In late 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments unveiled the Merida Initiative. A 3-year, $1.4 billion counternarcotics assistance program, the Merida Initiative is designed to combat the drug-fueled violence that has ravaged Mexico of late. The initiative aims to strengthen the Mexican police and military, permitting them to take the offensive in the fight against Mexico's powerful cartels. As currently designed, however, the Merida Initiative is unlikely to have a meaningful, long-term impact in restraining the drug trade and drug-related violence. Focussing largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction issues, it pays comparatively little attention to the deeper structural problems that fuel these destructive phenomena. These problems, ranging from official corruption to U.S. domestic drug consumption, have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to rein in the cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative as well.

Since 2006, Mexico has rapidly climbed the list of potential trouble spots for U.S. policymakers. Public security in that country has deteriorated dramatically of late. Drug-fueled violence has caused thousands of deaths, taken a severe psychological toll on the citizenry, and, in the estimation of some observers, brought Mexico to the edge of the failed-state precipice. This rapidly unraveling situation has hardly gone unnoticed in Washington. U.S. officials recently unveiled the so-called "Merida Initiative," a multiyear counterdrug program designed to help the Mexican government turn the tide in its fight against the cartels. As Hal Brands argues in this monograph, however, the Merida Initiative may not represent an optimal solution to the current crisis. It focuses largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction issues, paying less attention to the deeper problems that abet the drug trade and its devastating consequences. These problems include official corruption; U.S. domestic drug consumption; and a host of economic, social, and political questions. If left unaddressed, these ancillary issues will likely frustrate even a counterdrug program as ambitious and well-intended as the Merida Initiative. To make U.S. counternarcotics strategy fully effective, Brands argues, the United States must forge a more creative and encompassing approach to the drug trade. This strategy should combine interdiction and enforcement initiatives with a wide array of social, economic, political, and U.S. domestic programs, so as to create a broad, interlocking effort that attacks the drug trade from all sides. Forging such a strategy will not be easy, Brands warns, but is nonetheless central to addressing successfully the growing crisis in Mexico and meeting the broader challenges of counterdrug policy.The Merida Initiative is representative of the supply side approach to the narcotics trade that has long characterized U.S. drug control policy. It emphasizes interdiction, enforcement, and security measures, with domestic treatment and prevention programs, source-country economic development projects, and other alternative strategies assuming considerably less importance. This strategy is broadly similar to the approach used in Plan Colombia, the multi-billion dollar U.S. counter narcotics and counterinsurgency commitment to that country, and was recently reaffirmed in the 2008 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy. Unfortunately, this approach to the drug trade is unlikely to achieve the desired results in Mexico. In focusing largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction, the Merida Initiative pays comparatively vi little attention to the deeper structural problems that fuel the drug trade and drug-related violence. These problems, ranging from official corruption in Mexico to large-scale drug consumption in the United States, have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to rein in the cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative as well. For the Merida Initiative to be fully successful, the United States must therefore forge a more holistic, better-integrated approach to the drug trade. This strategy should aim not simply at strengthening the forces of order in Mexico, but also at addressing the root issues that the Merida Initiative comparatively slights. It should partner enforcement and interdiction programs with a wide range of measures: anticorruption initiatives, social and economic development, institution-building, and efforts to restrict U.S. domestic demand and illicit arms trafficking into Mexico. Implementing such a strategy will not be easy, but it will be central to improving U.S. counternarcotics policy and ensuring that the Merida Initiative is more than a mere palliative for the problems associated with the Mexican drug trade.

Over 3,100 total pages ... CONTENTS: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype? Crossing Our Red Lines About Partner Engagement in Mexico Two Faces of Attrition: Analysis of a Mismatched Strategy against Mexican and Central American Drug Traffickers Combating Drug Trafficking: Variation in the United States' Military Cooperation with Colombia and Mexico Ungoverned Spaces in Mexico: Autodefensas, Failed States, and the War on Drugs in Michoacan U.S. SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TWO WARS: OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND THE WAR ON DRUGS WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE WAR ON DRUGS? AN ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO’S COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY THE DIVERSIFICATION OF MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ITS EFFECTS ON SPILLOVER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations: Matching Strategy to Threat THE IMPACTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON CITIZEN SECURITY BEHAVIOR IN MEXICO Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Strategies and Metrics for the Threat Beyond Merida: A Cooperative Counternarcotics Strategy for the 21st Century MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, A NEW ALLIANCE? THE EFFECTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF MEXICAN DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS (DTOs) DRUG TRAFFICKING AND POLICE CORRUPTION: A COMPARISON OF COLOMBIA AND MEXICO CRISIS IN MEXICO: ASSESSING THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND ITS IMPACT ON US-MEXICAN SECURITY BORDER SECURITY: IS IT ACHIEVABLE ON THE RIO GRANDE? Borders and Borderlands in the Americas PREVENTING BULK CASH AND WEAPONS SMUGGLING INTO MEXICO: ESTABLISHING AN OUTBOUND POLICY ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER FOR CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTON DRUG TRAFFICKING WITHIN MEXICO: A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE OR INSURGENCY? USSOCOM’s Role in Addressing Human Trafficking Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence National Security Threats at the U.S.-Mexico Border Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America COCAINE TRAFFICKING THROUGH WEST AFRICA: THE HYBRIDIZED ILLICIT NETWORK AS AN EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL THREAT ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN MEXICO, 1999-2002 Is the Narco-violence in Mexico an Insurgency? THE USE OF TERRORISM BY DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS’ PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN MEXICO An Approach to the 40-Year Drug War EXPLOITING WEAKNESSES: AN APPROACH TO COUNTER CARTEL STRATEGY MEXICO AND THE COCAINE EPIDEMIC: THE NEW COLOMBIA OR A NEW PROBLEM? EXPLAINING VARIATION IN THE APPREHENSION OF MEXICAN DRUG TRAFFICKING CARTEL LEADERS Drug Cartels and Gangs in Mexico and Central America: A View through the Lens of Counterinsurgency The COIN Approach to Mexican Drug Cartels: Square Peg in a Round Hole Counterinsurgency and the Mexican Drug War THE UNTOLD STORY OF MEXICO’S RISE AND EVENTUAL MONOPOLY OF THE METHAMPHETAMINE TRADE Competing with the Cartels: How Mexico's Government Can Reduce Organized Crime's Economic Grip on its People FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN MEXICO: LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA Defeating Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: The Range of Military Operations in Mexico Drug Trafficking as a Lethal Regional Threat in Central America What Explains the Patterns of Diversification in Drug Trafficking Organizations Evaluating the Impact of Drug Trafficking Organizations on the Stability of the Mexican State

Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared war on the drug cartels in Dec. 2006, more than 35,000 Mexicans have died due to narco-violence. This monograph examines whether the various Mexican drug trafficking organizations are insurgents or organized criminal elements. Mexican narco-violence and its affiliated gang violence have spread across Mexico’s southern border into Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Additionally, the narco-violence is already responsible for the deaths of American citizens on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, and the potential for increased spillover violence is a major concern. This monograph argues that the Mexican drug cartels are transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that pose a national security threat to the regional state actors; however, they are not an insurgency for four reasons. First, none of the cartels have the political aim or capability to overthrow the Mexican government. Second, the various TCOs are competing criminal organizations with approximately 90 percent of the violence being cartel on cartel. For example, the violence in the city of Juárez is largely the result of the fighting between the local Juárez cartel and the Sinaloa cartel for control of one of the primary smuggling routes into the U.S.. Third, the cartels’ use of violence and coercion has turned popular support against them thus denying them legitimacy. Fourth, although the cartels do control zones of impunity within their areas of influence, the Mexican government has captured, killed, and extradited kingpins from every major TCO.

Concerns over the changing nature of gangs and cartels and their relationships to states in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has resulted in the emergence of a scholarly body of work focused on their national security threat potentials. This body of work, utilizing the third generation gangs and third phase cartel typologies, represents an alternative to traditional gang and organized crime research and one that is increasingly influencing the US defense community. Rather than being viewed only as misguided youth and opportunistic criminals or, in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social or political agendas, more evolved gangs and cartels, are instead seen as developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capacities. This evolutionary process has emerged due to the growing illicit economy and other unintended consequences of globalization.This important anthology of writings by Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan draws upon a collection of their works from the mid-1990s to the present with the addition of new essays written specifically for this publication. The work will be of great interest to academics and students in the fields of political science and criminal justice and to military, law enforcement, and governmental professionals and policy makers.This book is a collection of new and previously published works from a variety of publications, a full list of which is on the Citation Information page.

This new handbook provides a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an-up-to date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and counter-insurgencies. In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is available in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study and research. In order to contain this wide-ranging topic within an accessible and informative framework, the Editors have divided the text into three key parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues Part II: Insurgent Movements Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be of great interest to all students of insurgency and small wars, terrorism/counter-terrorism, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general, as well as professional military colleges and policymakers.

Mexican drug networks are large and violent, engaging in activities like the trafficking of narcotics, money laundering, extortion, kidnapping, and mass murder. Despite the impact of these activities in Mexico and abroad, these illicit networks are remarkably resilient to state intervention. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and interviews with US and Mexican law enforcement, government officials, organized crime victims, and criminals, Nathan P. Jones examines the comparative resilience of two basic types of drug networks—“territorial” and “transactional”—that are differentiated by their business strategies and provoke wildly different responses from the state. Transactional networks focus on trafficking and are more likely to collude with the state through corruption, while territorial networks that seek to control territory for the purpose of taxation, extortion, and their own security often trigger a strong backlash from the state. Timely and authoritative, Mexico's Illicit Drug Networks and the State Reaction provides crucial insight into why Mexico targets some drug networks over others, reassesses the impact of the war on drugs, and proposes new solutions for weak states in their battles with drug networks.

Now in its sixth year, the conflict in Mexico is a mosaic of several wars occurring at once: cartels battle one another, cartels suffer violence within their own organizations, cartels fight against the Mexican state, cartels and gangs wage war against the Mexican people, and gangs combat gangs. The war has killed more than 60,000 people since President Felipe Calderón began cracking down on the cartels in December 2006. The targets of the violence have been wide ranging--from police officers to journalists, from clinics to discos. Governments on either side of the U.S.- Mexican border have been unable to control the violence. The war has spilled over into American cities and affects domestic policy issues ranging from immigration to gun control, making the border the nexus of national security and public safety concerns. Drawing on fieldwork along the border and interviews with officials at the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Department of Defense, U.S. Border Patrol, and Mexican military officers, Paul Rexton Kan argues that policy responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent stoking more cartel violence, to cut the incentives to smuggle drugs into the United States, and to stop the erosion of Mexican governmental capacity.