extant writings on Kelsen's theory, this volume covers topics including competing ideas on the nature of law, legal validity, legal powers and the unity of municipal and international law.

Nearly all philosophers refer to Kant when debating the concept of dignity, and many approve of Kant’s conception, unaware of the tensions between Kant’s conception and the modern idea of dignity intimately connected to the idea of human rights. What exactly is Kant's conception of dignity? Is there a connecting tie between dignity and the legal sphere of human rights at all? Does Kant’s concept refer to a superior status human beings seem to own in comparison to non-rational beings? Or does it refer to an absolute value? The contributions of this volume are organised in five broader topics. In the first section tensions within the Kantian conception of dignity are discussed (C. Horn, D. Birnbacher, G. Schönrich). The second group of articles illuminates the intimate connections between dignity and human rights (R. Mosayebi, M. Kettner). The third group discusses the prevailing moral conception of dignity (S. Yamatsuta, S. Shell, O. Sensen). The fourth group focuses on the relation of dignity and end in itself (T. Hill, D. Sturma, A. Wood). The central theme of the fifth group of contributions are the social, political, and cultural dimensions of dignity (Y. Kato, K. Ameriks, K. Flikschuh, T. Saito).

It was not so long ago that the dominant picture of Kant’s practical philosophy was formalistic, focusing almost exclusively on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. However, the overall picture of Kant’s wide-ranging philosophy has since been broadened and deepened. We now have a much more complete understanding of the range of Kant’s practical interests and of his contributions to areas as diverse as anthropology, pedagogy, and legal theory. What remains somewhat obscure, however, is how these different contributions hang together in the way that Kant suggests that they must. This book explores these different conceptions of humanity, morality, and legality in Kant as main ‘manifestations’ or ‘dimensions’ of practical normativity. These interrelated terms play a crucial role in highlighting different rational obligations, their source(s), and their applicability in the face of changing circumstances.

What defines the social practices we currently call norms? They make theft forbidden, eating with a fork advisable, and paintings beautiful. Norms are commonly thought of as moral justifications for doing one thing and not doing another. They are also described in terms of their outcomes or effects, serving as mere causal explanations. The Possibility of Norms proposes a broader view of how norms function, how they are articulated, and how they are realized. It may be asking too much if we expect norms to be effective or morally right. Many norms are simply ineffective and many are at most ineffectively justifiable. Drawing upon a rich array of texts - from law and jurisprudence to philosophy, aesthetics, and the social sciences - Möllers argues for conceiving of social norms as positively marked possibilities. Positively marking a possibility indicates that it should be realized. Normativity thus hinges on judging the world from a distance and acknowledging the possibility of divergent states of the world. Hence, it is no longer theoretically problematic that there are morally unjustified norms, nor that norms can be broken. On the contrary, allowing for breaches may be an important feature of normativity. Möllers's conceptual study sheds new light on a range of paradigms in the humanities, social sciences, and cultural studies, reframing several aspects of norm theory and questioning the theoretical assumptions underlying existing empirical work on normativity.

Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays written by leading scholars define and assess this new approach in ethics, addressing such questions as the nature of constructivism, how constructivism improves our understanding of moral obligations, how it accounts for the development of normative practices, whether moral truths change over time, and many other topics. The volume will be valuable for advanced students and scholars of ethics and all who are interested in questions about the foundation of morality.

An important new monograph on an overlooked aspect of Kant's aesthetic theory, presenting an innovative approach to one of modern philosophy's greatest works.

Humans are justificatory beingsthey offer, demand, and require justifications. The rules and institutions they follow rest on justification narratives that have evolved over time and, taken together, constitute a dynamic and tension-laden normative order. In this collection of essays, the first translation into English of the ground-breaking Normativität und Macht (Suhrkamp 2015), Rainer Forst presents a new approach to critical theory. Each essay reflects on the basic principles that guide our normative thinking. Forst's argument goes beyond 'ideal' and 'realist' theories and shows how closely the concepts of normativity and power are interrelated, and how power rests on the capacity to influence, determine, and possibly restrict the space of justifications for others. By combining insights from the disciplines of philosophy, history, and the social sciences, Forst re-evaluates theories of justice, as well as of power, and provides the tools for a critical theory of relations of justification.

A major new study of Kant's ethics.

This book offers an array of important perspectives on Kant and nonconceptualism from some of the leading scholars in current Kant studies. As well as discussing the various arguments surrounding Kantian nonconceptualism, the book provides broad insight into the theory of perception, philosophy of mind, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, and aesthetics. His idealism aside, Kantian nonconceptualism is the most topical contemporary issue in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. In this collection of specially commissioned essays, major players in the current debate, including Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, engage with each other and with the broader literature in the field addressing all the important aspects of Kantian nonconceptualism. Among other topics, the authors analyse the notion of intuition and the conditions of its generation, Kant’s theory of space, including his pre-Critical view of space, the relation between nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction, and various challenges to both conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpretations of Kant. Two further chapters explore a prominent Hegelian conceptualist reading of Kant and Kant’s nonconceptualist position in the Third Critique. The volume also contains a helpful survey of the recent literature on Kant and nonconceptual content. Kantian Nonconceptualism provides a comprehensive overview of recent perspectives on Kant and nonconceptual content, and will be a key resource for Kant scholars and philosophers interested in the topic of nonconceptualism.