Having escaped the disaster of the Russian campaign of 1812, Napoleon set out to defeat a coalition of epic proportions, who had coalesced to change the French preponderance of power on the Continent. Leaving his stepson Eugène with the shattered remnants of the Grande Armée in northern Germany, Napoleon’s great organisation skills would be used to the full to replace his depleted ranks. Short of cavalry, to scout and follow up any victory and with in-experienced troops, Napoleon struck at the Allied armies with vigour and energy, not wholly seconded by his subordinates. The battles of Lützen and Bautzen proved that he had the will and drive to beat his opponents, but time was running out. As losses mounted, including Grand Marshal of the Palace Duroc and Marshal Bessières, Napoleon could not hope to be everywhere at once. Oudinot was beaten at Gross-Beeren, Vandamme was destroyed at Kulm, Macdonald defeated on the Katzbach and Ney at Dennewitz, the hopes of the French were also brutally dashed by the Austrians joining the ranks of their enemies. The dénouement would be the largest battle known to man at that point in history, fought over three days the battle of Leipzig was rightly known as the “Battle of Nations”, two thousand cannon and nearly six hundred thousand men would pound, charge, fire, and die to change the face of Europe. Continuing on in the series of books, after Napoleon and the Archduke Charles, Petre’s monumental summation of the 1813 campaigns in Germany is still relevant fresh and excellently researched, balanced. Author – Francis Lorraine Petre OBE - (1852–1925)

In this “engrossing,” (The New Yorker) vivid, and intensively researched volume, esteemed Napoleon scholar David Chandler outlines the military strategy that led the famous French emperor to his greatest victories—and to his ultimate downfall. Napoleonic war was nothing if not complex—an ever-shifting kaleidoscope of moves and intentions, which by themselves went a long way towards baffling and dazing his conventionally minded opponents into that state of disconcerting moral disequilibrium which so often resulted in their catastrophic defeat. The Campaigns of Napoleon is a masterful analysis and insightful critique of Napoleon's art of war as he himself developed and perfected it in the major military campaigns of his career. Napoleon disavowed any suggestion that he worked from formula (“Je n'ai jamais eu un plan d'opérations”), but military historian David Chandler demonstrates this was at best only a half-truth. To be sure, every operation Napoleon conducted contained unique improvisatory features. But there were from the first to the last certain basic principles of strategic maneuver and battlefield planning that he almost invariably put into practice. To clarify these underlying methods, as well as the style of Napoleon's fabulous intellect, Chandler examines in detail each campaign mounted and personally conducted by Napoleon, analyzing the strategies employed, revealing wherever possible the probable sources of his subject's military ideas. “Writing clearly and vividly, [Chandler] turns dozens of persons besides Napoleon from mere wooden soldiers into three- dimensional characters” (The Boston Globe) and this definitive work is “a fine book for the historian, the student, and the intelligent reader” (The New York Review of Books).

(Volume 2) "The first comprehensive history of the decisive Fall Campaign of 1813, which determined control of Central Europe following Napoleon's catastrophic defeat in Russia the previous year. Using German, French, British, Russian, Austrian and Swedish sources, Michael V. Leggiere provides a panoramic history which covers the full sweep of the struggle in Germany. He shows how Prussia, the weakest of the Great Powers, led the struggle against Napoleon and his empire. By reconstructing the principal campaigns and operations in Germany, the book reveals how the defeat of Napoleon in Germany was made possible by Prussian victories. In particular, it features detailed analysis of the strategy, military operations, and battles in Germany that culminated with the epic four-day Battle of Nations at Leipzig and Napoleon's retreat to France. This study not only highlights the breakdown of Napoleon's strategy in 1813, but constitutes a fascinating study in coalition warfare, international relations, and civil-military relations."--Provided by publisher.

It seemed that whenever Mussolini acted on his own, it was bad news for Hitler. Indeed, the Fuhrer's relations with his Axis partners were fraught with an almost total lack of coordination. Compared to the Allies, the coalition was hardly an alliance at all. Focusing on Germany's military relations with Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, Richard DiNardo unearths a wealth of information that reveals how the Axis coalition largely undermined Hitler's objectives from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, Mediterranean, and North Africa. DiNardo argues that the Axis military alliance was doomed from the beginning by a lack of common war aims, the absence of a unified command structure, and each nation's fundamental mistrust of the others. Germany was disinclined to make the kinds of compromises that successful wartime partnerships demanded and, because Hitler insisted on separate pacts with each nation, Italy and Finland often found themselves conducting counterproductive parallel wars on their own. DiNardo's detailed assessments of ground, naval, and air operations reveal precisely why the Axis allies were so dysfunctional as a collective force, sometimes for seemingly mundane but vital reasons-a shortage of interpreters, for example. His analysis covers coalition warfare at every level, demonstrating that some military services were better at working with their allies than others, while also pointing to rare successes, such as Rommel's effective coordination with Italian forces in North Africa. In the end, while some individual Axis units fought with distinction—if not on a par with the vaunted Wehrmacht—and helped Germany achieve some of its military aims, the coalition's overall military performance was riddled with disappointments. Breaking new ground, DiNardo's work enlarges our understanding of Germany's defeat while at the same time offering a timely reminder of the challenges presented by coalition warfare.

At a time when Napoleon needed all his forces to reassert French dominance in Central Europe, why did he fixate on the Prussian capital of Berlin? Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive showdown with the enemy, he repeatedly detached large numbers of troops, under ineffective commanders, toward the capture of Berlin. In Napoleon and Berlin, Michael V. Leggiere explores Napoleon’s almost obsessive desire to capture Berlin and how this strategy ultimately lost him all of Germany. Napoleon’s motives have remained a subject of controversy from his own day until ours. He may have hoped to deliver a tremendous blow to Prussia’s war-making capacity and morale. Ironically, the heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French left Napoleon’s Grande Armee vulnerable to an Allied coalition that eventually drove Napoleon from Central Europe forever.

In Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, the leading scholars of Napoleonic military history provide the most authoritative analysis of Napoleon’s battlefield success and ultimate failure. Napoleon’s development and mastery of the operational art of warfare is revealed as each chapter analyzes one Napoleonic war or major campaign of a war. To achieve this, the essays conform to the common themes of Napoleon’s planning, his command and control, his execution of plans, and the response of his adversaries. Napoleon's sea power and the British response to the French challenge at sea is also investigated. Overall, this volume reflects the finest scholarship and cutting-edge research to be found in Napoleonic Military History. Contributors include Jonathan Abel, Robert M. Citino, Huw Davies, Mark T. Gerges; John H. Gill; Jordan Hayworth, Kenneth G. Johnson, Michael V. Leggiere, Kevin D. McCranie, Alexander Mikaberidze, Frederick C. Schneid, John Severn, Dennis Showalter, Geoffrey Wawro, and John F. Weinzierl.

On April 20, 1814, after a dizzying series of battles, campaigns, and diplomatic intrigues, a defeated Napoleon Bonaparte made his farewell speech to the Old Guard in the courtyard of the Chateau de Fontainebleau and set off for exile on the island of Elba. Napoleonic legend asserts that the Emperor was brought down by foreign powers determined to destroy him and discredit his achievements, with the aid of highly placed domestic traitors. Others argue that once Napoleon's military defeats began in 1812, his fall became inevitable. But in fact, as Munro Price shows in this brilliant new book, Napoleon's fall could have been avoided altogether. Exploring a critical and often neglected period of Napoleonic history between 1812 and 1814, Napoleon: The End of Glory offers a more complete picture of the Emperor's decline and fall than any previous work. Price analyzes the political, military, and diplomatic events of the period, from Napoleon's disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812 to the multiple failed attempts by Austria to broker peace. He illuminates the dynamic relationships between Napoleon and the wily Austrian foreign minister Metternich-whose desire for equilibrium within the European states system clashed with Napoleon's unshakeable belief in hegemony and subjection-and the charming and enigmatic Alexander I of Russia. And he explores the lasting impact of the bloody Terror of the French Revolution on Napoleon's decisions once he came to power. Rejecting the assumption that defeat was unavoidable, Price considers instead why Napoleon failed to explore a compromise peace that could have allowed him to keep his crown, arguing that the answer to this question has powerful implications for our understanding of the Napoleonic wars. Ultimately, Price provides a convincing portrait of the Emperor's decline, exposing his blindness, intransigence and miscalculations; his preference for war and his declining ability to wage it; and his nearly pathological fear of a dishonorable peace. A deeply researched study of the moment of a great man's fall, Napoleon: The End of Glory forces us to reconsider Napoleon's character, motives, and the reasons for his spectacular failure.

A fascinating and in-depth history of one of the often forgotten wars that Napoleon fought. The campaign for Italy involved French, Prussian, Russian, Swiss and Italian soldiers including mercenaries from every corner of Europe.

Written by experts for use by nonexperts, this monumental work probes Germany's "Genius for War" and the unmistakable pattern of tactical and operational innovation and excellence evident throughout the nation's military history. Despite having the best military forces in the world, some of the most advanced weapons available, and unparalleled tactical proficiency, Germany still lost both World Wars. This landmark, four-volume encyclopedia explores how and why that happened, at the same time examining Germany as a military power from the start of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 to the present day. Coverage includes the Federal Republic of Germany, its predecessor states, and the kingdoms and principalities that combined to form Imperial Germany in 1871. The Seven Years' War is discussed, as are the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars of German Unification (including the Franco-Prussian War), World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. In all, more than 1,000 entries illuminate battles, organizations, leaders, armies, weapons, and other aspects of war and military life. The most comprehensive overview of German military history ever to appear in English, this work will enable students and others interested in military history to better understand the sociopolitical history of Germany, the complex role conflict has played in the nation throughout its history, and why Germany continues to be an important player on the European continent.